Francesco Guicciardini: Mirror of Cinquecento Disillusionment by Kucera, Rita
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
1964
Francesco Guicciardini: Mirror of Cinquecento
Disillusionment
Rita Kucera
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
Copyright © 1964 Rita Kucera
Recommended Citation
Kucera, Rita, "Francesco Guicciardini: Mirror of Cinquecento Disillusionment" (1964). Dissertations. Paper 772.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/772
FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI * 
MIRROR CF Cl~tJECENTO 
DISIl.LUSIONMENT 
by 
Rita Charlotte Kucera 
A Dissertation Subd tted to the Facul t7 of the Graduate SChool 
of Lc101a Un1ve:ra1ty 1n Partial. FuU1l.l.ment ot 
the Requirements tor the Degree of 
Doctor ot PhUoaopb;v' 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Rita Charlotte Kucera was born in Berwyn, nlinois, on November 4, 
1931. 
She was graduated from Nazareth Academy, La Grange, Ill1no1a, in 
June,1949. She reoeived her Bachelor of Arts Honore degree from Mundelein 
College in June, 19,3, and her Master of Arts de ... tram LOl'Ola University in 
June, 19$$. 
The author taught at the Indiana University Oary Center hom 19$7 to 
1959 and lectured at Loyola University at various times from 1958 to 1961J. At 
the present time, she is assistant prot •• sor of history at Chicago Teachers 
College SOUth. 
11 
'1'ABL~;' OF CONTE!I.'TS 
Chapter Page 
I • INTRODiJC TI ON • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1 
Italian genius in the Quattroeento-underlying poll tical 
weaknea8es-F.tfect of econoaic cbanges-other external. factors 
atfect1ng ltalT--Coneem ot Rewsance Utera17 men and 
political th1nken tor the condition ot their 8Oclet1'-
Character of the national. states-Politics of the lt~f,lan 
statea-Invuion of Char1 .. IDI-The five major states ot 
Italy-Rome and the papacy-Reactiona of Ouicc18l"d1m -Various 
judgments on OUicciard1ni as an h1storian-COJlp8.r1son vi th 
Fh1l1p de Comminea-Stor1& d.Ital.1a....ouicc1ard:1n1 on variable 
factors in hiato17 ana on it. e •• enU.al un1t:r-Interrelation-
ship ot the diplomatic and historical careers of 
Ou1cc1ardini~'1achiaYelli' s tr1bu:te-compariaon between the two 
men....character of Oui ec1ardin1 as a late Renai.sance th1nker-
Purpose of th1. invelUgation-orpniaation of it. reault.. 
II. GUICCIARDnlI AND THE ITALIAN POLITICAL SCENE • • • • • • • • • 
Importance ot Oulcclardin1 t. pol1. tIcal analysis tor .. study 
of his di11llusiOllll8nt-.H18 companIOn of the peninBula in 
1454 and 1494-lfactors accaunt1ng for the changea there-
Princely eeltiahness and opportuzd. .. -Intemal dlvi8101l8 and 
discord-Role of todovico U Moro-'l'he French and the 
NeapoU.tana-Ital.1an demoralizaUon-Open:1.rlg ot the way for 
other foreign powers 1n Italy-au1cciardin1 ta vi_ on 
Venice-Bignificance ot 1S08 and lS09-Eftects of 
Ou1cciard1n:1 '. Span1eh reSidence on his political and m1l1tU'.Y 
outlook-The mU.1 tary preblem--cbange8 in l.$l6-the e1 tuat10n 
In 1521...."Apparent wisdom of anti-imperial1at &lUance in 1525-
Ou1cc1ardini t • lnc1sive obaervationa on the faults of the 
League of Cognac-Its maD7 problema-Actiona of Machiavelli 
and Gu1.eciardird. in behalf of the League-.-Queation of MUan-
Shitting poliq of Alfonso dtEate-The bitter ;year 1.521--
Guicciardin1 'I companIOn between the Spard.sh and the Italian 
experience vi th foreign conquerore-Fall of the VariOUB Itallan 
units-Isolation and fall of Florence....summa.-y ot reaBona for 
Ouicciardini's political despair. 
i11 
Chapter Page 
nI. 'l'HE PAPAL INCUM3EN!S (1492-152) AND THE BASES or 
TEEIR POLITICS • • • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • •• 8) 
Papal. act1v1. tl88 in e1xtaent.h-eentUl",Y biato17-
Papal. role in the W.at-Bpeoial problema o£ the 
Renaillaanoe papacy-Iv ettorta to .tab:U1ae 
control in t.he papal .tatea-oppoa1. t10Da to papal 
authorltT by foreign dJDuU_, ndottier1 
oODOilJ.uo1.a and Oalll I. ears 0VtIi" 
cl.a1mt of Oharlea V-rla ... 1 V for papal teJJJporal 
authorlty-Otd.oclartUn1'. orlteria tor an. etteotift 
papal peUC1'-Pel1cy of Al.Itxancler n-cea.ve Borgta-
Pol1q of lull_ II towrd8 the great ponra, 
Altanao d''',- and the oo~l1C7' of r.o x-
Probte. of V8Id.ce-Critioal. _tuN of the ,..&1'8 iSlA 
to lS11-Fami17 ubi tlema of tao X......tl1. appetite tor 
Floftnae and hrrua-Modana-Papal teap Ofti' the 
bIper1al .Ucoeutcm-NeCfMlaltq of papal Men.dah1p for 
Chal'le. V and Franc18 I in lS21....outeciud1ni em the 
1Devitably ot the Habab1.U'g-Valo1e claah-Leo'. treatT 
v1 th Franoia in 1$21, then h1s volt. face and 
coop8N.tion vS.\h the E~ai2"'lap1ee­
Vi.oeJ'oy ot Naples and the V1Hoa of a ~ 
accol'd-Role of the M .. .....au1cciard1n1 'a .1uclgment of 
IAto's obaraoter-H1a relat4.em to O1uU.o de' Madici-
E1ec\10D of Adrian VI~ in Ito.. rAdrian'. 
relat1oDabS.p with AUonso-m.. eltOl"'te tor peaoe-Ifl. 
death aDd renewed diff1cult!. 111 the papal atatu-
Prob~ ot the pope. on the 100&1 and the European 
acene. 
IV. THE BASES or PAPAL POLITICS. OIEl€NT m ••••••••• 
Intefttelattonship between do_tic and fore1cn problema 
in the pontU'lcate of Cle_nt vn~laDat4on ot hiI 
poliq in OuiooiardW', pol1t1oaJ. tftete-C1_='. 
1rTeaolu\ton &lUI oontllotlng vi_ of h18 advi ..... -
S1gn:t.ticanoe of the League of Copao-Pol1q cI1eagree-
menw after _ok of ao.-Guiccd.udtD1'. n_ OIl tM 
~ and OIl the neoeN1t7 of papal l.eadeNh1.,..H.ts 
political wrlt1nga, lS2$-JO-His criteria for papal 
act10n-0rcnmde tor undel"taJd.. war ap1ut tbe 
Emperor-App11oatton to caaa of CleJlll'lt aDd Oharl •• -
Nece8l1 t7 for caution-Methods of Charlea to d1Id.n1eh 
papal potMr-Guioaiard1n1' a adv:lce to Cl.eMnt-H1.s law 
justification for h1a advice and tor papal polioies 
~"'r1ter1a tor entering an.:r war-Practioal prob18ll8 
of the aU1 .. in ca"1(1ng on the ..,...Nec.as1t7 of 
a deter.ined papal pol1cy .. ..atrong bJperlal power 
after Parta-81gnttioance ot ~h nsov.-Clement •• 
desire to save l"l.orence.....s.arcelona oapitulation-
Papal fear or a Ch'u:reh oouncil-Imperial ola1D!s 
NgardlDg order in Christendom-The LutheftD problem-
Clement ' •• treea on peaoe-Hi8 aplanaUon tor 
engaging in war-Pl.ana tor action qalnst hGretics-
Charlee' continual supp1laaUons in 1$30 arid 1532 tor 
a Counc11-Death or Clement-His deteats of a temporal 
nature ~-'1be1r a1gn11'1cance-uaoc1at1Oft of 
(,:U1ociardiDi with the tailure of Cle_nt and the 
League-lt18 apo1og1a. 
v 
Page 
v. 'l'HF. PROBLEH OF THE rrALIAN' aOVE.ltNMfCN1'S • • • • • • • • • • •• 162 
Scope of the stone fiorent1ne-Relat1onehip to 
Guioc1a.rd1n1 t a poll tical thought-Instab1Ut:r ot 
norent.ine gO'Mrnntnt-c~on with Machiavelll'. 
view on norence-Relation of ita problell to the 
riaing national atatea-VU',11ng remedies of 
Gu1oc1ardin1 and MaohlavelU tor Italian problema-
Ouiociardln1 '. contempt tor the COlftOIl people-Hi. 
praise of torenao de' Medici'. genius ... ruler and 
equil1bratore-Lo2'enzo'a death a tu:m1ng point-
Piere de' Med101-Bavonarola-Retor. in the Gran 
00ns1g11o-Dual basi. of Ouioclard1n1'.. judpeni of 
Sav~ola-6oderinit. republ1o-Ita algu1t1canoe tor 
popular gove!"n1l8nt-Deepening of Floren\1ne cleavages 
in l5U-Medlc1 restoration of lS12-GcmtrrmJ.4mtal 
reforms-Medici pol1CT-The1Jt enetrd. . .....auicoiardini t. 
Spanish td •• lon-Expertent1al buts of his polit1cal 
thought-on origins ot the .tate--Ro1e of the pl"1r1e6t-
B .. t g~nt tor florence cme w!th ottblat1 
predOlld.nanoe. the togroflo discc'Urae-locio-eocmomio-
po11t1cal oharactep of Ou1eo1ard11d. 's tracts-
Arguments of h18 IIOUthpieee ... AdY1ee tor strong Medici 
rule-Leo I and the Madiai regime 1n FloreDce-
D1a1oe-Nece.slV tor strong and stable rule in the 
~fiiiueoento-Gu1oc1ud1n1 '. peaeimi8m regarding 
Florentine tutU'l"e-I~tance ot v1rtd-nOl"9nt1ne 
Chapter 
h1Btor;r 1n late 1$20 r a and l5JO-Gu1cciard1n1 t s 
pflrsonal dlle!1m&--His own poU tical atf'iliation 
baNd. on honor and ambition-Reasons for his later 
career in Medici service. 
VI. THE RELIGION OF GUICCIARDINI • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 215 
VII. 
Importa.'1CG of understanding Gu1cclard1n1-. 
religion-VIews of hie character-Nineteenth-
cent'IU"Y emphasl s-Qpposing judgnsents t hi. 
skeptIc1n vs. h1a stnoere:rellgioalty-
OuicclardWt 8 'rlws of btman nature-Ghurch and 
sacred objeot.a-"Exoeaiw rel1g1on" .... Caxu:roh doctrine-
Miracles an4 portenta-Ouicolardini'. atresa on 
tortuna-v1rtu-H1a historical views in c~aon with 
Me(!leVitwrrtenJ-God, man and to.-VariOUS usag_ 
ot the term fortuna-Meta of 1'0 ~-Ite relation 
to jU8tioe...-Qiii.tlon of htnan 1"'88'pOJ'lBl'hs.l1ty-WroDg-
doing and retribution-ltGaacm ll. gu1c1e for men-
Importance of Indiv1dualln1tiative and expert.no.-
Contrarieties in Gu1.cc1ard1ni· It th1n1d.ng-Ifia oyn1d.8J11 
ragardlng hie:raroh1cal abu8ee~":mpGI'tamQ,!. at 
¥!ttaz1~lt-intereatl di8!i£riOne--seVeti. ty in 
ra-,·. ena.r-ll18cresione as ll'i the Church-
Luther •• relatione with the CUr1a-F:.conomic and pol1t1eal 
reasons tor spread. of Lutberardsna-Orov,tng diversiV in 
Lutheran ranka-Cuioc1ard1ni's attitudes on the rel1gious 
break of the s1xteenth-century. 
COliUtuSION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Tragedy of Ouicciard1n1 and of ltaly-Exper1.ent1al 
bu_ of his pessimism-Hi. real:lsm-Bor&heae 
tradition ot 0u1cc1.ard1D1 in contrast iO riOCfl1aftUt' a 
understanding of the national state approaoh-Rupture 
of the Italian balance-ot -power-OuicQiardin1 's 
strength a.."ld waknea.-Expla."l&tion or his varied 
allegiances-Dasic ooq>a:riscm or the two-Machiavelli 
MOre trul;r the real1st-Florent1De accuaat:tone againat 
Guiooiard1n1-ff18 d",!'\inH-Ult1-.te failure of 111s 
Ifreligion," politics. 
BIBLIOORAPHY • • • • • •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • ,. • • • • • • • 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the (uattrocento the Italian states reached their cultural apex. 
Humanism was in its period of golden splendor as geniuses, under wealthy 
patrons, produced a flow of masterpieces of literature, painting and sculpture 
The men of the Renaissance were not unaware of the er.ochal significance of 
their contributions.l 80th humanists and artists suggested, as Voltaire's 
sentence ran, that Itthe glory of genius belonged then to Italy alone, just as 
it had once been the property of Greece. 2 In modem times, Jacob Burckhardt 
stressed the importance of the Henaiseanee state and the self-interest it bred 
The Italian "rebirth .. was not only a revival of antiquity but it was funda-
mentally the cultural expansion of the Henaissanee Italian, who was in all 
lef. ilallace K. Ferguson, The Renaissanee in Historical Thousht (hoaton, 
19L8), pp. 1-28. - -
2EalNli IlUl' le8 "",eur. et l l eft des nationa, et sur 18B ruanc1rw,; fait, 
de IthistoIre, depy.is Charlema ne usquTtoiils nIl-first prin a eneva 
Iii 5:7)6, in Oeuvres completes 'pa S, l88):eS), fir,' 250. Voltaire did not 
take Italy's cUltiii=aI superiority tor granted as earlier writers had done, but 
he explained its basis. He stressed the eausal relation between her eommercia 
prosperity and her advanced civilization, ibid., 57, 187. 
-
1 
2 
things the f01'eJ'Wmer ot the modem world.) Serious weaknesles, however, under 
, 
lay the glory of the "civUta artistic .. ,11 the Viconian phrase commonly used to 
describe the P..enaiSS8nce.4 The very brilliance of society tended to delude 
Italy and to make her unaware of the impending historical tragedy. She had no 
political force able to operate in her own defense." 
The Italian state. stood also to be affected significantly by the major 
econardc changes following the discovery ot the New htlrld and a new route to 
the East. 7he economic fortunes 01' the ndghty Venetian Republic swiftly de-
cl1ned. CUltural pursuits stood to lOBe td th the decline in incoming wealth. 
The foreign invaldone, beginning in 149li, portended future troubles for 
Italian civillzation. The brutal sack of Rome in ]$27 merely symbollzed the 
pracipi tate course that events had taken. Nor were the familiar Turkish menace 
and the religious divisioms in Germat'\Y wholly divorced from the peninsular 
s1 tuation or fran the concern of the Holy See. 
lnie CUltur der Renaissance in Italien. Ein Verauch (Basel, 1860). The 
edi Uon of Burekhar:!t used' here 18"Tbe clvllizitron of trie RenaisSL"'lCe in Italy 
trans. S.G.C. Middlemo:re (London, l~). JoIm Ada:Iniioii'S1iiOnds pl1raued 
Burckhardtian lines in his lengthy 11 terery work, The Renaissance in Italr, .5 
vols. (London, 1877-1886). Citations are taken trOi""tfiEi eaprIcomedIiIOn of 
Volumes I and n of Symonds' work, The tie of the De. and The Revival. of 
LearninS (New York, 19tO). Not 811Ms rianswere fing toe·oncede &-
uiilquenees of trd.s period. The RomantiCists attempted to thrust Renaissance 
origins back into the Middle Ages while another group viewed the Renaissance U 
largely a continuation, or even a decline, of medieval culture, Ferguson, pp. 
290-385. 
40ianbattista Vico (1688-1741.), a Neapolltan and the author of the Nuova 
Seien;a, is noted for his emphasis on the constructive as Hell as the critIcsl 
nature of historical thought. He stressed the iJIlnortance of understanding the 
eu.l ture of a paop1e throu€h lingu1st1c and Jliytmlogical studies. 
"Pietro Niecolini, A.r1osto ~ .!! lY cen;tenariO (Roma, 1936), p • .3.34. 
But the giants of the Renaissance were not wholly uncognizant of the 
difficulties of their society. Familiarity with their writings reveals the 
presence, often general and semiconSCiOUS, of dismay, disillusionment, cynicism 
fear. This was not simply the literary melancholy which is relevant to many 
periods and which belongs to a certain senre of literary work. Nor was it 
, 
merely malaise or t.he malady of the m.al du siecle, so familiar, for example, in 
--
the nineteenth century. The contrast between Italian expressions of upset and 
those indicative of contemporary Elizabethan melancholy also are readily 
evident. 6 
The facts of Italian life were the realistic basis for the concern of thoa 
who were able to note the manifestations of decadence. The majority of these 
men, themselves caught in the maelstrom of portentous activities, realized that 
their danger could well continue its course. Most frequentJ.y, however, their 
bewilderment and anguish expressed themselves when things had advanced se far 
that they were personally and bitterly affected. 
Even men active only in the isolated society of letters, and there were 
not a few, could not ignore the chaos in the Italian states which followed in 
6Cf• ron Cameron Allen, "The Degeneration of Man and Renaissance 
Pessimism, fI .§!, XXXV (April 1938) ,202-227, for a discussion of Elizabethan 
perturbation over the degeneration of man and the growing senility of the world 
of the periodts spiritual tension over the ravages of time and its character-
istic preoccupation with maxims. Cf. also Lawrence Babb, The Flizabe'1han 
Cala~: i Stu5\Y of t,1elancho11a in Elizabethan Literature from ~ ~ ibL2 
Ese Lansing, ?4:1ciiigan, i95l}. Babbls preface Indicates that ~es into 
melancholy offered, or seemed to offer, an avenue of retreat from a dishearten-
ing world of SOCial, political and religious turmoil. It explains that the 
book treats melancholy in a broad psychologieal and Ii terary way, howevel" :;nd 
not t!e sobriety and disillusionment then manifesting themselves. 
4 
the wake of the invasions. Valeriano, a composer of panegyric and satiric po~ 
and an explorer of antiquities in great favor at the court of Leo .x, returned 
to Rome from Fiacenza in the fatal year 1527. He looked in vain for his old 
comrades and exclaimed in his dialogue "De Literatorum l.iJ,il Intelicitate:" 
Good Godl, when first I began to inquire for the philosophers, oraters, 
poets and profesecrs of Greek end LoStin literature, whose names were 
written on my tablets, how great, how horrible a tra~edy was offered to 
meJ Of all those lettered men whom! had hoped to see, how many had 
perished miserably, carried off by the most cruel of all fates, over-
whelmed by undeserved calamities. some dead of plsFtl8, some brought 
to a slow end by penury in exUe, others slaughtered by a foeman's sword, 
other worn out by daily tortures} some, a~a1n, and these of all the most 
unhappy, driven by a.nguish to self -murder. 7 
Valeriano enumerated specific scholars who had died of deSpair or who had 
experienced personal mal treatment, whose wealth had been confiscated or whose 
houses hael been burned, who had succumbed to madness, hunger or the plague. 8 
vmile the wars in Lombardy proved scarcely less fatal to men of letters 
than the siege of Rome, S;yJ!1onds explains, those disasters fell singly and at 
intervala.9 The fall of Roman and indeed of Italian civilization was 
exemplified by the s}'JJlbol of 1527. 
Various poetic attempts were made tc explain this tragedy. ln essays, 
7TMs 'Work, printed st Venice in 1620, is cited in Symonds, Revival, p. 
9rbid. 
-
epistles and funeral orations, humanists "amply recognized the justice of thei 
punishment" whUe all Italy re-echoed with their lamentations. In a letter to 
Jacopo Sadoleto,lO Hieronymus Niger wrote of "Rome, that is the sink of all 
things shameful and abominable. ttl 1 Lodovico Ariosto, the epic poet of the 
"Orlando Furioso," mingled a descript10n of the internal evils of Italy with 
the barbarian invasions: 
o faIn1shed wicked and fierce harpies whom in blinded Italy full or 
error, perhaps to punish old and heavy faults, High Judgment leads 
to every table! Innocent children and pitying mothers are perish-
ing from hunger and see that one banquet of these wicked monsters 
devours all that might be the sUPJX)rt of their lives. 
Greatly he sinned who opened the caves that for many years before 
had been closed, whence eame out the stench and the gluttotlY' that 
spread themselves to Sicken Italy. Fair living was then buriedJ 
and quiet shut out in such a fashion that she has ever since been 
in wars, in poverty, and in trouble I and is going to be for many 
years. 
until one day she will shake her locks at her incblent sons and 
drive them out of Lethe, shouting to them. 'Is there no one who 
has vigor like that of Calais and ~;.etes? who will free the tables 
from the filth and the claws and return them to their happy pur1ty, 
as lorur ago the brothers did those of Phineue and later the paladin 
those of the Ethiop king. ,12 
lOCardinal Jacopo Sado1eto (1477-1547) was one of the most important 
firures on the Roman scene from 1515 to the Council of Trent. He served as 
papal Secretary to Leo X and to Clement VII, as Bishop of Carpentras and later 
as Cardinal. He is commonly associated with the "middle group" of Catholic 
reformers who sought a reformation of the Church w1 thin the limits ot tradition 
llc1ted 1n 1bid., p. 323. 
-
12cr• Orlando Furioso di Ludovico Ariosto, ed. Nicola Zingare1li (Milano, 
193L), 3411-~. 'fhIs is the most recent and critical edition of the !X>em. The 
Eng'lish translation g1 ven here is from the able effort of' Allan Gilbert (New 
York, 195L). 
For many years, as Ariosto wrote, Italy was but a mute member of the 
European community of states. Culturally too she lapsed into quietude in the 
Barocca. Not until the nineteenth century did Italy really awaken from the 
deep slumber in which she had been entranced since the early cinguecento.13 
Although the Ariostean prediction proved to be correct, the realm of the 
poets is usually the realm of fantasy. Literature, the mirror of lite, must 
take second place to the world of day-to-day civil life. And it was this that 
formed the tragic basis of the literary cries. w'hat W8S the political status 
of the Italian states in the pertod of the High Renaissance? 
, 
One of the lIU:ljor political tb1nkers of his era and of all ages, Niccolo 
Machiavelli, linked himself with the poets when he judged Italy to be "la 
corruttela del mandan and her case to be desperate.1L Further.he had a lucid 
understanding of the new Eu.ropean power structure. Venice, Florence, Milan, 
Naples and Rome were destined to play but secondary parts on the new historical 
stage, occupied by the colossal dramatiE! personae of France, Spain, Austria and 
England. Unquestionably one ot the chief features of the Renaissance was the 
appearance for the first time of the national state. A power struggle among 
13Benedetto Croce, Stari}! della F:t~ Barocca .!!! Italla, 2a ed. (Bari, 1946 
finds the historical origIns of thenl'iiiteenih-century Italian state in the 
Baroccs, a time when the tletbical will It ap]:eared exhausted but actually waa 
preparIng for the laborious work it would later undertake in the building of th 
new ItalY. Cf. also A. Robert CaJX)nigri, Histo!,Z..!!!! Libertl (Ctdcago, 1955), 
pp. 89-ltf, for an elaborate discussion of Croce's concepUon of ethico-
poli tical history as applied to seventeentt.l.-century Italy. 
14MachiaVelli wrote: "non s1 puC sperare nelle provincie che in quest! 
tempi si vemrono corrette, come e l'Italia sopra tutte le altre," t.iscorsi, lib 
1, cap. 55, cited 1n Symonds, tespots. p. 282 and n.l. 
7 
the national states of Europe was a natural and logical political developnent. 
No one of them could survive without adding to its dominion and consolidating 
its strength in new regions. France is a good examrJ.e of this political 
phenomenon as the Habsburg states are classic examples of dynastic statecraft. 
~a th the election of Charles V as emperor in 1519, the Habs'burg-Valois stru ggle 
for mastery of 'Europe and the western Mediterranean begal as the final phase of 
the power conflict of the Renaissance era. Following a "manifest destiny" 
poliCY, Charles wished to extend his power and to cut out sny opportuni,tles for 
French interference with his plana. Francis I realized thst a strong re-
assertion of French claims to Naples and ~11an was vitally neces8ary in the 
face of imperial. power and prestige. 
Since the states of the f~ninsula were incapable of coping with these 
major powers, they became an arena fer their contests and the object of their 
spoliations. "-!hile the majority of Itallans knew the fury of these 
"barbarians, II they were not as a whole conscious of the complex causes of the 
changes they were experiencing. It i8 not surprising that the individual 
govemments found it difficult to view events with a clear European vision. 
This persJ*ctive was limited to only a, few. For more than three centuries, the 
Italian states had bettn accuctor.13dto a system of diplomacy and intrigue among 
themselves. Like the ancient Greek city-states, their individual loyalties and 
petty jealousies kept them disunited at a time of serious and crucial moment. 
They had, however, experienced German, French and Spanish interest at Ii much 
earlier period in their histo~. The invasions did not represent a completely 
new phenomenon for them, but their placement wi thin the new power struoture 
a.fforded ample opportunity for concem. 
8 
'ltJithin the narrow sphere of Italian politics, t.'1e princes and ruling 
groups looked tc the attainment of their own selfish objects. They involved 
not only their o~n states but ultimately ~ll the others with the foreign powers 
who towered over them like Ariostean harpies. Once the chains of the artiticia 
Italian eQ~.~ilibrium had been broken by f~incely selfishness and lack of fore-
sight, no one state was safe from the others. 
The first sign ot the alteration about to take pl&ce was the invasion of 
Charles VIII in lL9L, long prepared in the re1.gn of his predecessor. On the 
one hand, j. t made the northern nations even more deeply 4"!are ot the pregnant 
culture of Italy. On the other, it eventuated in the increase of the familiar 
weaknese t discord, egotiem and oorruption known to readers of Burckhardt and 
S.YlTiOnds. 
ot the five major states of the peninsula, Rome acted as the fulcrum. 
Under Alexander VI and Julius II, the Holy See had become the chief power in 
Italy. At this period in Venetian met.ory, the Republic's energy was no long-er 
needed for the extension of her rule but rather for i te preservation against th 
European league. The Venetian oligarchy, whose attention had been firmly fixed 
on the aggra~di8ement ot the Republic, was determined to maintain her power. 
Flol'cnce, with continuing tacttonsl struggles, now between the Eiagnoni and the 
15 
ottimati, concentrated her failing vigor for use in the internal struggle 
15 ' In the Florentine political history of Ouicciardini'a period, the 
P£P2lari were the democratic party and the ottimati the aristocratiC group. 
w.rine; Savonarola fS rule, the otti.'l!ati, rabidly antagonistic to him, were terms 
arrabbiati. From 1527 to 1530, arra6'E'iati referred to the advanced democrats 
who were uncompromisingly hostile to the Medici. Under Savonarola I the oopolar 
we~ te~ed ~ or ittP~ \:Iy their 9pponen~,. Medici partlsana we~ 
called the c or, a I' le~r e lS10h in 449 the bi i, Ferdinand 
Schevill, H ~Flor8nce, (rlew Yo~ 1ge1), pp. tt2, L8U~ 
- , 
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awaiting hEll' at th, end of the second Cinauecento decade. Thou€,h Venice did 
not ignore 11 terary acrJ.evement, &~e never publicly encouraged it as had 
Florence. But the Medici transferred the £<'lorentine tra~.1 tions of culture to 
Rome with Giovanni. and Giullo. At Naples the Aragoneae dynasty experienced 
continu.al troubles with baronial revolts in the 1480's and later feared Charles 
V's pretensions. The southern provinces of Italy were rent from the time of 
the struggle of Ferdinand of Aragon and Louis XII. But it was I'1ilan, first 
among the Lombardian towns, 'Which was doomed to bear the brunt of the vms., 
French and German armies. l~le the Sforzas tried to maintain the semblance of 
their dukedom, the populace lived under the hand of their conquerors. 
Cesare Boreia, !<4'echiavelli's great hero, snd Juliua II had either destroys 
or obliterated the lines of the smaller principalities. At the ber.innin~ of 
the sixteenth century, Ferrara, Mantua and Urbino alone continued the 
traditions of the previous age. 
A constant factor dur1ng the periods of stress and upheaval in the 
peninsula frior to 1527 was the r:,rimsoy of the papal position, in sri te of the 
personal insecur.i. ty of the incumbents, espeCially Clement VII. !'k>t lees 
important was the oi ty of Rome. Not only did Rome have the pope, revered by 
the Catholic powers in spite of his :-eaSllre of temporal potency and the balance 
of his diplomatic weight, but also the sacred c1 ty of Cr.rJetenoom had not as 
yet felt the scourge of war that was breaking the spirit of the northern 
capitals. Thus it was only natural that the pOlitical and intellectual 
10 
energies of the Italians should find their center here.16 
To this situation and its variegated facets reacted a figure ranked with 
17 Machiavelli and Ariosto as one of the "three keenest intellects of Italy" tI 
Francesco Guicciardini.18 The use of the word "Machiavellian" to connote 
l6s ;ymOndS" Revival" p • .320. 
l7This judgment has been made by a pioneer scholar of the social life of 
the Renaissance principalities" Edmund G. Gardner" The lung of Court Poets: a 
study 2! .t!!! Work" ill!.!!!.9. Times 2! Lodovico Ariosto'" London, t906~" p. 166.-
l8In the interests of unity and clarity, a biographical sketch of 
OUicciardini is given here. Further details of his life will necessarily come 
to light in the various chapters. 
The Guicciardini family, like the majority of families important during th 
republican period, issued from the l?9P2lani f,;assi or buoni POiilani, the 
nouveaux riches of Florence. For more than ~o centuries they ad played a 
predOlfllilant role in Florentine government. In its long history of civil 
service" the family included ~onfalOnieri" priori and ambassadors. 
Francesco (1483-l540) was educated in the humanist tradition by his father 
Piero" austere and melanchOlic, according to the testimony of contemporaries. 
In his later life, Francesco evidenced a predilection for his grandfather, 
Jacopo, who had rendered wise service as a counsellor of Lorenzo de'Medici. Th4 
bent of his nature was clearly to political life. In 1505 he took his law 
doctorate after studies in civil and canon law at Florence, f'adua and Ferrara. 
As a practicing lawyer in his native city, he defended important families and 
corporations, but it was not long before the somewhat sterile law of the 
Renaissance proved unable to sustain his interest. His brilliant career as an 
advocate and jurist, together with the renown his family had already acquired 
in the p.l.blic service, led in 1512 to his appointment as a diplomatic repre-
sentative from his native City to the court of Spain. Although he had received 
his commission under Soderini's government, he retained his post upon its fall 
and the Medici return to Florence. He was to promote there the interests of 
Florentine commerce as well as diplOmacy. Upon his return to Florence in 1514, 
he came to look upon their recent restoration as an evident attempt to renew 
their tyranny" and he 1mmediately began to formulate his plan of ottimati 
government. In 1516 Guicciardini began his long term of papal-Medicean service 
for eight years governor of Modena with jurisdiction over Reggio and Parma and 
their territories. and finally president of the disturbed Romagna under Clement 
VII. He acted as lieutenant-general of the papal and Florentine troops .f'ighti~ 
the imperial forces until 1527. He relinquished his office of papal lieutenant 
after the Signing of Clement. s treaty of peace wi th the Emperor. though he 
retained his presidency of the st1l1-disturbed Romagna a short while longer. Ir 
1527, with the second expulsion of the Medici, Guicciardini rallied to the 
support of the Capponi regime, representative of the ottiroati, and worked for 
u 
cunning action indicates a widespread acquaintance with the ideas of the 
Florentine Secretary's .!! Principe. And unlike Ar1osto, Guicciardini has 
the reconciliation of the Florentine Republic with the Emperor. In 1529, with 
the succession of the arrabbiati Carducci, Clement took advantage of the 
imperial offer to reestablish Medici control in Florence. Guicciardini con-
curred in this plan and was condemned as a Florentine rebel, though the city 
fell to the papal-imperial troops in 1530. In mid-15J1 he became vice-legate 
to Bologna, an important post procured for him by Clement. After his recall 
.from this position by Paul III .. to Duke Alexander, Guicciardini returned to 
Florence a.nd in 1535 became a counsellor, who was to head the city as capital 0 
the Tuscan duchy. :During these years, Guicciardini worked against partisans of 
a popular government and .. after the murder of the Duke in 1537, proclaimed 
Cosimo de' Medici as his successor. He then retired to his country villa to 
complete his storia d'Italia. 
Guicciard1n1 is wri tri'igs include I R1cordanze and Memorie di f~a and 
Storia fiorent1na (150B-ll) J niario del" via~io in S~gna (1)12),; ReaZ!one di 
Spae (lSl),; ras Discorsi P2Utlci;Cons:i.stingof onsiderazioni intorno ai 
If Discorsi" del Machiavelli so~ra 1& Erima deoa di Ti to L1 vio and several -
indIVidual writIngs on i)aitles" a!i'iances iiidtreaiie'i (various dates); 
Discorsi !!:.! reftimento .2.! Firenze, then Dialogo .2!! reH:imento ~ Fi;""'em:;e 
(152i-25)J Scr:i.tl aalofetlc!, fiicluding Consoiatoria>27)' oratio 
accusatoria, Defenso a1S27~,; Cose fiorentine (1527-35),; Rioordi (In their 
private form, 1512" revised in l~ and in their mature form, 1530), and 
finally Storia d'Italia (1535-40). 
Guicciardini's own jottings form the best source for l".is youthful years. 
Cf. especially his "femorie di famglia, nScritti autobiografici e rari, ed. 
Roberto Palrnarocchi (Bari, 19.36), pp. l-5b, and hIs "Ricordinze,1t ibid ... pp. 
51-98. This applies also to his political and historical writingsu.pon which 
this entire dissertation has been built. 
Among the general works which afford aocurate and useful factual material 
on Guicciardini's life are the following: C. Antoniade, Trois fiS,Ures de la 
Renaissance (Paris, 1937): Eug~ne Benoist, Guichardin: Historien et nomme-
d'etat italien ~ XVle si~cle (Pa.ris, 1862); L. ChIesi .. !Siio newEiniiia e 
rancesco GUlcciardinI gqvernatore della cittA (Reggio lia, ts92); Vittorio 
Cian~ I1 Eerf~tto cavaliere!l! £!rfetto EtiItico della Rinascita, Baldassarre 
si.£! Cieti~J.one ! Francesco Guicciardini Firenze .. 1930} J A. Geffroy, "Une 
autobiograp e de GUIchardin d;ap~s ses oeuvres, in{dites," Revue des deux 
ndes .. I .. s6r • .3 (lB7lJ), 656-685, and "Un politique italien de ia R"f!iiiiSS'Siicea 
G cardin et ses oeuvres in'dites, f! ibid., XXXIV, sIr. 2 (1861), 96l-96lJ; 
Luigi Malagoli" Guicciardini (Firenze;-I'939); Gino Masi, fill Guicciardini e la 
giurisprudenza del suo tempO," Francesco Guicciardini nel IV centenario della 
orte (15lJO-19lJO) (Firenze" 1940), pp. 117-139; siro A:-Num, Francesco A 
G cciardini (Bo1og~, 1936); Andre 01i~tea, Francois Gu1chardin, sa vie 
u ue et sa ~nsee Eolitique (ParrL 1926); Roberto RidolfI vIta~ 
r c o~cafBiM (6a, 1960). Aefore the publication of "t"l1'eel'tborate 
or 0 Ridoi1'i, otetea' s work was the most com et 
i2 
IOlOYnl neither, to use the ~!anzonian19 phrase, ttl faltere e la polvere, ff the 
altar of popularity nor t.'1e dust of' the library.20 Rather, as his various 
works came to light, 5cholan evidenced a renewed thotlr,h usually temporary 
interest in him, and Romanticists and men ot the national revival of the 
latter nineteenth century otten interpreted OUicciardini' 8 role to accord wi. th 
the view of their own periods. 21 
"*. 
utilized muoh material from the Car1:.eggi of Gu1eciardini, now in the process of 
publication. For brevity, balanoe andiccuracy, of. also Federico Chabod, 
"Francesco Guicciardini, It Enciclop!dia italians (Rama, 1933), Inn, 2hL-2L8. 
The excellent index or Ridolfi's GUIcciaraini, pp. 536-$L2, provides 
ad0.i tiona! chronological material on hIs auSjectfs life and wri tinge. 
19A1essandro Manzon:l (1181.-1873) a Milaneee in touch with many of the 
influences that formed modern Itallan thought, is best known for his novel, 
1. Prome.si BROsi, well as many lyrics. 
20Niccolini, Ariosto, p. 18. 
2lFor m.any centuries I the fame of OU1cciardini rested on the Stana 
dtItalia. Guicciard1n1an studies multiplied with the publ1cation or the 02ere 
inedite, ed. Counts Piero and Luigi Ouicciardin1 with a commentary by Giuseppe 
Canestrini, 10 vole. (Firenze, 18;6-61), though this edition was by no means a 
~.ri ti~ai one. Interest was, however, shifted to the man rather than the 
historian. BenOist, Guichardin, used the first three volumes of Canestrin1 
together with archiva! _&fla! to formulate his definition of the "political 
condottiere.," Following on Benoist's tracks were several prominent writers on 
HacEiavem. Nor was his theaia unklliOtl!n to Francesco de ;3anctis. "L 'uomo del. 
GuicciardilU," ~. critid., eel. Luigi Russo, III (Bari, 19$2) whose article 
was first publiS1iiO"in lUova antologia in October, 1869. He stud1ed 
Guicciardini's character ana pointed out his perfidy. Many n1neteenth-century 
estimates found in tl1e Riecrdi, in the phrase of r:e 5anctis, flla corruzione 
i tallana codificata ed elevaS a regole. di vita. ft F:ven Symonds agreed that tr..i 
was a most accurate ciescription of the Ricordi in contrast to the patriotic and 
sometimes enthusiastic traces evident in Hachlavelli's !l ~. From this 
time untU 1919, variOU$ a~ct. of OUicciardin1's were 8nal.yzed and episode. 
of' . his li..f~· :'*,ooMtructed. Fran that date a new phase ot Ouicciard1n1an 
studies began with A. Gherardi's edition of the Storia d'Italia sUjjl1 ori~ 
HSS. (florence, 1919), which had utilized much ii'Chlv'a! mateflai. HeW 
edi tiona of this major '!lION and other volumes of Oldcciardin1 meant !ntensi ft 
crt tical work. Too many pX"$judgments of nineteenth-century historiography had 
generated a."l&chronistio applications of the concept of liberty as appl1ed to 
Qy!ccia~nils career. Florentine republicans saw in Guicciardini a fierce 
1.3 
~'.hl.le significant progress has been made in Guicciardinian studies, be 
continues tc prove a m.ost enigmatic figure in relation to his times. No sinele 
work bolus the key to understanding him. The Ricordf. for example, are 
valuable as a. document of intr'ospect1on, for a knowledge of his 1nt1mate 
thoughts" but they present only a very l1mi ted and contradictory side of his 
character. Ouicciardini's critics, a recont l.n'ter has noted, ;ssem to have 
forgotten this and to have concentrated their attention on the revelations of 
the Ricord! ratl:er than on his et.ief work, the stem d l Italta.22 
., 
Judgmenta of Guicciardini can be made from various angles, but he should 
OUicciardini a fierce adversary, a friend of tyra.nny, a corrupter of customs, 
almost a traitor to country. Some pX'Ogre.3 toward a more balanced appraisal 
was made in the era of the national l'ev1val, 'When the storie dtltalla 
const! tuted the prinCipal %"Maon for reprinting his woritii. He narrated the 
crisis of Italian liberty and first suggested the history of In~l' not onlY 
that of a c1 ty or a region. It i8 at least wi til thil traditio judgment that 
modern work can join handel. For a detailed discussion of' the various inter-
pretations of Guicc1ardini, ct. Palmaroechi, studi i'¥!::cciardiniani (Firense, 
1947), pp. 113-124, and Alessandro Passerin d~., Liiii8 'POITt:1co e altd 
sas&.i (Torino, 1955), especially 1'1'. 157-171. .-
22Ibid., p. 159. The title of the Storia was given posthumously. ct. 
RidolfiTiGenesi, also his yuicciudini, pp. Ltl, n. 13, and 513 .. n. Ll. 
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be accepted primarily for what he was, an historian. 23 He spoke favorably of 
the sonice rendered by- the student of history; he who recorded events could 
f1ive the best evidence of the course of Qffai.r8. 2L In some respects, 
Guicciarciini linked himself with the earlier tradition of historical writing, 
but he was no mere chronicler. 
L~ lL90 the Neapolitan humanist, Giovan.'li pontana, wrote 1-.is ~cti::s on the 
relation between poetry and history. Here he set dewn three functions or 
ldstor,y, whieh 100m import.a.!1tly in both the theory and pract·ice of Renaissance 
historical writing. Fir~t, history is E!! i!StQ.e and war must be its 
prineipu component. Second, since war is in the realm of the cont1n{lt8nt, the 
historian must pay heed to 0.11 chance, l.ike weath.er, pestilence or treachery, 
23:For a discussion of Guicciardini ta technical role ss an historian and 
of his placement in the general pattern of historical. writing, cf. Ettore 
Allodol1, "Genesi del~ tStofi!1 d',ta1.1&· di Roberto Ridolfi," Francesco 
GuiceiardinI' net IV' centena:r:-~ pp. ~2~ Benedetto Croce, HIstO¥, its 
!liaory and ~iCi', trane. ~ glu Ainslie (New York, 1921) J Eduar Fuetir, 
ItGuicciardini als Historiker, tI Histonseh& Zeitscbrift, C (1908), 486 ... 514°1 
Fueter, StiSiI ;:lella sto1"1}?1raf1,8 moaerna, trans. A. Spinelli, 2 vols. (Napol1, 
19LJ-44) J j e aeChari, "Las historians florentine de la Renaissance at les 
I / 
commencements de 1 teconomie poli tique at socials, n Seances et travaux de 
l'Acad$mi~ 088_ science. morale. !! politi9?o,!J ClY t!8'15), »2-~~J J.r. 
Jameson, If'l.ii'e'i.IeV19iopmeni or Modern fllrOpean Historiography," Atlantic r<!ontlll.z, 
L>:vr (1890) I 322-333) Ridolfi, Genee! deUa storla d tltalia d~!ard~nIa.na (F1renze, 1939) J .lame_ l>'. ThompSon. ii IIIsiOq of Ili.tOr1ciI r=:ftOl. i 
(New York, 19!J2) J E. Zanoni, La ment'i al Franeiico MccliidIiit e opere 
pelitiche! storlche (Firen2a;-l~'. - 1_ 
2hrranceaco Guicciard1n1, Stor.1.a d'Itall!-', ad. Costantino Pa.n1gada (Bart, 
1929), V, 318. 
which might have some effect on the conduct ot the war. Third, the historian 
must report oracles, prophecies, visions, sacrifices and the like" as 
mani.featationa to men of the processes operative beb1nd the arpearances of 
25 thinr,s. 
Both Philip de Commines and Guicclardini follow precepts 11ke those of 
pontano, treating of war and of the individuals and circumstances that 
co~J. tion it. 26 Al though Commines might be linked more closely with the 
medieval writers, both he and C-uicciard1ni have points in common. Both 
believed in the determ1n1sma of Ood27 and of fortune which could not be in-
terpreted by the human observer. Likewise, both believed that the apparent 
inevitability of past happenings had been further conditioned by the wisdom, 
1'ol11es, virtuea and vices ot the individuals who made the venous de-
cisions.28 
Ouicciard1n1 had the ability' to observe his subjects' character acutely 
and to analyze their motives tor action. His keen estimate of the proximate 
and ultimate factors in the French irmasions, or those which intensi1'ied 
Italian vulne.rabU1ty to this curse, and of the leading individuals involved is 
2~n P. Gilmore, "Freedom and rietexmin1sm in Renaissance Historians,. 
Studies !!ll!!!. Renaiss",..nce. ed. M.A. Shaaber (New York, 19.$6), nI, L9-51. 
26the last two books of Philip de Commines t MEnOirs are devoted to the 
Italian expedition ot the French. 
27The opening pages of tr..e Starta d t Ital1a present the image ot the 
aftairs of men as comparable to me sea- agIiiGd by winds. 'Ihe 1esaonB o! 
history can teach us only to reter oursel W8 to nthe ways of God and not those 
o! men,tI Ou1cciardim, PR!re, ed. Vittorio de Caprariis (Milano .. 19$3), p. 373 
28oilmore, 59. 
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classic. 29 Though the form of the storia d'Italia 5s chronological, the work 
is fundamentally analytical. It beg1ns nth the year 1492, where r1achiavell1's 
histo1"7 of Florence and related Italian affain ends, and concludes with the 
death cf Clement m in 15.3b. 
Guicciardin1 was, like later scientific historians, conscious of the 
complexity of his field. Though himself of a communal background, he realized 
the nec ••• i ty of extending the municipal l1mi ts of communal and humanistic 
hi.torlopnpby and of giving national history a European scope. His aim WAS 
based on tl-,. perception that Italian affairs in themselves could on.lJr be judged 
erroneous17. Highly variable, in only a few months many things vere dit.terent 
£rom what they had been, .tor they depended in great part on the activities of 
the grea.t powers.)O 
In his historlcal work al well a8 in his active career, Ouicciardin1 was 
eminently conscious of change. He WZ'Ote that it was not enough to consider the 
l'.lOrld at any given moment, for at any time countleo accidents could arise to 
incnue present difficult1.ea.l1 He cautioned also that on s11ght causes 
29Cf. infra, pp. 26 4 31. 
,3n.. - I' / / 
I VJA cose d t Italia s1 possone male g1udicare da per ae, ai perch. lt; sono 
in se malta mutablle, e si vede cha in pochi mes1 variane assai, a1 perche 1. 
dependone in grandissima parte da queUo che tara loimperadore, el re catoUco 
Inghilterra ed e f svizseri ••• , "Sulle mutazioni segu1.te dOpa 1& battaglia di 
Ravenna, ff S,cr1tti rtl1tiCi ! ricordi, ed. R. Palmarocch1 (Bari, 193,3)" p. 91. 
This piece was va ten Iii spaIii !i'i i:5l2. 
,3l 
flOratio Accusatoria," BantU !lptobiosrafic1, p. 226. "lJon ci bisogna 
solo considerare el mondo come eta ora, rna possono nascere ogni ora molti 
accidenti che augumenterebbono sanza comparazione le difficult", .'so.petti e 
pencoli. " 
17 
depended the course ot the most weighty affain.32 He was well aware that one 
could not be secure in the posse.sion of things not in thansel:ves perpetual and 
which could be lost at any t1m.e, particularly through changes in court or in 
the pope's will. In his own career he tried to hold these good things as 
lIaliene. 1133 
Cne could not help but notice that Italian altairs were largely dependent 
on the role of the princes. Guicciardini expla1n~d that, since rulers were 
often conscious of their own inclination to preteI' their interest to faith, 
they thought that the same was true ot other princes.3L Treaties depended for 
their eDCU tion on the sineer1 ty and fOod w.Ul of the rulers as well as on 
countless other factors often unknown. 
Guicciardini contrasted the un1 ty in imperial affairs with the dieun1 ty 
in confederate ranks. At the height ot difficulty in 1526, he recognized that 
the negotiations, the provisions and operations of the anti-imperialists were 
"delayed, interrupted and varied, according to the forces, the views and the 
counsels of the princes. If The Emperor, on the other hand, exerted his utmost 
strength for his resolution depended on himself. 35 Though Charles V did not 
have the control over his own affairs that Guicc1ardini believed he had, it vu 
logical for h1lIl to hold that Yiew. Guicciardini always tended to equate 
32Storia dtItalla, V, 279. 
33ccnso1atoria," Scritti autobiografici, pp. 170-171 • 
.3l4Storia d'Ital1a, V, 10. 
35Ibid., 6L. 
-
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successful action with basic unity. $)IIII.onds tollows Guicciardini in stressing 
the princely neglect of their responsibUities. \\1l1le the glory of Italy Uke 
that of Greece lay in letters, the arts and the civilities of life, her ruin 
lay in indolent princes and the lack of arms. The very condi tiona which 
allowed her to produce her culture seem to have rendered her freedom impossible 
for spin. tual ascendancy was purchased at the expense of political solidity 
and national prosperity.J6 In 1526 Ouicciardini criticized Francis I for his 
indolence and insinceri't7 in league attaire but he thought that the Italian 
rulers were pr:i.marily to blame for their difficulties. Nor was there any 
significant assistance from skilltul miUtar,y leaders who obstinately rejected 
all adVice and badlY managed important affairs.3? 
So much for the variable factors at work in human history. Guicciardini 
unquestionably realized their significance. No less, however, did he under-
stand the essential unity of history. The past, the present and the future are 
fundamentally alike, though they may seem divergent in surface aspects. One is 
able to make an estimate of a situation on the basis ot another which is 
sim:Uar.38 Wise men alone are able to recognize the similarity in events, tor 
36 Revival, p. h60. 
37This was the case with the great French commander, Laut.rec, storia 
dtItalia, V, 208, 219, 228, 2)0. 
38ttte COM d6t mondo hanno questa condi.:done, 0 voglltmo dire, ciret40' 00_ 
eempre qusllo cbs e, ha similltudine eol passato, e queUo cbe sara, sara SimilE 
a queUo ehe $ stato. E d~verlO nelle suPGrf1c1e e net colon, rna simile nelli 
intr1naechi e eu.tans-iali ta J pel'O non 8i pue errare a ndaurare questo con 18 
mieura .:11 queUo J n "Ragioni cha consigliano a Clemente VII di aeeordarsi eon 
Carlo VI in contrario," Scritti 2211t19!_ p. 1Sh. 
"the faces of men and the outer appearances of thinrs change." Guieciardini 
adds that lIb1stol""J is good end useful beeause it places before you and makes 
you see and realize what you had never known or seen.".39 
Not. only was there unity in Guieeiardini's vision, but the unity of his 
diplomatic and historical careers must be stressed as well. More than almost 
any other historical figure, he must be interpreted on the basis of the 
intimate link between his thought and the action and events of his times. He 
wrote two objectively distinct types of works, political and historical, but 
the two stem from the same mental set fundamentally and are related to each 
other in an evolutionary fashion.40 The early storie fiorentine evidenced 
.- . 
Ouicciardini's realisation of the necessity for undentand1ng accurately past 
events as a basis tor statesmanlike action. The only way to transoend the 
historical situation is to try to discover how it has come to be. His back-
ground researches and the judgment acquired in his primary hiatorical endeavor 
proved useful tor him in his more active concerns in behalf of his native eity. 
His diplomatie mission in Spain gave him a model tor actlon, Ferdinand of 
Aragon, aJd.n to the meaning of Cesare Borgia for f·lachiavelli. Guieciardini 's 
thought, especially in its mature presentation, was greatly dependent upon his 
practical experience. His experience. l.a1d the basi. for the cynicism of the 
39r.etter to Machiavelli, May 18, 1521, carteflt.~ Franceseo Gulceiardini, 
ed. Plero Giorgio Ricci and Roberto ralmarocch! ogna, 19.3S-)~ - IV, lb. 
40A masterful study ot tId,s evolutionary :relationship has been made by 
Vittorio de Caprar1is, Francesco Ouicciardini dalla P21itica alla stor!a 
(Bari, 1950). - -
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Ricordi and tor ~~e sombre atmosphere of the Steri. d'ltalia. The narrative of 
tho Storia began with what became Book XVI, the Battle of Pavia. Begun in 
153$, that york lIas for a time planned as a Ouieeiardinian autobiograp~.Ll 
'i'his fact alone 113 a etr.:Ud.ng indication that his own tragedy was part ot one 
more vast. 
Machiavelli paid a tribute to Guicciardini tor the political experience 
and judgment that was his. Up to 1521, Guicciardini had been busy with 
governmental and administrative affairs and had wn tten very 11 tt.le and had 
published nothing. By that :late, much of !·1a.cmaveU:t IS major tfOrk had already 
been accompl1sh~d or was being executed. In 1524, he replied to Ouicciard1n1, 
who had given him some erra...,d to perform tor his property at Poppiano, that he 
r.ad been spending hie time in the country writing his Steria and would give 
"ten soldi-I ,,'ontt say more" to have Ouicciardini at his side. He explained 
that he was coming to "certain details" and needed his ~and's opinion as to 
whether he otfended either by exaggeratton or understatement.L2 
Personally, M.aehiavelli was tar different from the aristocratic and some-
what solemn Ouieciardini. One authority thinks that real friendship and 
congeniality between them was not ponible until the fierce storms of Italy 
L1ct. the enlightening aocount of Ridolfi, Oeneal della storia d' Italla 
guj.cciardiniana; of. also Fa.sarin d'EntNves, n:mia' ~11tlco, p. l6L. 
42Letter to Guicc1ard1n1, August .30, 1524, Nschiavelli, Lettere iam1liari, 
ed. Fdwardo Alvisi (F1renze, 1883), p. 435. 
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tount.! them both in the same boat.43 They were just as different in the realm 
of history, perhaps more so. l-1,achiavelli l s need for advice points up the fact 
that he was not interested in the rdIlute and diligent search tor facts &0 
cvidel1't. in Guicciardini '5 historios. He wrote history to serve the purposes ot 
political science, not 80 much as an historian. From the facta as he had them, 
he wisl~ to derive lS$80ns, principles and doctrloot't, while, on occ&fdons .. he 
manifested no scruples about fitting the facts to his th90ries.4h 
\~1rl.le Guicciardini is (til politico e solo un politico ,11 i1ach1a:velll is 
rather of a poetic mentality. The poet obeys no lawa other t.'1a.."'l his own 
f:::.ntaS"J and ca.'l put his intui tiona into a harmonious unity J while the poll tical 
writer must follow a complicated and often capricious development of facts, 
affirm or deny their relevance and accuracy, and walk through ways never direct 
or contUruous. The poet conquers reality by evading it, a..'ld a light of hopeful. 
prophecy illumines hie mela.ncholy. The political writer, on the contraxy, 
finds his liberation only in success. It t.his is 1acldng to him, his very 
ideas become burdens which drag him down and crush him.laS In this perceptive 
judgment.. one finds a guiding light tc the often tortuous road of Gtd cciardinia: 
thought and action" tor he was indeed "il 'f-'Ol1tico, tt to whom 11achiave111 "had 
la3aido1fi, The Lire of Nicco16 Y~chiavell1 .. trans. Cecil Grayson (Cf'..1cago, 
1963), pp. l87-l'B'S': - - • 
L41bid., pp. 196-19'1. 
hSThese Views are expresaed by Palmarocchi, studi gu,J.cciardiniani. p. 111. 
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always been .2! plur1mum a promoter of extravagant opinions and an inVentor ot 
new th1ngs.nL6 
Ouicciardini • s focus was almost entirely poll tical, for this was the side 
of events 'Which conditioned their course within a state down to the most minut 
detail. Neither economic nor theological problems troubled him.47 Still he 
not oblivious of his age's pioneering spirit. He wrote some very noteworthy 
r..ages dedicated to the commerce of the Portuguese and to the discovery of the 
New Horld. ~lith the Columbian discovery, the Old horld was assailed by the t~ 
He praised the brave man and his successors who came upon these good th.1nes, 
but he did not hesitate to intimate that their zeal for the spread of the 
Christian religion did not always outweigh their cupidity for riches. Yet, in 
the course of events, many natives became converted to "nostra religione. HL8 
One-half century after Columbus. navigation and in consequence ot his 
discovery, Ouicciardini commented that aome ot the principles (cardini) long 
JAU 
accepted by revered scholars and sacred writers no longer rule, and everything 
remains in a state ot dlscussion.49 In accordance with his method of strict 
marshaling of the facts, usually with a sparse commentary, OUicciardini did no 
46aidOlti, Hachiavelli, p. 188. 
47 Guicciardini simply repeated the usual humanist cn t1clsms of abuses in 
the Church. ct. intra, p. 449. 
48storia fltltalla, II, 127-132. 
49nNe solo ha questa navigaz10ne conf'uso mol te cose affemate dagll 
scrittori delle COM terrene, rna dato, oltra a eib, qualche anz1eu( agli 
interpret1 della Bcrittura Baera •••• ," ~., p. 132. 
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pose any problem here. Rather he seemed to be suspended between Renaissance 
admiration for this New Ulysses and an unnerving apprehension of its potential 
violence. 
In a sketch of IfGuicciardini vecchio e nuovo, tI the need has been cited for 
an explanation of his role in accordance with more recent views of the 
Renaissance.50 This dissertation attempts to illuminate a vital area of 
C1nquecento 11fe by portraying OUicciardini as a major figure of that SOCiety, 
as one who not only advanced his views but who also examined them. in his latter 
years. The extent to l'hich he vas a cooperati.ng agent in the ultimately 
debilitating vagaries of papal and 11edicean service or a retlection of the 
general and growing d!sUlusioment of the period are two aspects of the same 
question. 
Chapter two will deal with Ouicciardini t s views on the fundamentaJ. problem 
of his age, namely, the confrontation of the political units of Italy with the 
major ::'uropean powers struggling tor hef,emony over them primarily ,tlS 
Guicciardin1 handled it in his Stana dtItalia. Chapters three a.nd tour will 
deal with papal policies, the first, from Alexander VI through Leo X,and the 
latter, under Clement VII. The papacy was indeed the Italian Mcrum, and. 
Guicciardinits own disillusionment was intimately linked with the failure of 
the Cinquecento papacy to lead Italy aw~ from the policy of destruction to 
which .. wittifl€',ly or otherwise, she was precipitating herself. Chapter five wilJ 
treat OUicciardin1's attitudes toward his beloved Florence, in her past and 
-
5°Passerin dtEntrives, Dante j:£lltico, p. 159. 
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present, and his role in connection with events leading to her tragedy in 15.32. 
For him the Florentine decline meant the death-knell of his higbly prized 
borghese govemnent, to him bound with the salvation of Italy. Chapter six 
-
rill investigate Guicoiardinils "religion," important for an understanding of 
any thinker, and particularly so for one often held to have been one of the 
most i.m.oral, or amoral, men of the Renaissance. Chapter seven will serve 8S 
f I 
a resume of the material. of the thesis and will attempt to make as precise as 
possible Ouicciard1ni's own state of mind during his active career and the 
latter years of his life in its relationship to the weltanschau!ffi.S of the most 
critical period of the Cinquecento. 
CEAPTER II 
GUICCIARrINI 
AND thE ITALIAN POLITICAL SCENE 
Guicciardini t s storia d' Italla was also his J:Oli tical testament. He 
surveyed the Italian scene from lL90 to 1534 not onl)t as a carefUl historian of 
his age but also from the vantage point of one intimately involved in the 
penirumla's struesles. Basic then to a study of Oulcciardini's pessimism are 
his views on Ci2Quecento Italy and the fashioners of her policy. 
From his own period, the historical situation has becane well known. 
Later writers have detailed the power struggle in the Italian arena, but this 
does not mean that this topic can bedism1aaed here. It is what Ouicciardini 
saw through the maze of historical facts that is vi tal for the problem of the 
dissertation. With an almost unc~ political acumen, he analysed acutely the 
situation that spelled Italy's political collapse in the sixteenth century, 
especially the rampant division, ambition and jealousy of the Italian states 
and their rulers. One reads 'l'hucydides t account of the Peloponnesian wars not 
so much for the accurate historical facts contained therein but primarily for 
the picture of greed and individualism eo maeterfully woven into it. 
Ouicciardini 'til Storls d' Italis. is of Similar value. The essential accuracy of 
his work 1s not subject to question. He saw the a1 tuat10n for what 1 twas, 
hence the value of portraying the Italian scene through Guice1ardini~8 GyS8 
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-alone. It 1s important to give attention to his analysis of a s1 tuation which 
was of paramount sign1ticance to the e2l1t1cal ~ that be wa.. He not only 
wi tnesseC the trend of events and participated in them but he grasped their 
real meaning. His understandi!J£ of t.his Situation, as a participant and later 
as an historian, contributed fundamentally to his disillusionment. In another 
sense, as tho dissertation's subtitle indicates, Ouicciardin1 refiecteci the 
pessimism, defeatism and disillusionment of his mil1eu. 
Guicciardini contrasted the peaceful. character ot the peninsula from the 
Peace of todil ot 1454 to the period nearing 1494 and the thunderous change 
atter that date. The ccmnon interests ot the Italian states seemed pre-
dominant over their differences. In Ouicciardin1 t s judgment, Italy as a whole 
had not enJoyed a state ot such cCtl1plete repo.. and prosperity since the decl1n 
2 
ot the Roman Fmpi:re. 
Ouiceiardini addres8ed himself to a perplexing but basic problem, namely, 
what factors could account tor the strildng changes that he witnessed there. 
He discovered that. the factors in favor of the maintenance ol the status S!!.2 
lA. twenty-five year defensive all1ance against the Turks vas signed by 
the paracy, Naples, Florence and Milan. Thoueh its elaborate mach1nery never 
ll".ater1tilized, the League gave expression to the convictiOn that both the comon 
interests and those ol each state derr.anded peace and un! ty wi thin Italian 
borders, and it remained an ideal during the continuance ot war. The small 
states hailed the Lodi Peace as a guarantee ot their continued existence. In 
lL80 1 t8 League was formaJ.ly renewed tor a period of twenty-tive years. 
2storia d'Itelia, I, 2. 
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had been subject to e.ha.nge at the slightest provocation. None of the powers 
involved in the league of 11.80 desired war, but atill each tended to watch and 
to emulate any apparent increase in his neighbors' power, 3 with the undoubted 
exception of Guicciardini' a F'lorentine hero, Lorenzo 11 t4af1lifico. 4 
In 1492 there occurred a aeries of events 'Which Guicciard.1.n1 found seri oua 
enough ~ upset the Italian calm.5 The non-meddleaome Innocent VIII, whom 
6 Lorenzo advised "in all things, tt was succeeded in the papal chair by Alexander 
VI. Following the statesmanlike Lorenzo in Florence was his son Piero, 
stroneJ.y ~er the intluence of the Orsini and unable to cooperate with his 
htorenzo was "come uno censore delli al tri potentati. tt His reputation was 
so great in Italy that ''no l'".rave thing was deliberated without his will" and no 
serious discords were allowed to erupt, OU1cciardini, trElogio {ii Lorenzo de I 
Medici," Serittf., politici, pp. 225, 227. 
5.FollOldng Guicciardini, S)'mOnds cited the' significance of the y'ear 1492 
as "one of the most memorable dates in r.istory." Charles VIII actually took tht 
reins of the French kingdom into his own hands. Columbus clJ.scovered America. 
Roderigo Borgia became pope. i,j.th the conquest of Granada, Spain became a 
nation. Symonds judged that the three latter points wen tlno le •• trui tM of 
consequences to Italy than was the accession of Charles VIII.tt The discovery 
of America, followed in another six years by Vasco da Gama's exploration of the 
Indian seas, diverted the COIImIel'Ce of the world into new channels. Alexander, 
eo Symonds continued, "made the fl8fomation and the Northern Schism 
certainties." It would be more accurate to indicate that his pontificate gave 
strong evidence of the vi tal and present need for Church reform. Lastly, the 
consolidation of spain prepared the war tor the "autocracy" ot Cr.arles V. Ir'j,'hul 
the commercial, the spiritual, and the :pol! tical sceptre tell in this one year 
from the grasp of the Italian., ft ~eapots, p. 423. 
601.'. !lElogio," p. 225. "Papa Innocenz1o 8i laaciava in tutto vovernare a 
lui. 11 
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allies .for the preservation of reace. His fundamental error, aa Guicciardin1 
SSW it, was his strong friendship with Ferrante of Naples and his successor 
Alfonso. To counteract a possible alliance between Florence and Aragon, 
todovico of Milan then jkiitiated positive measures.7 
Each of these changes, Guiceiardini noted, portended quick and steady 
future ones. .An alliance like that of April 1493, geared to the common safety 
of the Pope, the Venetians and the l'iilanese and to active support of Lodovieo 
8 in };is duchy', could not settle the disturbed situation,. Ll)tlovico, realizing 
that he had nothing in common with the Venetians, felt that he could not rely 
on the course of their actions; he conceived the notion of bringing the French 
into Italy to aid his Milanese forces in an invasion of Naples.9 For his own 
reasons, Ercole dlE.te, the Duke of Ferrara and Lodcvicots father-in-law, also 
incited him to invite the French. i't'ith all the Itsllan states at variance, 
Ercole thought he could more easily recover the I-olesine di Ronge which he had 
earlier lost to the Venetians.lO 
To Ouicciardini, the actions of Lodovico i1 Moro and Ercole d'Este were 
typical illustrations of the rampant indiVidualism that wrecked Italy. It was 
nothing more than the vain and immediate advantage of certain ambitious Italian 
7 
storia d'Italia, I, 5-8. 
8rud., 16. 
-
9Ibid., 17. 
-
IDJ:bid., 30. 
-
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signori struggling for power that afforded Charles Vlll and his successors the 
-
opportunity to press Angev1n and Orleanist claims to Naples and MUan.ll 
Lodovico was one of Guicciardini' s blackest villains. The LUke t slack ot 
responsibility was partlcuJarly accountable for the unparalleled succession of 
disastrous events which Guicciardini saw as concrete evidence of "an angry and 
punJ. tive divine judgment." It seEllled clear to him that Lodovico must have 
harbored some realization of the flagrant canbus;iion he was about to kindle, 
else why would he have desired Alexander as an accomplice through the Pope' 8 
acquiescence in these plans.12 Upon Lodovico's death, the historian was moved 
tc ciwracterize his pan-Italian ambitions as too great to be confined within a 
narrow Prison.l .) Ouicciardini made his historical characterization ldth the 
same acuteness as Machiavelli, who wrote of n Marois opportunisma "Lodovico 
Sfona, as a shallow !ran, hopes, then fears, and anchors now to one thing, now 
tr another. u14 FroM the polic:Les of men such as these, the 'words of Hachiavelli 
and Guicciudin1 seem to intimate J stem all the ill. from wh1ch Italy suffers 
while they sadly observe. l"eebleneas and clum.s1neas resulted from prinoely 
attempts to be teo subtle and too astute. 
U Ibid., 1. Princely self1shness ie 11 constant theta :1n Gu1cc1ardini's 
wri tinge:--
12Ibid., 21, 30. 
-
13rbid., 393. 
-
lLHachiavelli, La ~, ed. F. Fanfani and L. Passerini, from Vol. II 
onwards, ed. L. Pasaer1nl""'iiid G. IUlanesi, (; vols. incomplete (Firenze, 1873-
77), II, 1.38. 
On the other hand, it seemed to Guicciardini that princely selfishness 
demonstrated the moral and political weakness of the peninsula. He explained 
even more basic reasons underlying its misery. Since Italy was divided into so 
many principalities and states, it was Itnext to impossible, on account of the 
various inclinations and interests of her rulers, that she should not be 
subjected to continual ferments. nl' Guicciardini understood that internal 
division could only breed disorder. 
It was not surprising to him that the Neapolitans welcomed the French nor 
that no honorable conduct appeared in their kingdomts defense,16 though "the 
known wisdom and understanding of the Italian princes" seemed baffled. As had 
all events in Italy from the arrival of Charles VIII at Asti in the autumn of 
1494, the Neapolitan capitulation portended further disaster for all Italy. 
The beginning of this Italian tragedy was referred to in Guicciardini t s 
Dialo~o. There it appeared even more dolorous inasmuch as it was presented as 
a prophecy made in the long past year of 1494. Wi th an analysis of French 
fortunes in Italy were mingled musings on the Italian future. The Neapolitan 
undertaking had succeeded so well for the invaders that it did not seem that 
they could be easily expelled. Even if this were to happen, it was most 
unlikely that this gigantic effort would be over permanently. The power of 
France was very great, and the French had "tasted the sweetness" of Naples and 
l'Storia d' ltalia, IV, 1-2. 
16Ibid., I, 103-106. 
-
--
stirred up the populace, The occasions for their re-entry could no longer be 
lacking, for Italian unity WtlS shattered and the chains which had held it .f'1rm 
irremediably broken.l7 tiith these invaders entered untold evils - new customs, 
new diseases and, above all, new and bloody methods of war. He wrote: "A door 
was lett open for barbarian nations to invade and oppress us. t,l8 
And such a situation could now come about easily. A mer with ambition, 
anger or fear would no longer hesitate tc; follow the example of Lodovico 
Sforza. Already Gu1cciardini t e mouthp1ece, Bernardo of the T;ial,oso, noted 
:t-:TOposals for German and Spanish help against the Fl'8nch. Not only did he feel. 
that there was no securityagldnet the French but also there was no doubt that 
the way was now opened in Italy for some other nation as well. So would come 
the ''Ultimate ruin, n with e1 ther one victorious conqueror holding the peninsula 
in extreme sam tude or its gradual sl1p into nothingness under the blows of 
l7Ibid., 67, 113. 
-
l8trhe feeling so evident in these wol'da is l'II)8t evident in the original: 
tI, •• ls SJltrat& lore in ltalla e JX)i 10 aequisto d1 que~ta prima impreea e 
state 8i .filice, ch'io non so se el caociargli riuacira cost facilmente, e , , 
quando pure riuscissi, dubi to cbe el giuoco non sara fin! to, perche 1a potenzia 
" , 
eli Francia e grande ed aranno g1a conm:d.neiato a imperan la via" d1 venire!, 
gustato ls dolcezsa di questa Ir0vincia ed acce8~ gl1 animi, ne mancheranno 1e 
eagioni e le cccasiord di farcegl1 venire, J:;Grche la unione di ltal1a • 
conqusssata, e $One rotU quelli vincu11 cbe ls tenevano forma •••• ," r1al.o&,>! 
dis71r,1 ~ reRGt!!.Pto S12'iren,M\, edt Roberto Palmarocohi (Bari, 19~), p. • 
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competing fore1gn groups.19 
Quicc1ardini's attl. tude seemed defeatist 1."J:om the Ye17 begin.1'ling. The 
Italians could in no way pull together against the momter which some of them 
had created. Internal discords are always dreadf'ul, OUicci~...:i.ni argued, but 
especially during a period of invasion. One burning issue was centrol of Pisa. 
This was central tor .rdlan, Venice and FlQrence. ana it brought still anot..~r 
"mediatin£" power into the fertile Italian arena, F)nperor 14aXimllian. 20 Then 
too the bonds of the alliance ot 149.$ amonr: Lodovioo, tn,a Venetians, the Pope 
and the Emperor were superficial and iUnd811'lentally v,;eak, Gu1ceiardini 
observed.21 
His mouthpiece Bernardo agreed that the league would provide super ricial 
19ttOgnuno abe ari ambilione, adegno 0 paura, non potendo satistarsi 0 / 
asejcur~rsi per altra via, oereher'a di tare venire oltramontani, e quanta p1u 
prosperamente saft riuscito al duca tanto piU Vi piglieramo animo gli altri. 
Vedete chs ora per cacciare tranzeai si comi.."1Cl.a a parlare di tedeschi e d1 
spagnuol1J perc non solo 10 non c1 veggo sie~ coo a' tranzesi nen sbhino 
stare 0 tcr.nare in ltalia., ma dubita aneers che non s1 a,Pra la via a qualohe 
altrs nalione. E questa sarebbe 1s. ru1na ultima, perche mentre che 01 staranno 
dtaccordo, 131 mangeranno ItallaJ sa verranno a rottura, la. lacereramoJ e se 
per sox;.te l'uno oltramonteno cacceft "'altra, l'Ital1a re8ter~ in estrema 
servitu ••••• ," ibid., p. 72. 
-
20 6 storie d'Italla, I, 12 I 121-122. 
2l1.2!2., 137-140. 
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unity but, were it to shatter, matters would be more confused than ever. 22 
Guicciardini particularly castigated Venice, whom the other Italian states 
feared. She made temporary alliances with than but terminated each one after 
the 1lmned1ate danger had r:assed. Guicciardini easily pointed to past instances 
of Venetian ambition. After the death of l'~ilippo Haria Visconte in 1441, in 
the times of "padri nostri, ,,23 the Venetians had planned tc usurp control of 
the Duchy ot Kilan as the first step of their domination of all Italy.24 Thei 
actions, Guicciardini agreed, had made the Venetian Republic "universally 
detested. " !4any Italians observed that haughty Venice had long set aside all 
regard to justice am public fBi th aa she openly and opportunistically sought 
to subject the peninsula completely. \<,'hen Venice lost much of her empire in 
1509, a larpe se~ent of the Italian population e:xperienced the "greatest 
pleasure. ,,25 Referring to Venetian ambitions tor Pisa, Guicciardini explained 
that 1 twas Iltheir nature always to embl'ac4" such occasions. ,,26 
Yet Guicciardini well understood that Venice was one of the most venerable 
220uicciardini's mouthpiece Bernardo stateda "Questa lega che ora s1 / . pratica, quando bene ai conchiugga, durera ~anto units quanta questo blsogno 
cha corre ora; di poi reatera ogni con pin confUsa cha m'l11, ft ~al0S2, p. 71. 
2~en during Filippo Maria's lU'at1me, Venice joined Florence against 
Filippo and took Bergamo and Brescia in 1425. 
24 ••• e • viniziani pensorono di usurpare el ducato di NUano, cha non era 
altro che la via di insignorirsi preato d1 tutta Italia .... ," [;1alol[o, p. 62. 
2$Stor.1a d'!talia, II, 282. 
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members of the Italic body. 27 Her plight was strong evidence of the basic 
slteration in peninsular affairs wt-d.eb had taken place between 1494 and 1508. 
The mighty Republic had been assaulted in her eastern outposts from lL99 to 
1503. The new route to the Indies struck at the old trade t.brough the Levant, 
steadily undermining Venetian prosperity. Simultaneously, the steady Turkish 
advance left Venice the alternative of active opposition or accommodation. 
Generally the latter poliey was .followed, much to the disgust o.f other 
European states. 
In this weakened condition, Gu1cciardini pointed out, Venice was prey to 
the similar ambitions of Italians and foreigners. The League of Cambrai of 
recember 1508 was successful in its object of despoiling the envied Republic 
of her possessions on the mainland zd in Apulia. 1'0 Guicciardini, the 
Venetian defeat by the French at Agnadello in Maw 1509 was cn tical for their 
position. Thereafter they surrendered Verona, V1cenza and hldua28 to 
Marlmilian, 'While Pope Julius occupied Ravenna, Rimin1, Faenza and other 
Venetian FOSS8Ssions in the Romagna. To Ferdinand of Aragon fell Brindisi, 
Otranto and other Apullan towns. 
Though the Fowers r.ad expected their .. sault to prove even more successful 
Venice 'was obliged to remain on the defensive from that point onward. For 
27Still Guicciardini could not t>.1de tie admiration for the well-ordered 
'overnt'llent of the Venetian Republic. cr. infra, pp. 394, Ll4. 
28'Ihe Venetians rallied and retook Padua in "~July while Vicenza recalled 
them. 
Guicciardini, the loss of the "greatest parts" of the Venetian empire and her 
fall from the "pinnacle of Italian p~'erft had vital meaning and ramifications. 
for one thing, he noted, many Italians were shocked into a deeper realb.ation 
of their crisis. 
Guicc1ardini realized that, as Venice fen to the "lowe8t" degree of 
misery," she hed nc resources and few hopes. To him thi8 meant nothing le88 
than the absolute stultification of Venetian activ.l. V for the preservation of 
her om liberty. While some grou}:S in Italy were secretly pleased at the 
Republic' e "catastrophic fall from power," he explained, he agreed with the 
oPfcsing group which showed "sounder judgment." For the latter, Venice's 
earlier attempts at Venetian danination receded into the background as their 
1ndi€"nation increased over the dismal situation intensified by foreign inter-
vention. usc great a city, so ancient a seat of liberty, which had diffused 
the splendor of the Italian nane allover the world" was now driven under the 
heel of the foreigner. Ou.1ceiardini, not oblivious of earlier Venetian pride, 
here looked beyond superficialities. Now, he wrote, there remained no bridle 
to foreign fury, for "the most honorable mEmber of the Italic body which had 
maintained the common fame above all others was struck dead and useless. n29 
For GuicCiardini, the defeat of Agnadello represented the danger for the 
common liberty. 
29 
storts d'Italia, II, 282-283. Guicciardini's words are incisive and 
well chosen. Vei'iIce 1'e11 "in tanto estemin:io." 
In a broader sense, the years 1508 and 1509 witnessed the demoralization 
of Italy which had been growi~'J; since the invasions of Charles VIII and Louis 
XII. Guicciardini noted ooncrete evidence of thi.s fact. 1:uring that period, 
the frequent disputes occasioning "wars and revolutions" temina.ted either 
bloodlessly or at the expense at the foreigners who had engineered them, and 
the rrinces rather than the populace bore the brunt of the sultering. The 
League of Cambrai seemed tc carry with it a train of "cruel events" which 
overspread the face at Italy. Everywhere Italians were personally affected by 
seeing nothinr but scene a of devaatation, plunder and alaughter. This waa 
attended by military licent1ouanus, the destruction ot friends as well as toea 
and the wholesale desecration at sacred objects.30 As the small fire of the 
P.isan war was dying down with Pisa' s fall to Florence in 1509, a tar worse con ... 
nagration was burning in Italy. 
It was at thia cn tical jUl'lCture of affairs that Gu1cciardini began to 
participate in the affairs that he was to record with such insight some twenty-
five years later. Until his appointment as a diplomatic representative from 
his native city to the court of Spain, Florence had mainta.ined no repreaentati~ 
there. Now ahe realized, in view of the Holy League of 1511 against France, 
with whom she was embarrasBingly allied, that it would be to her advantage to 
safeguard connections with both powers. Thus she oould maintain neutrallty. 
Piero E«ierini. the gonfaloniere, deSired the ambaasador "to defend Florence 
against the accusations of the Pope" and to try to dispose Ferdinand of Aragon 
-
30Ibid., 245-246. 
-
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favorably towards the Republic. 31 As an Italian, Ouicciardini understood that 
anY peace must be a balanced one and not Spanish. The Italians were not 
expending their etforts nerely to chanfe masters, but the anti-French league 
evidenced their desire to free Italy from all tfbarbarians.tt32 
Though the ambaseador's ase1gnment was a difficult one, calling for all tho. 
skill that he could draw upon, the Dieci33 gave him no helpful adVice. It , 
was not unusual for a period of three months to pass without any communication 
from them while Guicciardini, on the contrary, referred frequently to that 
body.34 The entire situation evidenced, as he testified, that there was a 
genuine bitterneea in their relationships.3> 
Though Florence, traditionally friendly with France, decided in favor of 
3101etea, Gu1chardtn, pp. bo-1&LJ cf. also R:loolfi, :t-lachiavel11, p. 127, 
for the view thit, wEn. Soderini and his fac't1on dictated Guicciardini' s 
instructions, they were written and handed to him by the well ... krtawn Secretary 
of the Republic. Hence these two great poll tical wn tel'S must have come face 
to face at t:b.1.s time. 
321 .. etter to Jacopo Salviati, July 4, 1513, Ctu'teut. I, 194. The worde 
are "non per mutare padrone." 
33The Dieci di Balla were a committee appointed whenever a war threatened 
am had the l'espo'iiii'6inty' of complete m.magement of affairs during the war 
period. In earlier Florentine hiStory, this had been fa leading function of the 
priors. cr. Schevill, Florence, p. 342. 
34Ridolfi, Gu1cciard1n1, pp. 48, 67. 
3%etter to his brothers, Luigi and Jaeopo, r~ay 14. 1$12 .. CartefQ., X, 52. 
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LOuis XII atter the French victory at Ravenna in April 1512,)6 the Spanish 
residence ot Guicciardini had far-renchinr, effects on him personally. Uis 
experience in Epain born r~arch 1512 to !-ecember 151L, had led him to realize 
the folly of the Julian league with its desire to bring t:eace to Italy by 
setting Aragonese against French, alrea.dy at fierce odds, and by having 
"barbarians more than Italians spend tLeir blood against the French." He .f'eare~ 
that it would not be so easy to expel the already-weakened Spanish troops with 
Italy's own arms and forces. Instead of praise tor the sentiments which 
inspired the HolJ" League of 1511, Guicciardini could only indicate the super-
ficial1ty of Pope Julius II's t.ttle, ttr::eliverer of Italy, if and the hope1esenesa 
of the task t.l-tat this suegested. The rampant internal an:1mosities would make 
any ctoperatton d1tficult to achieve. Further, the undistinguished forces of 
Italy" v1thout adequate leaderah1p, could not drive the conqueror from ltaly.37 
This po1nt was clear to Guicc1ardin1 from 1495, when Naples had fallen to 
the French. From his youthfUl yea.rs, he showed intense interest in military 
questions, for these were intimately linked with the strength of a state. The 
Spanish residence erystalli~ed the .. views. 'l'he Italian soldiery consisted o£ 
a heterogeneous mixture of peasants and :rr& n of low social strata, all subjects 
,36Guiccia.rdini complained that Machiavelli had given him a one-sided 
account of this battle. Letter to his brother Luigi, August 22 .. 1512 .. ibid., 
p. 90. Cf. also Ariosto.s words on Rl,venna in praise of the Lily which deI'eate 
the "rich Acorns of Gold," in Julius' coat-ot-arma, and "broke the yellow and 
vermillion staff I P refelTing to the Spanish colors, Orlando furioso, 14.2-10. 
Ariosto of course had praise for the French with whom his ra ti'On, Alfonso d lEst .. 
was al11ed, ibid. 
-
.37 storia d'Itali., III, 129-130. 
of different rulers and se1r1om subjects of the f,rince they served in battle. 
Unlike the French 1!fl'fIfY, for example, whlch fought in well-or€anized squadrons, 
the Italians d:lspersed themselves in the open country and retired te the river-
38 banks or ditches at any danger of attack. Guiccardini intimated that this 
was cowardly action. 
Guicciardini undcrstoo:j that the "Vital spiritstl of Italy were quickly 
being sapped.~9 She Simply did not have the resources, military or spiritual, 
to take unnecessary and unwise risks like the League of 1511. In 1512, 
Guicclardini 'e conservative perscnali ty di d not allow him to be an advocate ot 
any plan that was rash or hastily conceived. He placed himself in the ''Wiser 
group" who believed it would be better to shoulder the lesser burden of foreign 
habitation than to invite ul timate disaster by unwise action. God or a happy 
turn of fortune would undoubte<Uy bring about a more oPJ.:ortune time for action 
than the present afforded.LiO 
To Guicciardini, the moat eflective remedy seemed to be a "balance of 
power" between the French and Spanish rulers.41 He felt that this alone would 
38Ibid., I, 71-73. 
-
.39xbid., Ill, 129-130. 
-
4OJ:b1d., Referring to an event of 1$30, he wrote that "the success was no 
greater tEa.'l t!1e rashness of the resolution had been extraordinary." At tr .. 
same time J however, he understood that tensi.on sanet1mes foeds groups to hasty 
action, '*1£ those counsels can be called rash which are prompted by tr.e last 
necessit,y," ibid., V, 296. 
-
4lrurint; t.~e summer following the French victory at Ravenna and their 
sudden decline ther6atter, Ou1cciardini wrote from Spain that the Spaniards we~ 
still watching the French: ROli earebbe dunque piaciute veder declinare Franci 
l'!lS non t.anto che gli Spagnoli non le aV8esero ad avere risp .. tto .... ,11 Letter to 
Jacopo ..:ialviati, July 27, 1.512, carmel 1, 198. This waa the "balance of 
POwer" which he too was then advoca g. 
-Lo 
secure the freedom of those Italian areas not yet subject to foreign control. 
ctherwise the battl~s of the pO"tTers for supremacy on Italian so11 might be 
superseded by cooperative action to subjF.lct Italy. L2 
Not yet thirty years of age in 1512, as yet without years of the observ-
snce of shrewd and oonnivinr: rulers and diplomats, Gulcciardlni r.ad the 
poll tical acumen and the natural good sense which enabled him to' note the un-
certainty of Ferdinand's proposal to tighten Spanish relations with Florence.43 
As matters v."fJre tending, Gl1icciardin1 con:t1ded to his father that he judged the 
lTlaintenance of "buona amicizia" with the Spaniah King to be good for Florence, 
but he was not at all sure that her citizens were "ready to throw themselves 
into Ferdinand's arms. tI The King, and even those not so highly esteemed, 'WOuld 
look first to individual advantage in spite of protestations ot £ri.endship. w.. 
, 
It is important to stress that OUicciardini saw this individualism Of;i)r..:~~~ 
both wi thin the peninsula and in the ranks of foreign rulers. There was no 
trust anywhere. '.]hile rulers of all times look to their individual advantsre, 
but Guiceiard1ni vie'Wed this situation as excessive within his own age. 
Guicc1ardini understood too that, while l'~erdinand plied his stock trade in 
L2storia d'Ital.t!, nI, 12$ ... 130. 
43Lettor to the tieci and to P1ero Gu1ceiardini, .september 17, 1512, 
9arteggi, I, 102. " 
lt4Letter of Guieciardini to his father Piero, December 11., 1512" 1bid., 
133. These words should be particularly noted Itt ••• sarentene de lui 'ed'a111 
al tri stimati. meno J ne fate conto che 11 mostrare arnore 0 fede abbi ne' bisogni 
vostri a f'arrl valere di lui, se non quanto 10 conducessi 10 interesse suo 
schietto; e chi facessi 11 conto altrimento potrebbe trovarsene inr-annato, 
perch~ qui s1 va solo drieto allo utile, sanza respetto di cosa alcuna." 
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papal criticisms, the King was not oblivious that Julius· anti-Freneh endeavors 
cou.l:-l benefit h1ll'1 as well. One strong individual could well recognize another. 
OUicciardini lijd net h1t;1"e his admiration for Ferdinand's methods. From this 
period onward, the ruler who failed to keep his promise of safeguarding 
Florence, the incomparably succesetul Catholic King, became Ouicciardin1's 
model prince just as Cesare Borgia was ?!achiavelli ts. This face is imjX)rtant 
for an underartandinll, of Ouiccia:rd:tni's mentality, for he saw in Ferdinand the 
ver:t qualities that were laCking in tlle Italian rulers. 
Guicciardini was particularly interested in the :military establiabment of 
Spain and in the moral calibre of her people.45 He stressed that the proud, 
mil1 taristic Spaniards were not un:1..fied and in(1ependent. '!he underlying thetne 
of the ftRelazione rt builds upon this fact. Because the land had just, but 
severe rulers like Ferdinand, capable of cooperating with fortune and of 
impoe1ng an iron-clad, energetic discipline, she could look ahead to still 
greater power and g.lory by casting her views outward. This she had envisioned 
in sending armies into Italy to st.ru!"gle for cont:ro1 of the peninsula.lit: As an 
Italian, Ouicciard1n1 did not look kindly of course upon this occurrence, but 
he could not refrain from expressinr his admimtion tor a land so ably run that 
such a feat was possible. 
4'Cf. these wriUngs in Scritti autobioEirat'ici, pp. 101-124, pp. 125-146. 
His discuaaion centers on the &bad areas 01 Aragon, Castile and Portugal. 
Other areas at the Iberian peninsula he handled as subdivisions. 
L6Ibitl 
-'. 
-
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He explained that "8.' tempi noatri ff Sr.-in showed itself very enlightened, 
for, with her consolidation, she left the obscurity that had seemed natural to 
her. The glory of her king and bis outstanding deeds were known to all the 
world,47 but OUicciardini continued to elaborate on his Virtues. He testified 
to Ferdinand's kindl1neaa yet ldngllness in his personal audiences. Before he 
spoke, he we.ighed every word and made certain that h1.s expressed thought. were 
like to those of good and wise men. Though excellent in arne, r.e did not 
neglect religion, in him, according to Guicc1erd1n1, ''Very great. n 
Guic:cisrdini made no judgment on the r:reed commonly attributed to Ferdinand. 
Perhaps a tight hold on Spanish pureestrings was necessary, for there were many 
expenses in governing 80 large and important a kingdom. 
Above all, Ouicciard1n1 was impressed by li'erdinand ta basic method of state. 
craft. He handled all matters seoretly, and tlis indicated wisdom. He confelTE~. 
on no matter unless by necessity. A patient man, he lived in an orderly 
atmosphere un'jar a strict schedule. Thus hie daai.re that f"reat matters and 
small f.11SS through his hands could readily be actuated.48 His subjects were by 
no means always aware of this ccmplexityof their ldng's statecraft. He made 
certain that any measure he desired to carry out would be proclaimed first in 
~rder tc win popular favor tor it. This made it appear that the King was simpl~ 
if'oUOW1ng popular wishes.49 Nor did Guicciardini hesitate to point out that 
47 Ibid., p. 137. 
-48 Ibid., p. 138. 
-
49R1cordi, I, $1. 
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Ferdinand "gave lustre to all his enterprises" by causing it tc appear that all 
wero directed tc the defenGe of the Church or to the spread of the Christian 
'"'0 faith rather than to his own majesty or security." 
~1ost significantly, Ouicciardini did not fail to not$ that fortuna was not 
, 
lacld.nf, tc a man of such virtu. Already in 1~2 two concepts fundamente.l. to 
F..enaisaa.nce thinld.ng were intermingled in his mind with all the complex1 ties of 
Guicciardini's observation of the critical nature of 1509, based largely 
upon the Venetian defeat, proved its accuracy in succeedillf; years. No longer 
did he look for any silver lining in the Italian cloud. Any hopes the 
Venetians had at the beg-inning of 1513 tor a retum of ftold times" were brutal!; 
shattered}l Papal cooperation with the 1l'ilperor afainat Venice in that year 181 
to further devastation of her territory. OU1cciardini found the situaticn more 
piteous than ever, for the Italian soldiers, includinr those of the Pope, were 
as savage 88 the "barbarian" troops. Guicciardini, sympathizing with the low 
Venetian morale, explained how inconceivable it was that a small army could 80 
outrageously insult the glorious name of the Republic ot Saint Nark.52 
\1iith the imperial-Venetian accord of 1516, however, the nobility and 
population of Venice again expected the return of better times for they 
50Ibid., II, 142. 
>"'lstoria d*Italia, In, 241 • • _ ................ oiiiiIiiiioi ... 
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believed that conflict was finally at an end. 53 Guicciardini stressed that 
this reneral feellng existed throughout the Italian states, underscored by the 
removal of all occasions for a war between the French King agsir.st the Emperor 
and Cathollc King. This fJEt8Ce among all the potentates of Christendom did 
indeed, Ouiceiardini wxote, ..!.!.!! to haVe crushed all the seeds of ,,1&1" and 
discord in Italy.54 But this could. not be, he pointed out, because the princes 
of Italy had not come to realize the folly of the common policy of pursuL"lg 
their own desires with foreign assistance. As Lodovice il Hero r.,etere him, 
Francesco Marla della Revere in 1517 requested the Spanish troops in Verona, in 
addi tion to the French and Venetian infantry, to aid him in the recovery of the 
states £rom which the Pope i:ad driven him that aumner. Nor did the "author of 
these new tumults" find it difficult to persuade these .foreign troops to act 
wi til him. Accustomed as they were in the m3.I\V ware to plundering towns 8..'ld 
ravaging countries, to them ttnothing was more distastefUl than the peace to 
which all the a.ffairs of ltaly, they an, had a definite tendenCy."S, 
At the very period when peace eeaned to be a possibility" 1516, 
Cuicciardini began his long tem of papal..;r.~edicean service, until 1523 governo 
of I<odena with jurisdiction over Reggio and Parma and their territories, and 
fi.'1ally president of the p.omagna under Clement VII, from 1524 to 1;27. 
Certainly he was occupied with detailed and burdensome daily tasks but he never 
..,. 
53rbid., 40.3-404. 
-54 Ibid., IV, 1. 
-
55Ib1d., 2. 
-
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lacked a view of the total picture. The penetratJ.ng vision that he displayed 
while in ,[epa! service served him well when he wrcte the Storia dtltalia. some 
fifteen years later.· 
Ouicciardini explained the significance of 1521, when Italy became 
embroiled in ware greater in scope, duration and dange%' than. those past. He 
described the ambition and poIN"Gr of Fr&neie I and Charles V, their hatred and 
jealousy, and their emulation of each other. v:hat bothered Ou.icciardini was 
the fact that Italy oould have enjoyed even a longer period or her rather 
dubious "peace." No urgent reaGCm ensted for a major war in 1521. The 
balan~e of the two princes' power within Italy was almost even; it would. have 
been vary difficult for one to injure the other without the assistance of some 
of the Italian pwera. King Francis, then nUied with the Venetians, seemed 
sufficiently secure in his possession of MUan. Emperc:r Charles seemed well 
control of Naples, and a French attack upon it would have been very difficult 
without papal concurrence. Neither the French nor tho SWiss mercenaries wre 
apprehensive of azr:I imper1al movement from the southern kingdom or from 
Gemany.,56 In Guieeiardini fS jud@nent, it was once again the story of an 
Italian prince" Pope Leo X, who broke the peace.57 
v.'hile OUicciardini aocused Leo of unwise action in 1521, he certainly 
recogn:b,ed that Leo had to act. Italy could no longer be free fran barbarians 
The diplomat who spoke these words was clearly OUiociardin1's mouthpieoe, and 
.. 
50Ibid., 77-78. 
-
57Cf. intra, PP. 117-118. 
-he continued that if' theN l'..ad to be a conflict, it was much better tor all the 
peoples of Italy that there be two powers involved rather tf .. m1 one. In their 
SA 
competition would consist the safety of the Italian state •• ~ 
!n any event, by 1525, the wisest course of action seemed to bo an allied 
lear:'Uo, headed by Cloment ID, against the po;,,'Gr of Chal~les V. Guicciardini 
had .foresPen some of the essential faults of the proposed I,.guo \!bile it was 
under discueaion. He explained tbet in i t3 leadership and its armies were a 
{freat variety of intereste and motives so that disorders, 1ndigl'\.£.tion, reeent-
ments and distrust were bound to arise. Guieciardini pointed at both the 
papacy and the Venetian Republic as Inajor examples. Church weapol'\.8 had 
"naturally blunt edges" and those of the Venetians were no keener. He asked, 
it each were fla bad cutter" when aetlng separately, what could b" expected. when 
59 they acted. together? Further, Cu1cciardini knew that in allied ranks there 
would be a lack of promptness to take adVantage of favorable opportunities and 
tel resist stumbling blocks to pot,ential su.ccess.6O 
Guicciardini did not, lose any OPtOrtun1t7 to show that the Venetians had 
-
S8nse 1a fortuna buona di Italia avesBi potuto pi; coo 1& imprudepsis. di 
Lod()vico Sforza, e poi, ehe 1a nostra 0 troppa paura 0 trappe cupid! ta, non 
earebbono e,l trsmontani. in Italia, e· questa suebhe ls feliciU eli tutta r,iuest& 
provincia e speaial..rnente la nostra., che eravamo temuti de. 11 altri, ed in fatto 
<wvarno .. si puo 011"8, 1e legge a tutti, !'r18 poi che le cose acno scone in 111ogo 
che mon si puo sperare ella Italia eia sanza barberi, e mo1to IIlegUo per noi e 
per 1i altri ita1181ti. aha ce ne sia due~ che uno, perche'1& emulaz,ione che 
arauno queeti dua potenti insieme, sarff 1a guardia de f manco potenti. ed in 
spade, cieecuna fa1"8/ a gara .:ii intrattenere 18 nostra republlca. perch'in tal 
caso troppo i1'l.l.,POrtera la potenaia nostra, tt ibid... p. 123. 
-
59storia. d t ltal1a, IV, 326. 
60Ibid. 
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not completely learned their lessons. He became deeply aware of this fact 
during the 1,20·8. He analj'"2ed their policy, continually nuctusting in 1525, 
for they stood aloof as they sought to di. scovel' what \>1&S most favorable to them 
He explained that they would stand undecided as long as they could, and, if 
forced to take a stand, theY' would take that which they found most to their 
selfish advantage. They certain.ly would not look to the welfare of all 
Italy. 6J. 
In spite of the difficulties which the League would faee from its 
inception, Guicciardini understood that it was this or nothing. While laboring 
in the Romagna, he had heard th.e usual rumors and repone of action on both 
sides. On public atfairs, S!. rebu~ eblic1s, he admitted he did not know what 
to sq. Upon seeing eT81"'1ODe opposed ttl t ald.ng bold but necel88l7 action, the 
only course possible, he had "lost his bearingS.1f He wrote. 
I never heard of aJl3'ODe who when he saw a storm coming did not attenpt 
to take cover, except ourselves, ""710 preteI' to wait for it in the middle 
of the road without any protection. So ••• we shall not be able to say 
that government has been taken from us, but that t~ter elai,sa sit de manibus.62 .. 1M - __ 
In December he learned that the Pope wanted his services in still another 
capaCity. This turned out to be the job of conduoting the papal-imperial. 
armies in war, the "bold coursen to which he had referred. Later, when he was 
assured of his position, he regretted that he had delayed 80 long in accepting 
it. He expla1nfS>d that "the greatest satisfaction I can haYe fmm my sem.ce 
• 
61Ibid., 302-303. 
62r.etter to l-1achiavelli, reoember 26, 152>, f.ettere Xmni11ari, p. 4l,a. 
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is to see that Your Holiness does not intend to wait to be oonquered.,,63 
}1schiaw111 too beard rumors regarding the anti-imperialist alliance under 
discussion and on a possible agreement between Charles and Francis as well. In 
Jamtary 1526, before the conclusion of the latter, }'Iachiavelli had news of both 
Apparently he had leamed that an Italian league wu being negotiated with 
France. This he favored. Subsequently word was received that King and 
Dnr:eror had reaohed an agreement, but l-1achiave111 did not seem to know that it 
was not yet final as of January. He judged that Charles made this agreement so 
that France would break with the Pope and, when this was done, the Emperor 
would then not honor his word with France.64 
Machiavelli wrote at length on !mparlal poll tics. He always described 
Charles as a wily diplomat Woo had 0:--;:; objective, to make h1mse1t supreme. 
"'hi1e he held King FranCis prisoner, he could tenpt now France and now the Pope 
with the hopt of an agreement without ever brealdng off negotiations or bring-
ing them to a conclusion. }~aoh1avelli 'WrOte ot the Fmperor that "when he sees 
that the Italian, are about to join with France, he takes up the negotiations 
with France again so that they do not reach an agreement, and he wins the 
game. n6S Machiavelli was imlined to think that the Emperor would never 
release the King, whatever their agreement. 
For a whUe, Machiavelli seemed to be right. Quiociardini wrote later 
6%etter to Clement VII, fecember, 1525, QP:!r! i.Mdite, VIiI, 355. 
~etter to Guiociardin.i, J'anua ... $ 3, :a.;,~6 .. lAtt~'e !aroif1ari, p. 470. 
tSIbid. 
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that, despite the manifestations of peace and friendship, Francis was tightly 
guarded and given no increased freedom of JI'lOvement. As he put it. "At the 
same time Frallcis was care.ad Uke Q brother, he was guarded like a prisoner." 
It was clear that this was tte concord full of discord, an affinity without 
af'!'ect1on,» for "the old jealousies and contests between them !franCis and 
Charley would on every occasion rrevail over all regard !'or ties and 
alliances. nc6 Both Machiavelli and Guicciardini could estimate things well. 
In Charles' next step, which Machiavelli had foretold, 1".8 attempt-ed to deal. wit! 
the Pope. 
Later wi ten have followed Ouicciardini' s incis1. ve account signal1inR the 
course of events which logically spelled Italyts political doom. (1uicciardin1 
agreed t.hat the King at France was exelusivaly prompted by his own sel:C-
interest. hben Francis saw that the Emperor would not change the }1adrid agree-
mrmt and that to delay entry into the League any longer sd.ght induce the Pope 
to ma.lee other plans, he joined with the Venetians and Duke Francesco Sforza. He 
hoped that this alliance, concluded at Cognac on 11ay 17, 1526, would give the 
impression that he was in oomplete control of the situation and that, with this 
realization, the Emperor might in some way become more fiex1ble.67 By acting 
now as "a sell8ible man," Machiavelli wrote, Francis Ifoould not prevent the 
Fmperor from beine made to look a tool. tf68 
(:6~toria d'Ital1a, IV, 351. 
61Ibid., 14-16. cr. also Carteggi, VIII, 188, 191, for Gu1ceiardin1 's 
explaniiI'on that the League of Cognac was concluded on May 22 but at Rome the 
news was that all difficulties were resolved at the end of the day on the 17th. 
68tetter to Gu1cciardini, March 15, 1526, Lette.re familiari, p. L76. 
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Th<>ugh Francis delayed ratification and failed to cooperate by &ending 
troops and 1'!I)007, Charles showed fear of the coalition. He tantelized the 
?epe with hopes of peace for Italy if only Clement would not interfere in 
affairs between Francis and him. But the .Pope 'Would no longer listen and all 
things tended to a serious break in papal.-1mperial relations.69 The Pope 
comrrai tted himself' to the League of Cofl!lS.C and the balanee of power was 
destroyed, but almost insurmountable problems remained for the allies. 
Yet hope sometimes makes one Sf,eak in glowing terms of gnat projects wi th 
noble ends. Guicc1ardini, as lieutenant-general of the pOntifical armies,. wrot 
that the principal aim of this "Holy Leaeue II of Cognac wu the attainment of 
uthe £1tneral welfare ot all Italy and the uni vtlrsal good of Christian! ty. ,,70 
He expressed the opimon of all patriots when he spolre of the war as Il "holy 
and necessary national event. tin 
It was om thing to conclude a formal I,eague, but. there remained serious 
problema it the League was to have any !'ractieaJ, value. Ouieciardin1 realized 
this. He and Hach1avelll .tnaeed that the first order of buline8s was to f1.nd 
a commander, who" by his name md hi. ability .. could inspire COnfidence.72 Of 
Giovanni de' l'1ediei, the final chtJice of the allies, Macbia.velli wrote I 
-
I believe everyone is agreed that among Italians thet'S 1. 00 leader 
whom the soldiers more willingly follow or or whom the Spaniards have 
69storta ? 'Ital1a, V I 19-22. 
7Cr..etter to Latino Giovenale, August 11, 1526, certegs±' n, p. 124. The 
words are " ... per conw.me sa1.u"~e di tueta Italia, ani! bene universale della 
Cristiani t&." 
719Rere 1ned1te, I, 393. 
72stor1~ d t ltal1a, V, 16~9. 
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more fear or are lllora cautious. Fveryone feels that Signor Giovanni 
is brave, impetuous, with rreat ambitions and capable of bold 
decisions. 7 '3 
But G'llieoiardini, like Machiavelli, \<1as a-,mre of the continuing need for 
int6!!sive pla::n1ng and for ecnstant enthusiasm and cooperetion on the purt of 
the allies to make a BUCce8. or the venture. Though he was ldlline to obey 
the Pope a'ld the Venetians, Guicciardini found himself' w"Ondering about hie 
personal reason for workinr, eo hardl74 To the otto75 he explained that his 
"infinite occupations .. tI unimaginable to those 'it'ho did not witness them, were· 
the cnly reason he clid not report daily.76 He spent only s. 11 tUe time on 
-
7%etter to Cuicciardini, March 15, 1526, lAttere fSlfl.iliari, p. 476. Cf. 
stod.a d t ltal1a, V, 60, for OUicciardinifs concurrence In ihe aew of 
!l;aehlavem. After having observed trds soldier in action, he commented on his 
shill ty to infuse light into a group despised before they came under his 
command. Cf. ibid., 92, for a laudatory estimate of Giovan..l11 de' Medici's 
character and Cii'ier after his doth. 
71, 
*Letter to Giamatteo Glberti, July Z1, 1526, 2lJ!t! toed! te, I, L6. Note 
Guicciardini Ie languid we,rdSt " ... ncn l!lO a chi!}' fine 10 m! ahH tant8 fs.t.ice 
•••• " i.<lith OUieeiardini himself, Oiberti, the r;~o-lrench counsellor of Clement 
VII, had been one of the movi... ..... g sptrlte in the promotion of the League o~ 
Cognac. Pastor obse"ee that Giberti had deceived himself in holding that the 
League of Cognac eouJ.c settle the iseue ot the freedom or the rerr>etnal slavery 
of Italy. The st1pul.a tiona agreed on were such that, even if tt .. League t IS 
armies would prove sueceas.tul, the influence then 4CCruing to France in Italian 
affairs would be incompatible with !talian independence, Rister:.2!.!ill! Popes, 
IX, 3O~. . 
75 The otto di Pratiea, a permanent cOl'lmti ttee tt)r speedy and etricient 
action in foreIgiland iilIItary matters, wae instituted in Florence by Lorenzo 
de' t;1edici in 14r~o an,j reestabH.shed with the Ne11e1 restoration of 1512, 
Schevill, Histo~ s:! r'lo:rence, pp. 39t-'391, 475. This couneil had the funct10m 
of the'.lieCI (fU ne t&i r,.Hode of Medici dor.Unation, Ridolfi, Machiavelli .. 
p. 263, -no: ~. '" 
76Letter to the ~ S Pratica, Auguat 2, 1$26, Cartegg1J IX, 11-18. 
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entertainment but found 1 t important to keep his mental balance. Ouiec1ard1n1 
told l'1aehiavelll tlst the performance of his comedy, the ''l'landragola, fI unlike 
a speedy solution of Italyts .political woes, is something "within our power so 
that one is not wasting one's time th1nldng about it.77 Entertainment, he 
continUed, is ''more MCessary than ever in these turbulent times. tI 
Guicciardini's burdens were well-understood by the Lear-ue in Florence. 
Machiavelli's manifold duties included militar,r matters, and he urged the Pope 
to (·rganize the papal a~ along the lines ot the democratic-type militias 
already inaugurated in norenoe. But Guicoiardini did not find such a system 
wise or feasible.78 
The all.1ed leaders hoped against hope that the League's difficulties, so 
apparent from the ber,:inn1ng, could be sumounted. Ouicciardini wrote later 
that the articles of' the all.1ance "without doubt should have been more distinct 
and the security for their observance better established. n Hindsight had made 
one pOint very clear, the war should not have begun in the spring of 1526, 
before the SWiss allies had started to march and aU provisions were actually 
on hand. Gu1cc1ardini constantly complained of' the f,wis8 delay and the lack ot 
provisions. Years later he explained the League might also have been 
S'ITtS'ICTEENED BY n~CLUDING TI-IE English King whom the allies had not approached 
59. 
nLetter to liachiavelli, feecher 26, 152" Letters f~ari. p. 1&68. 
78 Guicc1ard1ni saw too many faults with these miut&s. Cf. illtta. pp. 56-
on account of the distanceS 79 But it was the warning sounded b~l Hachiavell1 
on the very day the League was formed that told Italy what she needed to 
,urv1ve. In spite of all complications and problema, he bade citizens to be 
cautioUS and dedicated: "Liberata dluturna cure Italiam. nSO Yet OUicc1ardin1 
round 1 t difficult to imagine "that victory would be lacking to us if they 
81 ffihe allie!! would do their duty with pzomptness. It Somewhat paradoxically, 
OUicciardini wanted to hope, but the desire to be optimistic could not destroy 
bis more basic pessimism. 
Yet very early in the history of the League ot Cognac, OUicciardini vas 
shaken by the !:uke Urbina's retreat from the gates of Milan in July when it 
appeared possible tor the allies to take the City.82 This would have eonstitu-
ted a varJ significant success. 'W'h1le realizing the plight of the r'lilanese, 
he cr! ticized the selfish motive which guided their actions, namelY, they 
wanted to save their own necks and were wi111ng to cooperate with the resident 
imperial soldiery it this could be accompUshed. On the other hand, 
Gu1ceiardini was quite s,apathetic. The l-!llaneae had too many masters, hence 
too many burdens. Not only were they subject to the exactions ot the Constable 
of Bourbon but also to t bon ot the League f s sold! ere now encamped around the 
City. Ouicc1ardini was highly er! tical of the allied troops as he pointed out 
79storia d'Itslia, V, 11 • 
• 
8Or.etter to Gu1cc1ard1ni, Mq 17, 1,26, Lettere familiari, p. 1189. 
8J.Letter to J31shop Altobello Averold1, July 28, 1$26, Carte,S!' IX, 58. 
82cr. Guicciardi,nits account ot Urbino's retreat in Storia d t ltal1a, V, 
36-Ll. 
that 11ilanese relief at their arrival. now turned to hatred.83 
In the months of tension following the formation ot the League ot Cognac, 
Quicciardini t s correspondence renected his concern over certain matten which, 
ha.d they 'been handled well, could have given his side an eatry victory. Aside 
from the manifest coldness ot the French King in the prosecution of the war,8L 
Quicciardini complained most of the Swiss delay. He looked back upon the 
optimism ot the allies at the beginning of the war and blamed the Swiss for 
preventing an early Victory. He pointed out with an obvious pride that an 
imperial amy up to the present unconquered had been on the verge of c8feat at 
the hands of the Italian forces alone.8S Nor were the J.''ilaneae free from guilt 
that matters did not turn out well for t,.'1e League. \-/hen theSw1H did not come 
83cr. ~., LS-52. 
8LGuicciardini made reference to this in several letters. The "good words 
and hopes of the King are not enough, for effects are needed •••• ,,, Letter to 
Roberto Acciauol1, August 3, 1526, CartesPJ ~, 82. (Acciauol1 was the papal 
repreaentati Te in France). Cf. alao dUIcciardin1' a frank words: "La freddeza 
d1 Francia ~ manif'est1881ma •••• , tf Letter to G1am._tteo Giberti, Auguet 9, 1526 
ib1d., 112, and another reference to "la freddeza d1 Francia," August 22, lS26, 
mer., 174. 
-
85tetter to Uberto Gambara, August 3, 1526, 1bid., 83. Cf. also letter to 
Roberto Acc1auol1, Auguet ), 1.$26, ~., 82, £or()UI'cc1ardini t s note that, wbe 
opportunities (di fare taccende) have once been lost, things do not always turn 
ou t the way one wanti-'tli. to (!!. gUal1 !l2!! tornano sempre 9.uando 1 thuomo !! 
dee1dera). 
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in time, they lost their enthusiasm.86 With the passing of many "beautiful 
occasions': for victory, Guice1ardini foreAW that the war was likelJ.- to be long 
and difficult and to cost much money. He stated frankly that he did not know 
hoW long the allies could car.r.y on.57 Each dsy he awaited new disaster for, 
every time the Swiss failed to replJr to new requests for military aid, trouble 
occurred.88 And he believed that a long war was not less a curse for the 
imperialists than for the allies. He conf'eaaed that he would hold for a long 
war if he was certain that, by tiring the adversary, the League could achieve 
viCtory, but he knew it would have been better to win in the beginn1ng.89 
8tLetter to Oiammatteo Gibert!, July 31, 1526, ~., 69. The reference 
to the League army's position at the time of the }4il8neee surrender to the 
imperiallsts on July 2h is as followsr "lJidlail fu bactuto innanzi paseass1mo 
e fiumi. ft 
87 Letter to Oberlo Gambera, August 3, 1526, Cartese., n, 83. 
88 Letter to Roberto Acciauoli, August 22, 152£, .!!?!s!., 168. Note 
Gu1cciardin1 t s personal anx1.ety in his responsibilities: ft ••• aspeeto o~ 
mactina qualche grandi.a1mo disordine." cr. also his words to Giberti: .. ttE vel'l 
ehe aiamo in grande t0n.fUs1one et in grande 80ma de t SVizen, nata per 14 varie~ et difficul ta del levargl1 et in questa ci bi80ena fare qualche 
resoluUone ••••• ," letter to G1ammatteo 0ibert1, August 22, 1526, !!:.!.!!_, 17h. 
89Letter to Jaeopo Salviati, August 16, 1526, ibid., lUO. Note 
Gu1CCiardini',s words, " ••• Gt che in dubio, 10 non m-per accostarmi sempre 
alis parte p1u s1cura. Per la qual. ragione, Ie 10 fusli corta che con 1& 
lungheza fUuimo per stracchara gU inimic1 et havere 18 victona, lOderei 
questo cammino per el piU aicuro, quando bene 10 cOgDOscees1 che anche 14 via 
breve fua8i sicura. Ma 10 ho s_pre giudicato et giudico che la lungheza sia 
non IilSnCO pitricolosa per noi ahe per 101"0, II ibid., 139-140. 
-
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The many difficulties stemdng from Francis Its defeat at Fevia and the 
innumerable problems since the formation of the League of Cognac in May 1526 
presented i-iachiavell1 J l.1ke Ouicciardini, the opportunity to make certain 
observations on miUtary matters. \,;itbin norence he had already organized a. 
democratic-type militia.90 Maohiavelli waa convinced that" if the rest of 
Italy used this system, it would help the Bllied cause. 
His interest in military matters in connection with the problema of the 
Italian states resulted in his Art of \o;ar. At the critical juncture of mid ... 
---
1$2$, he decided, on the basis ot the evident succeas of his ideas in Florence 
not only to seek sUPPOrt for his latoria in Rome but also personally to 
acquaint Clement VII with his military proposals. Not only the Pope but also 
his advisers, the Cardinals Salviati, Sadoleto and schomberg admitted their 
value.91 
Machiavelli was sent to OUicciardini in Feenza w.l th an urgent papal brief 
which explained in the main that extraordinary diseases demand extraordinary 
rerr.e!i1es. On the inauguration of mill ties, Gulcciard1n1 was reminded, ttdepen(l 
the safety of the papal states sa ",.11 as that of the whole of Italy and 
9~or an account of the working of the native army and the dUticulties 
Machiavelli encountered in attempting to revive a martial ardor which had 
perished during the employment of mercenary troop8t cf. Francis A. Hyett, 
Forence. Her Hi.toa and Art to the Fall of the Itepublic (London, 1903), p. ~a. Ouiee!ardIiiIis moUihPIeee;""Bernardo de!' ~lero, itressed th1s very point, 
Dial0S2 !!!!. reSfj'.im!nto, pp. 90-93. 
91Ridolfi, Machiavelli, p. 213. 
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practiCally the whole of ct~1stendam.u92 Guicciardini was informed in advance 
of Nachiave1l1's arrival by his agent at the court of Rome, Csstu'e Colombo, so 
be had his answer ready. Already on June 16, 1$2$, he wrote to Colombo. "Ask 
on my behalf to what end the Pope plans this, for, if he intends it as a remedy 
for present dangers, it is a proViaion which cannot come in time. tt9.3 
OUicciardin1 t IS complaints on the Italian mill t.ary 8i tuation in 1526 were the 
more pitiful. in that the hopelessness of the situation had been evident for 
over a year! 
After f.1achiavell1 presented his business to OUicciardini, the latter 
explained that no one could deny the practicality of the militia system. If 
this plan could be realized. it would be one of the beat things the Pope ever 
did. 94 The cold and caut10us realism of OU1cc1ard1n1, Clement's principal 
milJtary adviser, revealed itself. His task of working cut a system of detense 
arainet the imperial foroes in Lombar~ was mammoth but no less problematical 
was his work in the Romagna. 
From experience, Gui.cciardini knew the laole of res!*'t tor authort ty and 
the factiousness of the population in the papal states.95 The Romagna was by 
92.rhe brief is included in Monumenta saeculi .XVI, histon_ illustrantia. 
Vol. I, Clementia VII ei2istolae, E!!: Sadoietum sci-iiiiU. ed. P. Man (innsbruck 
18BS), nO. lIe. Ins printed alSo in Oreste !ommasln1.t La vita e t:;ll seritt1 
a N1ccol~ Machiavelli (Roma, 188.3-1911), II, 1150. - --
93gpe~e inedite. VIII, 2)6. 
9L!b1d., 266-269_ 
-
9S0uieeiardini set rorth his doubts to Machiavelli on the wisdom of anoing 
the people of the Romagna in 8 letter of June 19, 1525. cr. T. Pandolfi, 
"Giovan !?latteo Gibert! e I'ultima dif'" della libertA dtltalia negl1 ann1 1521 
152S, II Archiv10 della R. societA romana d1 stort. ~;Qtria, XXXIV (1911), 209-212 
cr. also H. aon, Rachiavel {Parts, 19L!!, pp. 38 -3§j. 
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Ear the worst example. OUicciardini's attempts to impose respect tor laws and 
to administer justice rigorously were continually interrupted by the CUria, 
often through favontism.96 He struck at the strong Ghibell.1ne faction at 
\ 
Forli, the most infected of all cities in the Romagna, and at their influential 
patron, the Cardinal of Aracoeli, Cristoforo Numai, who had ccmpla,1ned ot 
Quicciardinits decisiveness. In defense of his policy, CUicc1ardini avowed he 
was impartial. If he thought that the activities ot a Guelph cardinal were 
oreating troubles in areas under bis jurisdiction, he would punish him too. 97 
He was loyal to the Pope when he assured him that, if the plan were to be 
put into effect, he would devote himself to it completely. Bis reply showed, 
however, that victory depended not on verbal support of a nebulous plan but on 
the working out of countless military details, 
••• i£ it is to succeed, Your Holiness must do the same; either you 
should not berin it, or you should go into it with your mind firmly 
made up to help in everything that is needed, to overcome all 
difficulties, and to regard it as more important than anything else.98 
Clement tabled t1achiavell1 f, proposals, though they looked tempting to ~ 
as a life-saving measure tor Italy in m1d-l$2$. Perhaps Machiavelli ts plan had 
merit but, at so crucial a juncture, thos. responsible for pollcyand its 
execution could handle only what was moat immediate. And Clement would have 
had -'e1 ther the time nor the detel'mination to support the slow progress of a 
96Cf. Ridolfi, Gu1cclardini.. p. 193. 
97Letter to Clement VII, June 18, 1$21., Car'teS;Q., VII, 88. 
980Eere ined! te , nn, 2~,6-269. 
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national militia. 
The most immediate problem of the Pope and the Leegue was the ruchy of 
}~ilan. In the time of Lorenzo de' Yedici, it had been considered as ''Una 
bilancia eli tutta Italia. ,,99 Now in July 1526, as the fortress of' 1-{ilan was 
near surrender to the imperialists, Guicciardini again wrote on the importance 
of the north. Lombardy was the weight (!! pando) of the war. Dangers to Rome 
and to Siena were secondary because the nerve center was in the north.lOO 
Milan above all ~"U worthy of all allied efforts. 
When Guieciardini saw the Pope's continuing indecision, he could not 
refrain from think1nr, how he would handle the situation. If he were Clement, 
he would hold back yet not precipitate himself into "pace dannosa, in.stabile et 
dishonorevole." "Non siamo in termini di disperatlone," OUicciardini pointed 
out, but one has to be resolute in spir1 t and to torce oneself to solve the 
difficulty.10l 
Not only was Ouicciardini particularly distressed over the r:uke of Urbina'iS 
retreat two weeks earlier but even more so over the fainthearted attempts ot 
the League t s army to relieve the fortress of f.1ilan. After its surrender to the 
im~rialists in July, OU1cciardini wrote that it would have been easy enough tc 
hold the fortress and even to take all of Milan. It was evident that Urbino 
99storie fiorentine .. p. 73. 
100r.etter to Giamroatteo Giberti, ¥Y 31, 1526, CllrteS&t, IX, 71. 
Guicciardini t s words are I "e1 puncta e tucto qua •••• " 
lOlIbid. 
-
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either did not know how to accomplish this or he did not wish to do 80.102 He 
cri ticized thc> diffidence of Urbino as a thing which communicated i teelf and 
had spread to the whole camp.10) Then too, Ouicciardini pointed out, the 
cooperation of the i3W1ss troops mr,ht have given the League victory within a 
month. Yet he saw that the arrival of the allied troops had at least one good 
etrect J it led the im-per:ta11sts through tear to agree that Sforza could freely 
come into the League's camp at Lodi. Guicciardini noted that this was a 
change, for the imperialists had always considered control of the Duke more 
important for their succe8S in Milan than control of the fortres8.104 
Urbino and F'rancesco Sforza agreed that, because of the surrender of the 
fortress, new plans were necessary for the war, and both pressed for an attack 
em Cremona. Guiceiard1ni argued !!2! that bold plans do not necessarily spell 
suecess,105 for "the situation of attairs affords little hope of victory." He 
confessed he did not see bow the Pope could conclude a peace offer, should one 
be made, that was not injurious or f:'0rilous to the 8111e8.l06 
First,he pointed out, the loss of the castle of l'1ilan had diminished their 
reFutation while the freeing of Sforza meant little. That section of the 
enemy which originally guarded the castle was free. Mal\Y of the important 
l02Letter to Giammatteo G1berti, July 27, 1526, ibid., 44. Note 
Cuieeiardini's words. /fJrbiniJ "non hill saputo 0 non lia voluto farlo." 
l°3tetter to Giammatteo Giberti, July 31, 1526, ibid., 69. 
-
lO4tetter to Accura10 Gr1neo, July 28, 1526, ibid., 57. 
-
l05Storia d'Ital1a, V J 58-60. 
106r.etter to Giammatteo G1berti, July .31, 1526, Carteg;g1, IX, 70. 
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citizens now ned, especially the merchants who found }lilan too disorderly.107 
\-Jaiting for the Swiss troops made it very difficult to send aid to 
108 cremona. If Guicciardin! could judge from his vantage point, all Lombardy, 
despairing of the French coming, began to doubt the King's sincerity. Already 
manY of the exiles took steps to settle their di1'ferences with Bourbon. He 
. l~ pointed to the action of the Bl.raihi and other important Ouelphs. In view 0 
the camplexi ty of these weighty matters, of necessity so interwoven, 
Guicciardini felt that Italy would probably have had more security if Francis 
were to hold Milan than if it would be in the hand.s of a weak Duke, an 
imper;4.alist pawn. This opinion, he recalled, hed long been held by Jacopo.110 
He knew also that money and provisions were needed for the Cremonese 
expedition. Though the ''w1ll not to win" dominated the papal camp, Guicciardin: 
now expresaed reasonable hopes of victory. The anti-1mperialist operation wh1c) 
had once seemed "easy and secure" had become "difficult' and dangerous." ldtb 
good organization and sufficient money, the allies could hope tor success .111 
But Clement did not have the resources for a long 'tiiar, and Ouicciardin1.a own 
107 Letter to the otto eli Pretica, August 2, 1526, CarteSEi, IX, 70. 
l08lbid., 79. 
-
l09I.etter to Roberto ACciauol1, August 3, 1,26, ~., 82-83. 
U<1.etter to Cesare Colombo, August 6, 1526, ~., 101. The reterence is 
to Cardinal. Jacopo Salviati. 
lllLetter to Giammtltteo Giberti, July 31, 1526, ibid., 69. Note 
Guicciard.ini's clever uee ot worda, " ... ae 10 non miT Inganno, e in temine ehe 
5e haveasilllo buona goveme at 1& spesa ordita non c1 superchiassi, non ci puO 
ragionevolmente mane are 18 victoria." 
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desperation in the late summer of 1526 centered lar~ely on the lack of 
nnances.U2 
Near the end of AUf.'Ust Guicciardini, still in the field, did not know 
where to turn for assistance. The signatories to the League of Cognac cont1nue~ 
to fail their obligations, military and monetary. His frequent requests to 
the T;etariol1.3 and to Salviati had met with unsatisfactory responses, and he 
was grr'atly concerned. ~rything would collapse if money were not quickly 
forthcoming. Expenses in camp were great and they were rendered greater be-
cause of Francis t failure to contri bute. Guicciardini reminded His Holiness 
that soldiers were not paid ~th designs in air." Above all, it was necessary 
to have the money in time lest, to all the other disord.ers, another would be 
added, that of having provided too late.ll4 There was no time to quibble in so 
vital a concern, for upon cold cash de~.ended the preservation of the Holy See .. 
Clement's own safety, the weU'are of norenee and that of all Italy.ll5 
"''batever Francis' reasona for failing to provide what everyone expected of 
ll2cf. infra, pp. 146-148, 161. 
~ 
ll3rhe r.&tario was the papal bursar. 
1.l.4r.etter t e Clement vn, August 21.. 1526, Carteggi, IX, 163-164. 
Guicciardini concluded I "Ma 18 prudentia sua bisegna che consiata in questo: 
di farlo in tempo chs gli glovi) et non tardare tanto che, o1tre alli a1tri 
;Jiscrdini, 131 aggiunga sncora questo: d1 havere r.rovisto doppo 81 tempo. tf 
115Ibid• Note Ouicciardini's lofty worden 'lEt la prego quanto posso che, 
per conservations della Sadia Apostolica et sua, per beneficio della sua patria 
at per Ie. salute di tucts Italis, non vadia p1h differendo 81 risolversi a fare 
groSS& provisione di danari, perche''' a1 trimente non c1 'e rimedio •••• " F'lorence 
was tleus patriae u 
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h1tn, Ouicciardini did not precisely know. But he did point out that a good 
judge of the situation oould only conclude that Francis preferred a long war 
and no early victory. Ou1cciardini '8 cynicism showed i tsell in his repeated 
comment that the "little faith and confidence among princes" probably made the 
King of F'rance feel that, as aoon as the fuchy of MUan would be recovered, the 
Italians would pay little attention to his interests. Either they would make a 
separate peace with the Emperor or at least they would not pursue the war and 
thus render the recovery of his children, then hostages in Spain, more 
diffioult.ll6 
In any case, he was still bound to the artioles of the League ot Cognac. 
i1 thout concrete assistance in the form of man.,. for the army and reinforcement 
necessary for battle, the allied undertaking was doomed,1l7 Guiccidardini 
stated that the last pa,yment to the Mss had been made without any French 
money at all and even at the time provisions from Rome and from the Venetians 
were falling off. He begged Roberto Acciaiuoli to t ake only one course ot 
aotion, namely, flto ory to heaver-I' for help. The expenses of the Marchese di 
saluzzo and "other minutiae" should be set aside if favor of those enterprises 
undertaken for theweltare of all Italy. Guiociardini wished to believe that 
this lack of aid proceeded from nothing other than negligence and that the will 
116Storia d'Ital1a, V, 60-61. 
117Letter to Roberto Acciauoli, August 3, 1526, carteeP, IX, 82. Cf. ala< 
letter to the same, August 22, 1526, ibid., 168. Acc!auofi was the piapal 
representative in l"rance. -
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to provide it was there; but they had to impress on the King that, if he failed 
then, later he might :have reason to repent his failure to assist the Italians 
to his shame and dishonor.U8 Notes of similar distress sounded in 
auicciardin1's appeals to the Venetians.1l9 
Guicciardini pointed also to the non-eooperation of I'.ngland. Ouicciard1ni 
blamed the infiuential Cardinal of York, "willing to amuse everybody and to be 
entreated by all." Both he and his king were used to answering requests for 
assistance with brevity: ''We have no concern w1th the atfairs of Italy.tt120 
Ouicciardini evaluated the entire situation just prior to the allied 
success at Cremona 1n the autumn. He paid careful attention to Crem.ona. He 
believed that taking the city would give the s1l1es much le.8 to fear.l2l But 
he repeated what he claimed to have said already a hundred times daily: every 
part of Cremona would have to be taken to make the move a success. If any of 
the territory remained unconquered, the allied cause would be more than eV6r 
jeopardized.122 
118 Ibid., 168-169. 
-
119C£. Geftroy, ftAutob1ogra.phie," p. t69. 
12On ••• anzi e i1 re • U cardinale rispondevano speaso I a noi non 
appartengono le cose di Italia," storia d'ltal.ia, V, 72. 
121Let ter to Giammatteo Giberti, August 22, 1526, Cortesgi, IX, 17.3. Not. 
Gu1ccia.rd1ni's wordSI "Sa piglassimo Crem.ona, CrederreI havessimo da temerno 
molto poche." 
122tetter tC' Giammatteo Gibert!, August 17, 1526, ibid., 150. 
-
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In early September Guicc1ardini reported that he hoped very shortly to be 
able to re):'.ort victory in Cremona and then Genoa, where prosp.ectB for allied 
success appeared wry favorable.123 Beceuse the Cremona siege wa$ so drawn 
out,124 however, he desired tirat-hand information, and on September 10 he sent 
Machiavelli, "a man of great competence,tt125 with credentials and instructions 
to get that information. It there were actually 11 ttle prospect of an early 
victory, Machiavelli was to make every effort to persuade the Venetian 
adjutant Fesarc to end the siege and to attack Genoa immediate1y.126 
Machiavelli carried out his assig1'llnent by personally surveying the s1. tuation an 
by going over it with Pe88J"O and Urbina. On September lL he returned to the 
camp under the walls of Milan with a report stating the confidence of the 
oapt",':'l18, and in V"lis he concurred.127 The city capitulated on the twenty-
third, but t.tut actual change of hands was deferred unt:U the very end of the 
month. 
Aside tZOOln the temporary victory of Cre."!lOna, autumn witnessed the break-
down of all the allied plane in L01I'lbardy. The attack on Pope Clement in Rome12 
123tetter to Goffredo de Granges de 'Iavellis, September 6, 1526, ibid., 
2Ll. -
124cr. Guicciardini's words. "Non 01 ei vede, quanta alla speranza del 
vincerla, altro male che peri colo di lunghezza: cbe, nello state che sano Ie 
cose, ~ bene male assai," letter to Oiammatteo O1bert1, September 7, 1526, ib14~, 
245. -
125~ inedi te, IV, )61. 
1260uicciardini's instructions to ?Jtachiavelli are pubUshed in the latter'l 
Opere, VI, 22L-226. 
-
!lUov! l~~~l: ~tfil:r.'Jii~u;F~~!S~ite~Mh~W~!~"~ ~ 5LL 
128cr. infra, pp. 161-162. 
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allowed Machiavelli too to reconstruct all the events leading to it, including 
the captains' errors in the campaign and Clement's blunder of "living in Rome 
1n such a way as to let himself be captured like a child. ,,129 
Guicciardini's tasks during this period were just as difficult a8 the 
s1 tuation itself. At Piacenza in October, he became invo1 wd in the matter of 
the papal reconciliation .... v1th tho Duke ot f'errara. In August he had already 
explained that the cont1.rmati(m of Modena and ReggLo in Eate possession was "01 
great importance though perhaps not of such great usetulnen." Ouicclardini 
used a Florentine colloquialism. since the Pope simply had to approve such 
action, the Duke "stara tacil:mente in sullo asino. 1I130 
The approach of the Qermans and the arrival of the Spanish neet made it 
clear to the Duke that affairs were taldng a very favorable turn for Charles. 
Alfonso had been "earlier in longing eXpectation" of Guicciardini's coming. He 
llOW notified him in } arma, where the direction of the war seemed to be tending, 
that it no longer seemed fit to discuss any anti-imperialist endeavors. 
Alfonso lett it to Ou1cciardini whether he would come to F'errara or not. Had 
Alfonso said nothing, Clement might have been angry. L'ut Guicclardini realized 
that further negotiatioll5 could end only in a cornproIT'.ise of the papal 
reputation.l31 
He informed hie superior that the Luke's negotiations with Charles were 
129The letter containing Machiavellits analysis and his criticism of 
Clement is printed in Tommasini, II, 1251. 
l3Ot.tter to Giarnmattoo Giberti, AUf'ust 22, 1526, ,cartaggi, IX, 176. 
l31Storia d'Italia, V, 90. 
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evident in many ways and he warned, should they come to conclusion, there would 
be "no remedy for our houses. 1t He did not know the state of their consultatioN 
132 but stressed that an irnperial-Ferruese accord meant allied ruin. On the 
other hand, it was possible there was still hOFe, for Machiavelli' s report was 
that the LUke had stood tllittle heard" in the court of Charles.l )) 
Ouicciardini tendec tc tak[~ the more pes,s1m1stlc, or realistiC, View. For 
many years, he held that it \''a£ simply good sense to maintain £riendly papal-
Ferrarase relations. Not only did he reter to the neutralizing etfect that thi 
would have on the problema of one pontificate but especially he looked to the 
welfare of his native Florence. 'Ibis was "mOre lasting than the life of one or 
two pontiffs." Then t·oo the papa1-ducal association had become intimately 
joined with other important interests. Until OU1cciardj n1 saw clearly the 
;:ukets imperial tendencies, he had adVised Clement to "come freelY*' and to 
negotiate an agreement that would allow the Duke to reciprocate without any 
difficulty.l34 He advised that an agreement earlier suggested at Reggio be 
concluded if it were not possible to do any better. He seemed to be grasping 
tor something concrete, when he wrote. "We are in atrai ts in which we must do 
l.32Letter to Jacopo Salviati, September 10, 1,26, Cartese, IX, 258. He 
wrcte plainly. " ... se F'errara 5i acoorda con Cesare, no! aiame ruinati .... " 
cr. also letter to Qiammatteo Gibert1, september S, 1$26, ibid., 2381 " ••• il 
chs se riuscissi vedrai malo axite aU. cosa nostre." -----
l3Jr.etter to Giammatteo aiberti, September 11, 1.526, ibid. 270-271. 
-
l34r.etter to B1shop Altobello Averoldi, August lJ, 1$26, ibid., llL-l32. 
-
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everything that is possible to have victory."135 Near the end ot 1526, how-
ever, he sadly reported that the Cuke was riving clearer signs than ever that 
136 he favored the Emperor. Obviously he was by no means finished playing 
clever politics. 
A!'ter OUicc1ardini's lack ot success in these papal matters in the autumn 
of 1526, he returned to Modena, where matters were worsening so quickly that 
the entire state ot the Church was th~atened.l37 Charles' fleet, f~t 
certainly as great as had been rumorod but of importance enough, ,,138 engaged 
that of the allies. George Frundsberg's German pikemen, the landeknech~, of 
whom there hed been much talk for some time, had not been stopped by the 
Venetians et the mountain passes and had reached the Po croSSings, where the 
r.\lke (;f' Urbino was in no pos! t10n to defeat them.l )9 All hopes centered on ffJW 
troops and the courage ot Giovanni de' Medici. wounded on November 25 as he was 
fi~htin€ 11ke en ordinary solO1er against the landsknechte. Two days before 
13Stetter to Qia.'!l1'II8tteo Giberti. September 5, 1526, ibid., 2.38. Note the 
frankness of his wordfn " ••• siamo in termini che bisogna"""fa'X.e ogni con per 
vincere •••• tt 
l36r..etter of Machiavelli to the otto, r.ecember 3, 1526, QRere, VI, 230-231 
137 start. d tltal1a, V, 90. 
138Letter to Gi.armlatteo Giberti, septem~r S, 1526, Cf,'rtese, IX, 238. 
l.39Guicciardin1 's letters included freouent references to the 
rndsknechte. E.g., cf. letters to Bishop Altobello Avero1di, Aur,ust 22, 152c, 
Sid., 1'11, to Ciammatteo Gibert!, August 22, 1526, ibid., 173, and to Pietro 
Pesaro, September 11, 1526, ibid., 267, where he shoWi"'Interest in their back-
grounds, their Lutheran religIon and their obedience to the Emperor and the 
Archduke and House of Austria. In August, he described his naws of their actior 
as "Ho{;rgi caldi, domani freddi." 
his death on the last day of !-lovember, the Germans crossed the Po with their 
pikes aimed at the wry heart of Italy. 
This disaster was lout l:l .tinal. culmination of OUicciardin1 's many 
dirrerences with Urbino, differences which had begun at the time of retreat 
from the walls ot Milan. Guieciardini had felt that, for the security of the 
state of the Church in that region, Urb1no should cross the Po southward with 
the Venetian troop.. But the Duke delayed, oometimes stating that he awaited 
adVice from Venice, and, at other times, alleging wholly different reasons. 
Urbino informed the Venetian Senate that, were he to cross the Po, the 
imperialists would probably fall upon their dominions on which he had been 
140 
ordered mt to pass. 
Guiceiardini worried that the difficulty 01 making ~:~ere •• in Lombardy 
would lead the Germans to pau into Tuscany. He preferred that they lay siege 
to :Piacenza. Years later, in the Storts d t Ital1a he finally admitted that it 
was for this reason, unknown to anyone, even to the Pope himself" that he 
delayed senr:!ing provisions there. He would thus give hope to the enemy that it 
might be taken. Guicciardin1 was caretul to find excuses for his action. rIe 
hoped that, if Piacenza should be beSieged, he would tind the means to relieve 
it.lhJ. 
l"Jh11e Guicciardini invited the attack on Piacenza, he was thinking not 
only of all Tuscany but of florence in particular. Nor were the Florentines 
1I.OStoria d I Italla, V, 90-94 • 
. 
l41Ib1d., 95-96. 
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less fearful of their pl1ght. One of Hachiavell1's duties as a representative 
of the teague at :1 ts headquarters in Florence was its protection. His 
responsibilities led him to travel back and :forth on various cOllRiesiona. He 
bad many personal meetings with Guicciard1ni. At the end of November 1526 
Machiavelli set otf, on orders from the magistracy of Florence.. to 
Quieciardini .8 camp at Modena to in:fom him of conal tions in the oi ty. 
ouieciard:1ni was told that he could negotiate as he thought best and as the 
times would indicate though the Florentine people preferred. to "sign an agree-
ment" rather than make concessions for their satety.142 Arter iMmediately 
conferring with OUieciardini, the envoy reported to the otto that, if the 
-
enemy came to attack the City, no help could be expected outside of six or 
HVen thousand infantry of the Church. Guicciardini had infomed Machiavelll 
that an agreement would have to be diseus .. d not in the field but in Rome or in 
Florence.143 
On December 31 .. 1526, Alfonso d tEste and Viceroy Lannay concluded an 
agreement. The Duke was appointed imperial captain-general in Italy, and he 
was to assist Charles with troops in return tor imperial protection and support 
for his efforts to gain Modena}.44 Though this action of AltoZlSo by no means 
.F 
14~hese instructions, dated ~iovember )0, 1$26, are given in !"lacrJ..avelli '. 
QRere, VI, 226-228. cf. also 'rorumQaini, n , 666 n. 
143t.etter of 1(achiave1li to the otr- December 2, 1$26, Qpere, VI, 228, 
cr. also Gu1cciardini's 2E!r! 1nedlte, ,9-10. 
~~~~:~t~~Q, V, 100. 
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crYstallized his position, he drew ever closer to the Emperor in the early 
JftOnths of the next year, as OUicciard1n1 had tear1'ully predicted earl1er.1Ii5 
Machiavelli wrote. "If the Duke of l"errare. had a bit of sense in bie head and 
this weatoor lasted another two days, he could !1.n1sh oft this war with his 
eyes ahut.lh6 The sl1O'lIQl" Bologneae weather continued, but AlIeneo went along 
for the present with the conv.1ction that the Bate interest lay not with their 
old French ally but with the all.powerful Einperor. 
The !uk$' s action was typical of the otten selfish and invol'V'$d polley 
webs quietly woven as the peninsula was about to enter one of the most rever-
berat:lnf, years of its long history. For too many of the ru.lers, self-interest 
motivated by the lust tor power was the onl: key to their shifting allegiances. 
OU1coiardini was certain of only one thing, that the year 1526 ended. wi til 
preparations on all sides tor a "WrY vigorous wv.lh7 
The year 1527 he characterized as "full of events unheard-of tor many 
ages. ff It was replete w:1 th Ilchanges or states JI capti Vi tie. of princes, shock-
ing sacld.ngs of cities" a great scarcity ot provisiona, and a raging pestilence 
which spread through It.al7, where nothing was to be seen but death, rught and 
rapine.QUa By that year the intensity of the Habsburg-Valois struggles on 
Itnlian soU B~ had more than made up for the diversity and llUJnbera of 
1l6c.r. ,SUE4, p. 68. 
l.4~tter to the pt;to, March 18, 1527, in 0i!X'e, VI, 2ltB-2h9. 
147stor1& cl'Ital1a, V, 100. 
l18Ibid., 101. 
-
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the various conquerine groups of Spain, a subject which had once interested 
him.149 He expl.a1ned that Italian atfairs were more dieturbed f !!'lOre nout-of-
joint, n than they had been for a thousand years,lSO 
Guicciardini • ~ distress was intensified wi tb the Constable of Fcurbon' e 
march from Milan in Feb:ruar;y of 15'27. 'I'i:lcse towna on Bourbon's route from 
1.1i1an to Flol'ence and Rome were well aware of the1r danger though they were 
merely stepping stones to the .. two major Italian targets. Guicciardin1 and 
x{acirlavel11 knew something was afoot when the Span1arde left Milan, following 
the German ptkem.en who had already crossed the Trebbia. It was clear to them 
that the imperial troops were enroute to sack Florence and ultimately Rome. 
Guicciardini had already informed hie fe1low.c1 tiMne of the aid that the,. 
could expect,15>1. but at the beg1nnillf of FebruIi:rT the otto once again sent 
-
r-iach1avelli to OU1eciardini's camp. l1ach1aYelli was to tell him of the city'a 
wishes and find out it further aid could 'be expected. Qu1cciardini, Wormed 
ahead of time of the EUl'f'OY'S arrival, gave him still another taB. Machiavelli 
was to "tell the tWce §t Urbin;2] and the Marchese £of Saluzzg what is 
needed.ttl$2 On th() $&:I!'1e day as he arrived at Farma, February 7, Ma.chiavelli 
• It .11 
1h9ffRelazioM d1 Spar,na," So:dtti autobiograf'ic1. p. 1)3. 
15O" ••• le cose di Ital1a in tantn agitazione e travagii che da mille auni 
in qua non furono mai tante," "Oratio accusatoria," ibid., p. 226. 
-
15lcr. £1U'pra, p. 70. 
IS2The instructions for ~iacb1avell1' e mission, dated February ), 1$27, are 
included in his Opere, VI. 232 ... 2)). Cf. aleo Ouicciard:1n1's words to the 
Cardinal. of CartONi', Who had in1'omed him ot the envoy's coming on February S, 
cited in Ridolfi, l1aeb1.avelll, p. 325. n. 12. 
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tt.'1Cl Cuiceiardini went to see Urbina me tEmporized as usual. The Duke pointed 
out that SnlUZEo vas to enter Tuscan;y- with the vanguard of the army "muG he 
would stay in the enemy's rear llith the remainder. l~everthele$a, all agreed to 
narrant~ everything pen in hcL~n on the day £Oll~~.153 
The discussions ended in &. plan that, 1f the e~ would head £01" Tuscany 
by way of PontrenlOli, all the Fnnoo-VeooUan £orces and the armies of the 
Church would begln their march there immediately. If instead they turned 
towards Bologna, Ulan Saluzzo alone 'WOUld enter Tuscany tmlle the Duke would 
bring up the rear. According to OU1cciardini, Urbino was committed to this 
plan .. 1Sl. 
On enemy movements depended the action of the League'B troops. 
Hechiavell1 remained with Guieclard1ni to Bee ''Which way the water W4~ going to 
flow) so that, 1! 1 t were coming your way.. I coulrl return tully informed of the 
nature of the remedies .... ,,155 Instead ot the three or tour days he had 
intended to remain, Hach1avelli stayed almost th:ree months. He viai ted the 
papal camps facing the entll'!O" fram Panna to Bologna, where he arriftd on 
February 27, and stayed for more than a month while the Spaniards and a~zmana 
vere b~aten down for lack of money and provisions, not to mention the inclement 
weather. 
-
153tetter of ~!ach1avell1 to the otto, Fe'bruary 1, 1527, ppere, VI, 233-
~. -.
154Letter to the cardinal ot Cortona, Fehrue.ry' 1 and 8, QRere inedite, 
VIII, 215-216. • 
l$Stetter to the pttq, February ll, 1527, QP2re, VI, 235-2.36. 
Several things i.!revented the allies frm dealing a serious blow to the 
imperial amy. The 11archese di Saluzzo a.nd the papal army tried to take 
,Bolof1lB., but he could not control the troops there. OUicciardini felt that 
Saluzzo was ''more £i t to break til lance than to diseharee the office ot 
oeneral. n156 Several months prior to Saluzzots present assignment, Guicciardin 
had already recognized his inabill ty. He simply lacked those 'luaU ties 
essential to an able mili ta.ry leader.lS7 By this time, the Puke of Urbino was 
back in Guicciardini's eood r:races, tor he was somewhat more successful than 
Seluzzo in building up allied morale .158 
But Guicc1ardini found more debits than credi te. lie referred to the ttnon_ 
cooperative disposition ot the Florentine people" and the imperialist ad-
herents in Siena.159 The allied campaign as a whole was not proceeding With 
1 ts in! tial vigor. Thouch the other members ot- the League oontimially 
criticized the Pope IS inconstancy and the King's dllatory policy and used it as 
an excuse tor their feeble action, Ouieciardini remarked that they were 
"remiss enough of themaelves.ul60 
Pope Clement, realizing how risk;y it was to separate hin1selt from his 
allies, nevertheless concluded an agreement in March with the Emperor's 
lS7ttt~11'iarchese di Saluzzo non 81 intende mente." letter to Giammatteo 
G1bert1, August 24, 1$26, Carteggi., IX, IBL. Cf. elso another letter to Gibert: , 
September 6, 1526, ibid., ~, where he states the impossib1l1tyof excusing 
the J-1archeae's tardIiliis in reporting his movements. 
158Storia dtltaliaa V, 118-119. 
159Ibid., 121-122. 
-
16<>J.bid., 111-112. 
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representatives in Rome. There was to be no m1lltary activity tor eight montha 
the Pope was to pay the Emperor sixty thousand ducats) and the Colonnas, 
j,.Jnperlal adherents, were to restore all lands taken from the Church.16l 
On t"'areh )1, however.. Bourbon informed Guiceiardini that he had to continw ~ 
his southward march, for his troops would not obey any comma.na to the . contrary. 
He explained that they could probably be stopped upon the payment ot more money 
Pope Clement accepted this otter and ordered Florence to provide the required 
amooot.162 OUiceiardini's words intimate his disapproval ot this heavy 
obligation on Florence. 
Jllachiavell1 too had a good idea ot the situation when he wrote from Imola 
in early April. The otto, he cOUIll5elled, should not be blaclana1led by 
Bourbon. He asked figuratiYely what agreement could be hoped tor with an 
enemy ttwho, when the Alps are still between you aD! your forces are still in 
the field, asks tor a hundred thousand norins wi thin three days and a hundred 
and fifty thousand within ten daY8?1t \'~hen they get to Florence, he continued, 
the first things they will demand will be everytb1ng ,eu own, tor without any 
doubt (and would it were not so I) their adYance 1s prempted only by the 
prospect ot booty, end there is no other remedy against thia evil than to set 
them right. And, it you have to do this, it 18 better to do it at the Alps thai 
at your very walls.J.63 
At thia point, in the spring ot 1$27, both Mach1avelli and Gu1cc1ard1n1 
-
161Ibid., 122. 
-162~., 12.3-125, 130. 
163r.etter to the otto, Apr.U 2, 1527, S;ere, VI, 256-257. 
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were seriously concerned about the fate of their beloved Florence. Machiavelli 
exPlained to Vettori that it was essential to beat the enemy into Tuscany and 
leave the 'iilatory r-ulce of Urbino to "raw up the rear as he pleased .164 Urbino 
, 
had only a few papal troops under his command at Forli, and the others had been 
stationed here and there along the way as protection tor cities on the road 
from l-arma.165 The two norentines agreed at this time that "help should be 
go! ven the Romagna while its territories can be defended at sixteen soldi to the 
}ira," but then t'With those Italian troops that can be collected and with what 
money ie left come ••• and eave Florence at all costs.166 l"'18chiavelli's words 
manifest real tension, for he saw what could happen. "Things are in such a 
state that we must either reconstruct the war or conelude peace." These words 
were the words of Machiavelli to the Otto on April 11.167 
-
Ouicciardini understood that Fope Clementls hopes for Bourbon'S obedience 
to the Viceroy were vain. He earnestly implored the Marchese di Saluzzo and 
the Venetians tc realize that there would be no peace and, tor their own 
interest if not that of others, not to abandon the Pope and Tuecany. Clement 
had been deceived, for he sincerely expected the agreement to end in a truce. 
By giving him assistance, Guicc1ardini was careful to point out, the Venetians 
woulci simply be carry.1ng out the conditions of the alliance. This would 
l~etter to Francesco Vettori, April 5, 1527, Letta" tamiliari, pp. 521-
522. · .. 1 
165tetter to the 9~to, April 11, 1527, Opere, VI, 261-262. 
lutetter to Vetten, April 5_ 1527, Letten familiari, pp. 521-522. 
167Letter to the Otto, April 11, 1527, QE!re, VI, 2€1-262. 
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redound to their credit. And. if they gave him help, the Pope would be able to 
make a truce favorable for lrl.nu!Ielf and Florence. and this, in the long l'Ull, 
would prove very beneficial to the League. If abandoned, however, t.he Pope 
would be forced to grant the imperialists a large sum of money and make 
considerable monthly payments. All Ws money would be used later in a war 
against them! He begged them, as a protection to themselves, to dispatch their 
forces to defend Tuscany when Bourbon MO'Ved to attack it.l68 
Salu£zo and the Venetians felt that they had been asked to place their 
interests in a }::Osition secondary to those in the League. Perhaps it was true 
that to abandon the Pope would hurt the common etfort. On the ot..'ler hand, to 
grant military aid would' mean to eXJX)se their troops to danger between the 
Apennines and the enemy, an area already 60 disaffected to them. 
Intrigue played its role. OUicciardini observed that many suspected that 
the Duke of Urbino had made a secret agreement with Bourbon not to block his 
passare into ~~scany. Though he was in extreme need of supplies, Bcurbon was 
able to cross the Apennines. At the same time Bourbon wrote, though insincerel . 
to Lieutenant Guicciardini of h!s desire to show his devotion to the Pope. 
The imperial Viceroy, Lannoy, was just as clever as Bourbon. For many 
reasons, he was satisfied with the papal-imperial truce in the sprine of 1527, 
"ns for many other reasons, so also, as I !:tJuJ.cciardin!! have heard from trust-
wc.rthy persons, because of his plan that the azmy should move their full force 
against the Venetians. If Yet he did not carry out the promise he had made at 
Rome to remove the cavalry and the greater part of the Spanish intantr.r from 
168storla d'Italia, V, 125-126. 
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BOurbon's control. In fact, while he was negotiating at F'lorence, he refused 
to do so on the grounds that he l."Ould not cause the ruin of Charles' army. 169 
P..oth Machiavelli and Guicciardini recognized that the agreement between 
pope Clement and Lannoy was ttuncertain and false, ••• Jnade in Rome and not 
observed in Lombardy." Machiavelli explained that an insincere agreement would 
be a loss to the allies and Ii boon to the enemy. "They are thinking only of 
war as they advance upon you., and they are letting you become confused between 
war and truces. n170 While the Viceroy attempted to get Bourbon to agree to 
halt his march, Guicc1ardini wrote that 
flever W8S there a more complicated and dangerous affair than this •••• 
In these difficulties, I feel that the most perilous aspect of all is 
the fact that we have the enemy in Tuscany and are without armed forces, 
and 80 I have taken the decision on my own initiative, as I have no 
aesi.stance from Rome, to send towards Florence all the forces at my 
disposal •••• 171 
Machiavelli was elated by Guieciardin1's decision, for it afforded at leas 
some hope for Florence. He stated with a burst of emotion: 
I love Messer Francesco Ouieciardini. I love my country more than my 
own tioul and I tell you by the experience I have pained 1n sixty years 
that I do not believe tilere was ever a more difficult situation than this, 
where peace is necessary and war cannot be avoided, and we have on our 
hands a prince who is hard put to it to do what is needed 8i thar for 
peace or for war alone.172 
169Ibid., 126-128. 
17Or..etter to Vettori, April 14, 1527, Lettere !.am111ar~. pp. 52.3-52L. 
l71Letter to the £t..l.2, April 16, 1521, QR!re inedite, V, 409-hlO. 
172tetter to Vettor1, April 16, 1527, Lettere fami11eri, pp. 524-525. 
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The allied army paesed into Tuscany. Ita commanders knew of Bourbon. e 
advance. The major officers in councU "dth papal and Florentine agents agreed 
that the united arn".1es should encamp at some post beyond r'lorence tc deprive 
Bourbon of all means of access to it. They agreed to Feder1g'O da Bozzolo t 8 
recommendation t.o remove the troops to Anelaa, thirteen miles !rom Florence.173 
Internal commotion in Florence formed a hindranoe to this project. 
Machiavelli arrived in norence on Apr1l 22 and Ouicciard1n1 on the 
followj,ng day. The city wae in a bad mood. Gu1cc1ardini made the statement 
theta fllf the populace does defend itself the government nll not be able 
to. ul7h His pror.heey was right, 88 the Medici reRents were driven out and a 
Florentine republic proclaimed. 
But. the Roman hell of May 6, 1527, was thedis8ster. Guicciardini wrote 
"It would be impossible ••• to relate and almost to conceive the calamities of 
that city .... 175 In all fairness it l!1\1st be said that Gtdcciardini tor once 
did not give himself the credit due him. "''hen he learned of the sack of nome, 
he sent Machiavelli to eiY! tavecchia. The IUtnor was that the Pope had taken 
re.fure there. In any cue Andros Doria was there with his ships, and 
Machiavelli was tc diseuse future allied plans with bim.176 
l!lhat came as a worse shock to both Guicciardini and Machi.valli was the 
173stona dtltalia, V, 129-1.31. 
17ULetter of April 2u, 1527, geere inedite, V, h17. 
175Storia dtltalia, V, 1)6-141. 
..................... , 
17~etter to Gu1cciardini, Opere. VI, 265-266. 
80 
"dreadful news from Rome, "177 that Clement, without hope, had made a treaty 
6 178 wi th the imperialist troops on June. To Guicciardini this meant only that 
the horrors ot the month of May could have been avoidedl AU past efforts now 
seemed so useless' 
These views of Ouicciardini further crystallized with the Barcelona accord 
between Pope and Emperor on June 27, 1529, where Charles again demonstrated the 
upper-hand. or this agreement Gu1cciardini wrote. 
This peace and confederacy put an end to those long and burdensome 
wars, which bad continued over eight years, with so many shocking 
events, and all Italy remained free from the tunultuoua noise and 
perils of arms, except the city of F'lor·.::nce, whose war had been 
conducive to the peace of the reat while the peace of the rest 
aggravated its war.179 
Florentine affairs, caught up in the maelstrom of power polities, could 
not have taken any other course. With Pope Clement and King Francis reconciled 
to Charles V, the many small states of the pen1nsula had no choice but to make 
the best terms possible with the Emperor and to accept him 8S the arbiter of 
Italian destinies. Perhaps the motives of the Venetian Republic for a treaty 
with the Emperor did have a selfish note, but its very preservation was at 
stake. And with the fall of Venice under imperial control, the isolation ot 
Florence was complete. 
Guicc1ardini fa own sentiments in the matter of papal-F'lorentine relations 
177'1'11is phrase, from 8. letter of Machiavelli, referred to h18 and 
Guicciardinits react10n when they had learned of the May 6th sack, Ridolfi, 
Machiavelli, p. 21.7. 
178storia d'Italla, V, lh7. 
l79These provisions are given in more detail in ibid., 261.. 
-
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are clear. It was frightful tor Guiceiardini to contemplate the destruction of 
the city.leO Hence Florentine submission to the papacy, now cooperating with 
the Emperor, was the course of wisdom. This view Guicciardini held as a loyal. 
.on of Florence and not because of any particular loyalty to the r~edici. 
Native-born historians of Florence of ill periods have held the viewpoint 
that, had it not been for Malatesta Baglioni's treason,l€l their city would 
have survived the crisis of the siege.le~ While recounting the facts, 
QUicciardini as usual took the more profound. viewpoint. No single accident of 
the papal-imperialist siege could have accounted for the fall of Florence. 
'I'he tenor of all his pages relating to the Republic's struggle is that, in her 
isolation, she could not sustain herself in the lonp run against the over-
powering strength of the two allied world potentates, the Pope and the Emperor. 
Guicciardini was pessimistic as he looked at the political scene, both as 
an historian and as a political figure involved!!! _1Il8 ... di ......... b ... u... s rebus. His dejectio
' 
centered on many things. He saw the greed, the selfishness, the individualism 
and the treachery which reigned supreme in Cinguecento Italy. He knew the 
Idlitary ineptitude of Italy. He realized that, without these blemishes, the 
barbarians, for all their power and resources, could not have gained so strong 
180 8 Ibid., 2 O. 
-
18J.1iis treason consisted in the fact that he had taken it upon himself to 
begin negotiations for the eventual capitulation of Florence to the imperialistl 
182 Schevill, Florence, p. 495. 
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a foothold 1n the peninsula. He observed ,ally the apathy, the neglect ot 
responsib1li~ and the lack ot ettective leadership183 which doomed the cause 
of the allies ot Cognac. 1'ben neutrality was no longer possible, when Italy 
understood that her safety did not lie in the struggles between two toreign 
powers, steadfast adherence to the anti-imperialist league would have at least 
helped :;::eninsular attairs. 'Ihis Guicciard1ni believed. He seemed to have 
hoped against bope. But instead be lived to see each pOlitical unit lose its 
independence, including his patriae Nothing gave him reason to hope from 1$27 
to 15.30. He could only despair. 
181iere Guicciard1n1' s crt ticlam centered largely on his papal master as 
leader of the League ot Cognac. ct. inf.fa , pp. 148-1$0. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PAPAL INCW.BF-NTS (1492-1$23) 
AND THE EASF,s OF' 
THEIR f'OLI'l.'lCS 
Papal activities are woven into the fabric of sixteenth-century Italian 
history. Many of Guicciardin1 ts observations on the Holy See and its 
incumbents fit equally well under the topics of power struggle, papal poll tics 
or relipion. This chapter will consider the underlyinr themes of papal 
politics in the Henaissance with stress on the period from Alexander VI through 
the death of Adrian VI. With it one can see more clearly into the politics of 
Guicciardini. 
Ouicciardini noted that the prime pen tion 01' the pope and the reverence 
due the Christian religion were partial explanations for the developnent of the 
political power of the early Church and its acquisition of lands and meney. He 
suq;:ested that the popes, through fear but mostly through ambition, followed 
the examples of' secular princes. Before the end of the Censtantinian period, 
the popes found it easy to establish control of their "regno celeste" by w.ln-
ninr support throur:.h charitable works and by the organization of dioceses. The 
transfer of the imperial center to the East crystallized the developnent of 
papal rule in the West. 
Ouicciardin1 passed quickly over the medieval period and concentrated on 
83 
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biB own time. Though men lost reverence tor the popes, t.l)eir authority was 
maintained. The popes enhanced their prestige because they controlled various 
ecclesiastical appointments. In fact, they were often stimulated to ennoble 
their relatives and grant them rich benefices. Yet Ouicciard1ni seriously 
opposed a secular ruler's warring against the pope, who was so highly esteemed, 
tor this would bring him grave infamy and small gain.l 
In this treatment ot papal power, Guicciardini expanded on the eroliling 
problems in the laicization of society during the tifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. One of the fundamental issues considered was the Franco-Span1sh 
,truggle for southern Italy which proved to be a CI'OSS for the papacy. Both 
the French and the Aragonese violated papal authorl ty in their attempts to gain 
the Neapolitan crown. The situation was, moreover, complicated by repeated 
attempts ot the Aragonese to make alliances with the Sforza and Malatesta in th. 
north, which would result in the encirclement of the papal states. As early as 
1420, the popes were torced to defend their holdings against the encroachments 
of the Aragoneae, the French, the Florentines, the Venetians and the 
2 
condottieri. With the ending ot the Great Schism and the return of Martin V 
to Rome, Rome was in the possession of Francesco Sforza. By the aid of Joanna 
of Naples and a subsequent alliance with the Sforza rulers, the papal states 
lei. stona d'Italia, I, Chap. 12, 370-)81. 
2odorico Rinaldi, Annale. Ecclesiastici !2 anna MCXCVIII, ad. Joanne 
T'omenico Maw, n (Luau, 17$2', 71, no. 5, and5Cr-.5~, no. 19. 
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saw the removal ot toreign troops and the return to papal control.) Hence from 
the beginning, the t1lteenth-eentury papacy had to fight to keep t he papal 
states free. 
Rome was torn by the continual quarrels of the Orsini and the Colonna and 
tile failure of the papacy to insure a stable grain supply tor its territories. 
Under Alfonso V, the Aragone •• took Terracina and .Benevento, whioh guarded the 
g~dl.U routes from the southem kingdom to Rome, and used this position to cause 
trouble tor a papacy reluctant to support. their claims to Naples.4 
Eugenius IV tried to settle the Neapol1 tan question by recognizing Alfonso 
a8 the heir of Joanna II in 1442, but his plan was upset by Alfonso's death in 
1455 and the conf11ctiny claims of Alfonso's illegitimate son Ferrante and 
another relative, John of Calabria.5 Yet the papal support given these 
Aragonese claimants was in tact :recognition of 8 !!!! aooompli. Like his 
predecessor, Eugen1us tried to reassert his authority in the papal states, but 
he never got anywhere. The oondottier1, s~ to restore a Roman republio 
and to carve out individual holdings for themselves, plagued the papacy. 6 
Eugenius replied to such threats by creatin~ a warrior element in the 
>rbid., VIII, 488, no. 10. 
-
4Emmanue1 P. Rodocanach1 .. Histoire .2! ~ S!.!J2k.! 1k7! (Paris, 1922), 
pp. L47-J .. 48. 
5John of Calabria was a direct descendant of Louis I of Anjou (d. 1385). 
6A1berti , COII'IIl8ntariu8 de co~urQtione forcaria, in Lodc..vicus A. Muratori, 
~ Italicarum §rigtores, xxv MedlolanI, i7Sl), :311. 
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cardinalate.7 By doing so, he continued in the tradition of the great four-
teenth-century Cardinal. Albornoz and foreshadowed Pope Julius II. Eugeni.us was 
eVen forced to seek refuge in Florence, whose inhoapi tali ty .forced him to move 
to Siena. 
The tittcenth-century popes were forced of necsssi ty to solidify their 
political control of the papal states leat they loose them entirely. Mertin V 
and his successors were forced to become more and more strict in maintaining 
peace in RoM. The provincial areas were nominally under the authority ot a 
papel appointee, but they were actually in the power of a local conctottiere. 
Brir,andafe and ci vU disobedience were commonplace. Pius II attempted. to 
restore .ome order by offering amnesty to all except those gullty ot homicide, 
heresy and arson and by eatablish1ng a guard for the preservation of civil 
peace.8 Sometimes the popea tried tc regain pol! tical control by granting 
concessions to the Romans, but, as Guiccisrdini fS own career as a governor in 
the papal territories later deonatrated, after 1170 they took very stern 
messures.9 
7 Such were the appointments of Cardinals Vitellesch1, Scarampo and 
Ficeinino under Eu~en1us rJ. 
A 
""Auguste 'l'he1ner, ad., Codex f;1ptomati.cus [:mini 'l'empenlls S. Sadis, III 
(Roms" 1862), 415, no. J6l. - , 
90uicciardini·. rule of Reggio and Modena taxed his ingenuity as he 
rigorously exercised his papal charge. ~tr1ct punishment of the authors of the 
excesses was necessary to curb disorder. Note his wOrdSI "Le cose ••• non 
potl"8bbero Gsnre in pegg10re disordine, ehe 'l& come uno baccano •••• , .. letter to 
Cardinal de t tJledic1, July 17" 1517, certe~6i, n, 173. ~:isorderly conditions 
continued to prevail in ReggiO a1. though e had used almost every conceivable 
87 
In spi to of the turbulence of the state. ot the Church, the despots and 
republiCS \1itbin them did not want to repudiate papal suzerainty completely. 
TheY sought a compromise with the papacy which would gu."t1'&ntee as far as 
possible their stability and freedom of action. Thus papal claims l'emained 
intact and simply needed reasaertion. 
- , 
type of repression, including the confiscation of crops and goods, the razing ° ,i 
houses and capital pUni.shment., Oe.ffroy, ffAutobiograpMe," p. 666. He had to 
deBl with quarrelsome and rapacious feudal -roras, ~ who enlisted the aid of 
neighboring lords and even notor.1ous Apemi.nfJ brigands l1ke Domenico da Morot to 
ibid., p. 66$. Ariosto encountered similar problema in the Eate-controlled 
"OQi-1'ag:nana. Moretto was one of the thorns in his side too, and he received 
advice from nuke Alfonso on the method of procedure he should take, letter to 
todovico Ariosto, April 6, 1$22, in C40vanni SfOrza. ted., Documenti inedit1 E!! 
servire alla vita di'1cdovico Ariosto (Modena, 1926), p. 121. Cf. ibid., pp. 
Ul-l16, 119, 124-i27, for other letters of Alfonso to Ariosto in 1m-which 
show that the nuke was interested 1n Anosto's work and gave him power to 
proceed with cemplete :independence in difficult cases. Like OUicciardini, 
Ariosto reallY undertook all cares of the goverment, hearing all accusations 
and struggles over thefts and homicides. He begged some to cooperate with him 
and threatened others, and daily wrote to the ruke for counsel and aid. His 
armed men were too few to affront the band! ts and assassins who infested the 
terri tory, and he was reduced to the al ternati ve of us1ng the extreme measures 
of burning the goods of the bandits, their adherents and aids and even the 
churches which, because of ecclesiastical 1mmun1 ty, served as a secure retreat 
for offenders, Lodovico Ariosto, Letters, Jrd edt by Antonio Cappelli, (Milano, 
1887), pp. lxxxix, 200, 163, and, lor references to the ducal COun8el in the 
8ummer and fell of 1523, p. xci, n. 1. His task: was 80 difficult that Ariosto 
eften spoke exCitedly, ""i., ibid., pp. 21.)-21.6. He even threatenf'l to abandon 
the offioe" for "Ognuno eli iiiravoglia, e dicona mal d1 me, ma piu di V.5. 
Lthe rYukeiJ aha pigli 11 loro denari e lasc1 abbandonate 1. rocche •••• ," ibid. 
p. 2.3U. ,But, like Guicciardin1, Ario.to took his dUties seriouslY. u ••• f~ 
che stare in questo utticio non sono per nervi amico alcuno, .. non 1. 
giustiz1a, II cited in ~., p. xcii. Of his role as governor for the r;'Uke, 
Ar.1osto wrote in the third person that "he acted so wisely that he brought pesc 
to the country) when he lett them, he was content, although while he remained 
there he was disturbed, It I.e Satire, ed. Antonto del nero (Milano, 194.3), p. 
46. Bot only the papal hoI'di"ngs bUt maDY' otl"..er Italian regions _1'0 b ... t with 
problema which were intensit1ed by foreign 1nvasion. 
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The papal states never fully providec' financial security to the fifteenth 
and sixteenth-centu17 papacy. A concession was made in tax exemptions, a 
10 practice which grew and grew under each pontift. Under such cond! tiona, they 
bad to fet funds by means of 8f!..nates and indulgence money. 
The poll tical and economic &eti vi ties ot the fifteenth L"ld sixteenth-
century popes should be viewed not so much as a concentration on pa.pal leader-
£;hip in a pan-Italian movement,l1 but s:imply' as an immediate struggle tor the 
maintenance of poll tical independence. The papacy was forced into the position 
where it could make its authority felt only to the degree to which it could 
claim "srect as e. political power. 
Violations ot papal authority by foreign dynasties and by local ccndottier 
were evident proof of the growing secularization ot European society. 
Conc11iarism end Gel1icanism too tr.reatened the fifteenth-eenwr,y papacy 1n ita 
treedom. By virtue of their c\,"l1 princely cr.aracter, ne.tional monarchs kept 
mixed m.-itters within their own jurisdiction or looked upon the pope 8S a t'r:imu8 
!!l!:!£ pares. Martin V and his successon had adhered to simple traditional. 
principle of the separation of church and the aeeul.ar order in a Christian 
.n 
leThe extreme debt of the Roman government in l.471 was traceable to heavy 
expenses during the Crusades and to the dwindling tax resources of the papal 
atatea. cr. ":r:1arium Anton11 Petri" in !'1uraton, XXIV, 977-985. 
ll-rhit3 intorpretation was read into the oontl1ct of the papacy with the 
French and the Aragon.a. by Cecilia M. Ady, Flue II (London, 1913), p. 184, but 
it has also 'been expounded by 8n entire school 'Of modern Italian scholars, 
notably Ernesto Pontieri, L'eguillbrio e la crisi polities itallana nella 
!e?P!lS ~ !!!! peeo}.~ XV (NapeR, 194~";-p. ". 
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society,12 bu.t the reputation of the papacy still stood r';u"ficiently high at 
tbe time for them to exert pressure in purely temporal matters. Ouicciarc.ini 
noted, for example, that Innocent VIII had suPr,.ort&d some Neapollt.an bs.l'Ons who 
trel~C revolting aeainst King Ferrante. Lorenzo d&t l';edici feared such a polley. 
Given papsl a"l'!bi tion, the Croxreh' s power ehown here might prove harmful to 
other rulers.13 
Althouell the papal dignity was still important, the papacy could no 
longer seriOUSly hope to demonstrate its leadership of Chriet~ndom through a 
cornmon 'ruropean crusade. Yet both Nicholas V and Cal1xtus III thought they 
could obtain support tor a crusade it there would first be polltical peace in 
Italy. The Poaee of Lod! of 11~5L evidenced a general ltallan desire tor peace. 
Theoretically at lea$1i, this pea.ce continued as the basis tor all papal 
action.U, 
The death ot Lorenzo de' Medici, who tried to keep the balance of power 
in Italy" and t."1e accession of Alexander VI occurred coincidentally in the 
same year. The Borgia rope and hi. successors, especially Julius II, torce-
fully Nl:asMrted their spiritual prerogatives and their claims to Church 
territories. Leo I witnessed the accession ot Charle. V, who maintained that 
he stood for peace UiOng Christiana .and the defense ot Christian! ty against 
l2cr. the papal letter to Charl;,. VIII in Victor Martin, Les orinnes du 
pallican1~ (Paris, 1937)" Il, 241. - . v -
13nElogio," p. 225. 
lLcf• TheineI', III, 379, No. 324, and supra, p. 26, n.l. Clement explained 
frequently that the maintenance of peace was his papal charge, but Guicciardini 
found it necessary to challenge his words. 
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MOslems and heretics. The Emperor hoped that the Pope would be his ally. As 
,p1r1tual. heads of the Christian Cnureh, however, the popes could never 
acknowledge the etperor as the ultimate arbiter of the religious problems 
a£!'licUng Christendom. It was intolerable that a secular prince should take 
the 1m tlati va in refo:nn:1.ng the Church and should threaten to summ.on a general 
council. 
Europe ecnceived of Charles ViS empire pr1marily in terms of pure power. 
This gave birth to the permanent hostility of France, the only other European 
power of comparable strength, and then the dependent position ot the les .... 
powers, England, the Italian states and Denmark. Guicciardini agreed with 
tanney, the Viceroy of NaplH in 1526, that it was the nature ot the Popes to 
fear and hate the Emperors.l5 At the high pOint ot the struggles which 
Guicciard1ni delineates, Clement VII was as alarmed as the medieval popes OWl' 
the control ot Milan a.nd Naple. by one ruler. One of Charle.' major weaknesses 
was his 1nab:U1 ty to get the papacy to cooperate wholeheartedly in his 
policies. 
Ouicciard1n1 is at hi. best in detailing the play-by-play movements ot 
Charles V and Claent VII. Alone amon.s contemporaries perhaps, he saw clear17 
the medieval character ot the imperial politics of the empel"01'.l6 He realized 
that a pope could onl.;Y preHr9'e his role as Vicar of Christ it he could maintai 
15storu d'Ital1a, IV, 31.2 • 
• 
6
16aatraello Ramat, !! Guicc1ardini !!! tragedia ~tltal.1,,(F1renlZ', 1953), 
p. 2 • 
-his regr!U!!!.l7 There was an intimate link between the reS!!!! and the 
.8Cf'rdotium. 
-
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Ue did not deny that the pope was a spiritual leader and that his attent.101 
to spiritual affairs gave 111m greater esteem in the eyes ot the Chriatians. 
Yet, as always, he accented the fact that man and his world an certa.inly not 
too good. w'bo doubts that if a pope did not tend to his charge 'twith ever,y 
ldnd of arms and power be would be annihilated !!2ll!!!. !!! ~ se.ritt:aat 
aspects .2!.!:!!!!!!! l!!!!!!a l!:! t~P2ral?" With careful and shrewd lOgic, he 
-
argued tor the preaenation of the temporal. authority ot the papacy without 
which the pope could not exercise his spiritual authority.lS Further 
Guicciardin1 knew tn>m experience that disorder in the papal states 'WOuld in-
evitably open the way tor lay prlnees to seize contn>l ot the church.19 
17The word "regnwn" as used in this sentence refers to the temporal aspect 
of papal rule and not as usual to the tanporal. power. Cf. infra, p.129, n.l. 
18"Giuatificazione della politics d1 Clemente VII," Scritti 22litici, p. 
201. Cf. also the same argument in "Contro 1 taccordo tra Clemente VII e Carlo 
V," ibid., p. 185: "Non potete conservare 1a autoriU del papa, Be non 
coneervate quelle deJ principe. e que1la del principe resta annichUata, come 
ha a rico~noscere 1 tenere suo dalla discrezione di uno maggiore, come ha a 
depenc!ere de' cermi suoi." Because ot these views, Guicciardini has been halle 
86 a precursor ot later proponents ot the Lateran Fact, Francesco Sun, 
"OUicciardini e 18 rellg.1one, It Francesco Guicciardini ne1 IV centenario della 
morte (1540-1940) (Firenze, 1940', p. 18L. Pastor callS attention to 
OUicciard1.ni • a view that, though in i tHlt it would be a good thing it the pope 
had no temporal sovereignty, the world being what it is, a powerless Head ot 
the Church would very likely tind himself seriously hampered in the exercise ot 
his spiritual ottice or even reduced to absolute impotence, VI, 451-452, Citing 
.QJlere inadite, I, 389. Pastor shows that Guicciardini's view approaches that 0 
~t Bellaminel ttPropter malitiam temporum experientia c181'l".at, non SOIU11l 
utiliter, sed etie experient1a clamat, non solum ut.11iter, sed etiam neceasari 
ex singulari Dei pIt>v1dantia donatos .tu1sse pontifici ••• temporales aliquos 
principatus," cit.1ng ~e Rom. Pontit., Lib. V, c.9, in ib1d.,452, n.* 
-- -
19 ttCiustifieawne della poll tica, " pp. 206-207. 
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Guicciardini stressed that a pope has the serious obligation to hand on to 
his successors what he has received from his ,redecessors. He shunned violence 
in papal activities lest it result in immediate papal defeat. PrerequiSites 
for a just papal policy are a good christian Ufe and refusal to fight to exteb 
lands or in revenge against papal opponents. OU1cc1ardini recognized that good 
20 
example and gentle action are not enough for an effective papal polley. 
These criteria made 0u1cciardini a good judge of the popes from Alexander 
VI to Clement VII. No pope ahould dare to take any step which would place him 
at the mercy of the tanporal power. Then too, the papal station was too often 
attended \.'ith reatless ambitions.21 More than any other persons, the popes 
22 . 
were obliged to procure the preservation ot the peace, but Guicciardini 
accuse,: them of standing most of the time as "lo inst.rwn.ento di suscitare 
guerre e incendi nuoviin Italia.,,23 He aceuaed Leo X of having used all his 
power to start a war in 1$21. For difficult cases, the popes should be willing 
to five their cwn lives.2L 
He could look impartially at Alexander VI for his own papal semcs did 
25 
not ber-in until the reign of Leo X. He recapitulated Alexander's role in the 
20 
Ibid., p. 207. 
-
21Stor.1a d'Italla, n, 168. Note Guiceiardini's wordsa ft ••• aedia 
comunemente derti im6!zioni e delle azioni inquieti." 
22Ibid., IV, 77. 
-
23Ibid., I .. .38l. 
-
2hlbid., IV, 77-78. 
-
2$Aa one of the major directors ot the foreign polley of the Holy See 
duri!'lg the reign of Clement m, he felt called upon to justify it after ]$26 
a'1d 1527. Cf. intra, pp. 144-1$1. 
-9.3 
struggle between Ferdinand of Aragon and Lodovico Sforza of Milan for the 
mastery of Naples. Both vied for the support of the papacy. Guicciardin1 
pointed out that, to II Moro I s satisfaction, Alexender had been one of the firs 
to approve of Charles VIII '8 invasion of Italy but he came to teer for his own 
life and took refuge in the Cutel Sant I Angelo as the French passed through 
the papal dominions. He was cognizant too that enemy cardinals might take 
advantage of French interest in ecclesi4stical relom. Perhaps the King would 
heed their requests and procure the elect:ion of another pope to replace hi.m.26 
In lU9$ Alexander fomed the League of Venice, ail.,ed primarily' at the expulsion 
ot the French King from Naplae. By' lL9B the Pope pressed the ambassadore of 
Spain, Milan and Naples to plead with the Venetian ambassador tor the restor-
ation of Pisa to Florence as a condition tor Florenc.'s allegiance to the anti-
French league. With the removal of this probl .. among the Italians, it seemed 
probable at the time that no one power would ever call in the French again. 
Guicciardin1 judged that Alexander was exclusively inspired by self-
interest. This accounted .tor his wavering policy. It was "well.-lmown" that he 
had privately negotiated with Charles VIII for Ceure's benet1t,27 and later 
fomed the league against him. Then the Pope considered a league with Louis 
XII when he had been unsucceeaM in gaining Naples.28 His "immoderate thirst 
for power" made him feel that he could achieve his ends more eftectively in a 
-
26p~r1a dt lta11a, I, 99-101. 
27Ib1d., 294. 
28Ibid., 304-J08. The Pope first thought that he would gain control of 
Naples l)ymarry.1ng his son Cesare to King Federigo's daughter. 
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disturbed Italy. 29 
In 1497, he took adVantage of the opportunity to seize the Orsini estates. 
,,11ile the heads of the Orsini were prisoners in Naples, Alexander declared them 
rebels for having entered the French service without his permission. Cardinal 
Ascanio Sforza encouraged this action, for he was friendly to the Colonnas, 
enemies of the Orsini. The Fope agreed that the Cardinal could keep some ot 
the Orsini lands for himeelf. Lo&>vioo too approved of the Po~ ts action but 
the Venetians did not. 30 
Guicc1ardini stressed Pope Alexander VI's misconduct. He showed excessive 
interest in Cesare's advancement. He scandalously promoted twelve men to the 
cardinalate who offered him much money' To seize every opportunity to sene 
his avarice, Alexander pubUshed the Jub1lee in Italy and in foreign countries. 
The prot! t .fxtl1'll the 1ndulgences and other spin tual emoluments and from the 
temporal dominions ot the Church he gave to Cesare, who was tl-.en preparing for 
his siege of Faenza.31 
Cesare, the Duke of Valentino, fell from the height of his greatness in 
1503 after the Jope's reconcilation with the French ld.ng. He had quickly in-
creased his strength by fraud and CJ'Uel ty and by the arms and power ot the 
Church, but his ru1n vas headlong. His enemies used him the same way 8.S he and 
his father, Alexander, had used others.)2 
-
29rbid., 299-.302. 
-
3Orbid., 271. 
-
3lIbid., II, 10. 
-
32Ibid., 70-71. 
-
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The Pope's major enemies were the Orsini, ColOMS, Savelli, and the lords 
of the Romagna, the Harea and Urbino.33 The norentines and the Venetians 
feared him but he won the esteem of the French ldng. He was the' head of an 
elCcellent body of troops in the Roman region and he held the balance in the war 
between France and spein.l4 
Guicc1ardini termed Alexander ttuomo valent,is81mo, ft a man of great judgment 
and vi a ion 8S the sucoess of his house shows, but he did not admire the Pope" 
methodS. At the death of Alexander, all Rome hurried to St. Peter's. As pope, 
he viewed sacred and secular things without distinction, diapensed 
ecclesiastical ottices profusely, was immoderately anb1t1ous and avaricious, 
treacherous and monstrously cruel. His cupid! ty led him to assassinate those 
cardinals and prelates who stood in his wq. From the time of his simoniacal 
election as pope, he cultivated all vicea of body and soul. There was in him 
no religion, no obaervance of fai th, no concern for justice in a Rome which was 
nothing but sin. He observed only what seemed useful to him.35 
A sense of tragedy is evident in Guicc1ard1n1' IS portrait of Alexander. 
The Pope's undertaldnga were attended with a very rare prosperity from his 
33Aluander Borria aimed to break the power of the great RoJnan fam1l1es. 
Ouicciardin1 points out that the Cardir.als del V1ncola, Asawo, those of the 
Colonna and Savellitam!l1es, and ~ other enemy cardinals pressed Charles 
IDI to r EIllOV8 him from the papal ar.air and tc procure another election in 
defense of (Jed's Church, ~., I, 101. 
34storle fiorentine, pp. 258--269. 
I 
35Ibid., cr. Machiavelli's characterization of Alexander's ambitions 
"W1cked"'1'fO'Pe, his head full of his own designs, preyed on ~ilan and Florencel 
the times serve him wen, ft ~ ~, ed. P. Fant'an1 and L. Pasaerlni, from Vol. 
I~ onwards, 00. L. Pusel-inr"a'ii!"1r. Milanesi, 6 vola. incomplete (F1renze, 
1 73-77), li, 138. 
youth to the day of his death. He always desired great things and obtained 
even more than he desired. From this OUicciardin1 suggested that things were 
influenced t,y fate or by inexplicable divine justice. Guicciardini came to 
think tt-.at justice does not nourish amone men on earth • .36 
The historian's interest in Julius II was more poll. tical. He believed 
that a pope was bound not to alienate ecolesiastical posseasions. Though he 
did not think a pOpe should be a military man, he suggested that strong action 
at times was necessary. 37 
• 
36S1m:Uar jud~ents, with only differing phraseolof,7, are given in!2!!!. 
and in storis d'Italia" II, 97-98. Note the puzzled explanation of . 
OU1cciaraii'd, una\ile to fathom Alexander's good fortune. • ... 19 nondimeno, non 
trovando at peccati s~ condegna retribuzione nel mondo, ru. insino allo ultimo 
di'feliciss1mo •••• e volto l'animo a fare state turono at successi sua p1u' 
volte maggiori chte' disegni •••• fu insomma pi;? cattivo e piu felice che mai per 
IIlOlti secol1 f'usli forse state papa alC'lll'lO." cr. also the following. "Esempio 
JX)tente a contondere l' arroganu. d1 coloro 1 quill, presum"ndoe1 di .corgen 
con la debolezza deg].i oeehi umani la profond1ta de' giudici div.1n1, affermano 
010 che d1 prospero 0 di avverso avviene agl1 uomini proc:edere 0 de' meri t1 0 
da t demeri t1 lore I come se tutto di 'non appar1.ssero mol t1 buon! euere ves.at1 
1ngiustamente e molti di pravc animo easere eaaltati indebitamente, 0 come se, 
altrimenU interpretando, 81 derogas88 aUa giust1zia e al!.J t:l()ten~ di tto, 141 
amplitudine della quale, non rietretta at temini bravi e present!, in altro 
tempo e in altro luogo, con large mana, con premi e con euppU61 sempiterni, 
riconosce e giuat1 dagl1 1ng1usti. n 
37 Cf. supra, PP. 90-92. 
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Pope Julius' character is evident in his leadership o.r papal troops at 
M1rBndola, where he exposed himself to all the fatigues and dangers of a 
JDi11tary commander. It was an uncOJ'IIfIOn and shocld.ng sight to see an old and 
infirm pope engaged :in battle. This 'W.I:lS evidence that Julius was a pope in 
name only. 38 
His energy, like his audsc! ty and resolution, was boundless, and hi. 
experience toughened him even more. Guicciardini compared him te· the classical 
Anteus, who demonstrated more vigor With each blow of Hercules • .39 Guico1ard1n1 
did not att('!'mpt to hide his admiration for JUlius who, NOre than any of his 
predecessors, was honored by those who judged that a pope ehould add 1mf!rium 
to the Holy' See more than influence eoule by a good example. But for the 
latter task, Christ const.ituted popel his vicars on earth. Julius would have 
been worthy of the greatest glol".Y if he were a secular prince or if his care 
and intention vere rather to exalt the Church by the use of the spir1tual arts 
of peace. Had he been moderate and prudent in the exercise of his papal duties 
he would have sustained the Church's reputation, lee.ned princely di8cord, and 
bettered the r.'eneral condition 0:£ the times.40 Either the .fate. or the Pope's 
strong constitution kept him alive to serve "come autcre e cagione pr.1.ncipale 
38Stor.l.a d fltali&f;e nI, 64-65. In this passage Ouicciardini also noted 
the striBi'ii contraSt tween Julius and Louis XII, healthy end Vigorous and 
trained from youth in military exerei8es~ Unlike the Pope, he lett the conduct 
of the war to l".i.s generals. 
39 n!2.., 39. 
4~bid., 2$7. 
98 
I ,41 di piu lunghe e maggiori calamita di ltalu." 
'41th his accession to the pontificate, Jullus relented from fomenting 
disturbances in Italy so that he could accumulate money tor his projects. He 
"as ::ietermined to restore the lands of the Church which had been taken from it, 
and he vowed to use any method to rain his ends.42 Poth France and the Empire 
succumbed t( Julius' desire t, regain these territories. He wanted to maintain 
temporal strnegth and decided now to aSfLst the Venetians, against whom he had 
entered the confederacy of Cambrai in 1508, against the foreign states strugg-
ling for Italian control. Ouicciardini pointed out that Julius was jealous ot 
France and the Empire and V8'lted to involve them in d1.f'.ficultiee which would 
divert their attention from him. 1118 members ot the Cambrai league reminded th 
Pope that he was bound by its terms to prosecute the Venetians with spiritual 
and temporal weapons until the al11es recovered their poss.asions. Jul1ua 
aasured the Emperor in particular that he would not torget that the Venet1ane 
had seized SCRe imperial lands.43 
From 1510 he was set to expel the foreigner fran Italy. His cry was 
"Fuori 1 barbar.11" He harbored strong anti-French distaste and,ss a result, an 
anti-Ferrarese and ant1-Florentine feeling as well.lab In that year he began to 
b2Ib1d., II, 168 .. 174-17.$. Note Guicciardini ta phrase: IMa in Giul10 era 
intenzione mol to di versa. tl 
44Guieeiardini observed that everyday Julius grew more insolent against tht 
King of France and the Duke of Ferrara, It ••• w.oltip11cando scop-c·rtamente nella 
querela e nella mi.n&cc1e," ibid., III, 25. 
-
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speak openly of his intention to change the government of Florence because it 
was too French.45 Nor was the A.ragonese ruler unmindful of what. he considered 
imModerate ambitions on the part of the Pope. On August 19, 1512, a period in 
OUicclardini's legateship in ltdch he .llready showed himself to be in excellent 
standing with Ferdinand, the King called Guiceiardini to him to discuss this 
s1 tuation. Julius f desire to change the government of norance "sand ragione tt 
indicated that he wished to dominate all Italy, and it was Ferdinand's intentio 
to defend the City and her present government in every way. 46 
The religio-political connections between the policy of the French ruler 
and Julius II merit further consideration, likewise events regarding control of 
Ferrara, Reggio and Modena. His i:mmectl.ate successors too displayed the same 
in~ensive interests in these regions. 
The Pope attempted to break the Franco-Ferrarese alliance and to gain 
possession of Alfonso' s duchy. The French King thought that Julius had sent 
papal troops into Ferrara to oversee the customs and salt works. The King 
agreed that, in the case of Alfonso's interference with papal customs and the 
salt works, Julius could proceed against him, since no ally was to intrude into 
Church affairs. The Pope did not wish to disclose his intentions until his 
plans matured, and he negotiated continually for an agreement with Louis XII. 
But Julius was adamant in his posi tlon that the King must renounce his 
protection of the Me. Guicciardini observed that Julius knew what he was 
-
4'tetter of Antonio della Valle to Machiavelli, August 30, 1510, Qpere, 
VI, 97. 
85. 46r.etter of Guicciardini to the DieCi, August 22-26, 1512, Cartegp., I, 
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do"...... for the r......... did not want to war ac;ainst the Church and would be w:Ulinft ~"E" ~ e -or;> 
to conte to an agreement with the Pope 1n th~ event of a showdown as to the 
french position in the struggle between JU.lius and Alfonso. 47 
In 6pite of the mi8cani~ of many of Julius' plans and the hIJavy ex-
penditures, he had high hopes for tuture success. P'llo1icl;y he proclaimed that, 
with God t !3 assistance tor the restoration of ItaUan liberty" he would see his 
labors brought to a prosperous end. The Venetians would aid him, for they were 
his only true frienda. They had to act with Julius, OUicciardini explained, 
for they had exhausted their finances and 'Were in dire straUs. With them he 
moved against Ferran troll! Bologna. 48 The K1nr soon realized that the Pope 
was actinr to subject l"erru-a to the Church. He had IUTlmged tor more papal 
troops to move into Ferrara with the intention, if his SWiss mercenaries were 
noted. ellS there, or prooeed1 ng into Milan. After investing the 'Fmperor with 
Naples and making secret provisions for attacking Genoa by land and se8, he 
tent twelve thQu.sand SWiss into Milan and moved to assist the Venetians to 
recover some towns held by the Emperor. 49 
Julius excomntWl1oated All'oMO dtEste and all who had or would take arms in 
• 
47 Ibid., 22-24_ 
-
48Ibid., 39-L1. Note Ouiceiardin1 t s wordsl ••• delibero d1 traaterirsi 
persona~te a Bologna, per strignere piu con 1& sua pr'esenzs. 8 date maggiore 
autori ta alle COS8, e accreaeere 1& caldezza de' capi tani in1'eriore allo impeto 
SUo J afl'emando abe a espugnare Ffirrara gll baatavano 1e fofte sue e de t 
V1n1zian1 ••• ," ibid., Ul. 
-
49Ibid., 24--26. 
-
~I 
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his defense, including all t!-.:.e principal officers 1n the French army. 50 Even 
after Gallican articles were draw up against him. at Or16a.."ls and Tours with a 
threat to SUlII'IIOn him to Ii Church council, the F'Ope answered tlmt he tfoulrl come 
to terms only 1£ the King obligated himself totally to abandon the defense ot 
Ferrara,51 
Guicciardini strongly CIOndemnad Julius here. For a. very long t·ilne the 
House of fate held Ferrara as vicars of the Church and Reggio and Morlena by 
imperial investiture. Until the reign of Julius II, there was no question but 
tl"..at these two oi ties were under imperial jurisdiction, and the Este rightly 
possessed them. That Jope, nthe reviver of the old and almost forgotten rights 
of the Holy See and the author of much nrl.schiet UI'lder a pious title, "52 made 
war u-pon the Dulce of Ferrara tor the ~rpo_ of reducing his duchy under Church 
control. First, he kept Modena for hi!'!lsel.t, together with other towns as tar ~ 
the Ri Vel" Po, which he claimed had belonged to the Holy See as part ot the old 
Exarchate of Ravenna. Shortly after, tor tear of the French, he gave 1. t up to 
the F:mpel"Or MmdJnilian. Julius cont1m1.ed his war against Alfonso and took 
ReP:J!io £rom him. GuicciardL'li felt with others, that, if Jul1us had lived 
longer, he would also have taken P'errara' 
He could give many reasons for tile strong papel hatred of the Eate, for 
, . 
SOIbid., 47-1.+8. Guiceiardini eanrnented here that, "in the midst of the 
battle aiid"the din of tEr.lporsl ama, the thunder of spiritual artillery began tc 
rattle from all ~~8.fl 
SlIbid., 47-48, 53-54. 
-
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JUlius wss a bitter enElllGY of Alfonso. There were hi. pret .. nsions to' I"errareae 
territory which once 'belol1f'$d to the Church in addition t.o his hostUity to the 
ruke for ha.ving been f'riendlyto the French. Perhaps the Popels bitterness 
stemmed from the implacable ha.tred for the memory of his predecessor, fops 
Alexander, whoso daughter L'llCl"8zia h~d 'been married to Alfonso and by wham she 
had several. children. lhe reason tel' Julius' hatred at the Este did not alter 
its effects. To his lUoca.sors he left Reggio and his ambition for recovering 
Ferrara. They believed that Julius' glorious reputation stemmed from these 
endeavors} 3 
Ria ueaire for the utenaion of Church boundaries soon gave way to the 
defense of l:is ow.,h GuiceiarOini detailed the manner in :fhich Jullus during 
all cf 1510 drew farther and farther a:way from the French Kinr; as he veered 
toward the fuperor. Cbstinate1y bent on a war, he inveighed bitterly ageirust 
Louis" accusing him ot cal.lillg himself unjustly a goed Christian aIle of 
desir1..'"lg Jul:1.u£' destruction. How could he aver have ae."'lt troops ar;a1nst the 
Popel Louis also contemplated. t..1.e meaaures to be taken arainat the Pope if he 
would persist in his alliance 'With the Venetians and in 1".is attempts to subject 
Farran.5, ThG matters between Pot:e and King remained the same but each month 
• 53 ~., 278-279. 
~1d.., In, L5. Jote OU1eciardin1' 8 vo.rds I lIMa 1 lardo:re che aveva U 
pontitiee di oir.ndere alt.r1 si convert( in nee.a.ita{ di difendere le cose 
proprie. " 
55Ibid., 56, 61, 63. 
-
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POpe Julius' other rrohlems did not d1minish his desire to r,ain Bologna 
and Ferugia. Bologna was under the control of the Bentivogl1o and gave a 
nominal support to the Pope.56 Already in 1$06 Julius informed the Florentines 
that he wanted to clear the lands of the Church of tyrants and requ.ested that 
their captain, l'<1arcantonio Coloma, should serve him against the Bentivogl.1o. 
ThOUgh the Republ1c opJ'.)OSed this request because it would weaken their forces 
in their war to keep control of Pisa, the Enf'aloniere did not want to anger 
the pope and delayed giving an answer 88 long as he cOUld.S7 The Bentivogllo 
were friendly to the French King, and Florence did not want to incur his wrath 
by' attacking Bologna tor the Pope. By 1511, Jul1ua real1zed that he could not 
take it.SS 
Pope Julius also el.uhed with Lou1a over coneUiar1a. The French 
aasembly which had threatened the Pope and empowered the King to raise money 
from the revenues of the French clergy, called a councll to be held at x.,ons 
the following March.59 Ccmc1l1ari_ was indeed one ot tr ... major problema ot 
the age, and a pope 80 involved in pol1t1es u Julius was moat apt to become 
involved. Louis preaeed for a eounc1l and wsa 8U8p1e1cus because Ferdinand did 
not agree.60 To procure the good will ot the pr1neea and keep the council tram 
S6rb1d., II, 171&-175. 
-
57,stor1e fiorentir,te. p. 290. 
,aStoria dtltalia, Ill, 99. 
59Ibid., 48. 
-
I 60yerdinand claimed that it seemed unwise to call a Church council wb1le 
tall' was involved in war, ibid., Bo.8l. 
-
lOb 
materlalizinr, Jul1us created eight cardinals.61 
Louis XII went ahead wi til ~'renoh plans I however, and summoned the CouncU 
of Pisa in lSll. The cardinals explained that theY' could lawtully call a 
council without papal sanction because it vas obvious that the Church needed 
reform in both head and members, and it was clear that Jullu. did not intend 
to undertake it. They branded the Pope an inveterate simon1ac, a man of 
infamous and abandoned manners, not tit to discharge the office ot a pont1f'f. 
He had undertaken many war. and opened all Christendom to scandal. In this 
case, the power of convoldng a council was lawful.:b' theirs. 
Cardinals who apprond the Council of Pin argued that the Fathers ot the 
COUncll or Constance .tated that a council should take place every ten yeu •• 
Nothing el. could keep the pope. on the right path. Human nature was very 
fraU and life subject to many temptations. How could the Church atard secure 
if a man with eo JlUch power knew that there were no checks on him? 
Guicc1ardini also explained the other side of the conciliar question. 
Those who followed the theologians rather than the canonists eiad only a pope 
COU1~1 convoke a council, whatever his morel character. The onl.y excepUon wae 
heresy. Otherwise, and th4tY pointed to history to justify- their argument, any-
one could disturb the state of the Ohurch on a:a:r pretense, by ambition or 
retorm. Louis' Pisan assembly, this papal group maintained, was not a council 
a.t all, but rather it was the foundation of a. schism in the Church of God and a 
convention inspired by' the deVil. t2 
- 61 Ibid., 85. 
-
62Gu1cciardin:1. • s account of concillarism and Pin is given in ibid., 102-
103. -
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By the Cambs-ai a.greement6) none of the allies weN to take the settlement 
of ChttrCh affairs upon tr.emael.vee. Yet they went boldly on. For them, the 
political and the religious spherea constituted but one arena.6!& Even those 
wiK eager,ly wanted reform were atraid of a Church couneil w~.ich, acting on 
conc:1l1arist pr.1nciples, could do more harm than good. In lS11 moat of the 
Christian world was well _are that the Pope was at the mercy ot tcrt.une, 
snilltaril)" and polit1c~. The Venetian troops allied with him were in even 
worse condition than his own who were scattered up and down the reninsula while 
LoUis was victorious. If he wished, he could Mise Rom.e and all the papal 
state. But the Kinf' did not f'ollow up his victory either because of his 
reverence tor religion or because he was afraid or 1nculT1ng the wrath of the 
other pr:: nees if' he went further.6S Heft aga1n religion end Pll1 tics were 1nte "" 
linked. Guicc1ardin1 observed, wi. th an eye to the French defeat and withdrawal 
from Italy in 1512, that L0111s, who requested papal pardon tor these reasons, 
embraced certain patterns of action more out of piety perhaps than out of 
policy.66 
JullU8 took measure. to clear h1mse1t from the charge of negUgence and 
summoned a rival Councu of the Lateran. He condemned the card.1nala who had 
convoked the one at Pin. At the .&mIlI time the King thought that papal friend-
ship and ~ace were desperately needed to free himself' .tl-om Charles' 
-
M'l' 
63the League of Cambrai was tonned against Venice 1n December 1508 by LouiA 
XII, !:1ax1m1lian, Julius II and Ferdinand 01' Aragon. 
6Lsimilar problema W8ft encountered by Clement m. ct. ~ntra, Chap. IV. 
6S~tor1a d'Ital1., nIl' 10$. 
66Ib1d•• 105-106. 
I. 
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. " 
.1
1 
Ii 
I: I 
106 
imPOrtunate demands. He was man1.f'eat1y cold to the Pian eounell. and, in an 
attempt to g$t Julius to agree to a peace, he rejected it entirely. 67 
In a period ot illne., the Pope called a conailtory and ordered the 
fUblication ot a bull stating that the election of his $"J.cceasor should proceed 
eanonicall7. No person vas to aocend to 80 great a dignity as Julius himself' 
had. Methods were set up against those who would use simoZ'(Y to be elected ae 
pope and for ann.u.l.ling such an election. Gu1ceiardini obsel"fed that tl'..a bull 
was seomed by certain cardinals who were already electioneering in the event 
of JuliUS' death. 68 
In the same year, lSU, Julius n showed his antagonism tovuds tou.i8 by 
engaging in a consp1n.cy apinst France. the Florentine s.<;ntalon:1.ere had it 
enacted into law, it the Pope ehould attack Florence, allied with France, the 
Church revenues would be used for her deten ... f:I) Florence felt she had realOn 
tor animositY', for both she and PiA had been excommunicated. 70 
Julius did not want peace with Franee even after her defeat at PAyema. 
The entire papal court, which had been in tear ot a ~ on Rome, now requelJte 
the Pope to conclude a peace whioh the French weJ"e then w11l.1ng to negotiate. 
While he had acquired great glory" the cardinalI pointed out, it was apparent 
that God w1ehed the war againet ?':rance to come to an end. To act in oPPOsition 
-
67 11 6 Ibid., 0, 11 , 123. 
6Bxbid., 119-120. 
-
69S£. Storia d t ltal1a, nI, 13t-137. 
7Orbid., 12h. 
-
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to the Divine liill woulJ bring about the ruin of the Church. It only tho Pope 
would make peace according to the Gospel" he would tree h1msel.f and the Church 
:from trouble. But Jullus would not. listen to these appeals. Seeld..ng to 
hUInilia:te the French even more, he followed the addco ot the Venetian and 
Spanish ambassadors and ot GiuUo de.~.edic1, who lM1ated that the French ,.,... 
weak and he could grind more aut ot the. Be decided then to nah everything 
rather than conclu<1e peace with his enemy. 71 
Julius necotiated with the SWiaa tor six thousand soldiers. The lOpe 
c1a:lJned that he would send these mercenaries againat Ferrara where the fatigued 
Frenc.'1 troops wish'Dd tor an end to the fighting. The French lost Crem.ona" 
Bereamo and Pavia. Parma and Piacenu voluntarily submitted to Julius, who he1~ 
that the,. belonged to the Church al rumbers of the T'xarchate of Ravenna. Th18 
revolution in public affairs 1n 1512 centeNd on French losses and papal 
£ains.72 
SQm£l.'"hat p'..12:zl.ed by the Pope ta good fortune in api te of his reckless 
polley, Guicc1ard1n1 noted that his bad fortune 88sued at an end. A period of 
better luck: vas a,mbol1zed with the opening of the Lateran Council: 
= 
... very decent and very holy and of a torce lufficient to penetrate 
into the innermost reoeeMS ot the hearta of men, 1t they could only 
make thems.l .... s believe that the leaders of the eoune1l had no ulteriOl"7) 
motives but only what appeared from the obvious meaning of their words. ! 
71 Ibid., 193-19L, 196-197. 
72 Ib1d., 202-210. 
73Ibid., 197, 199. 
" 
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}3esides the cynicism in Guicciardini' s observation, there was a cautious 
pessimism. He did not feel that the assembled prelates were really sincere in 
their desire for Church reform. 
Guicciardini criticized Julius' obstinate policy. The French ruler wanted 
peace in the face of successive defeats in Italy and the Pope looked to war as 
his inclination to peace, g.h! ~ ~ any. diminisrJ8<i.74 Rather, Julius 
thought it prudent policy at the end of 1512 to come to terms with t.he Emperor. 
He promised to aid him now against the Venetians temporally and spiritually. 
Guicciardini narrated that this volte !!:!. came almost immediately after the 
Pope had worn himself out ''by exhortations, entreaties and menaces" that the 
preservation of the Ve.1etian sUtte was vi tal for the common goed of Italy. 
This change in policy brought about a Venetian change too~ and the Spaniards 
feared that they might now again ally with the French King. 75 
Pope Julius' great plans came to an end with his death in early 1513.76 
Just before, he ordered the publication of the earlier bull against simony to 
attain the pontifical office. He also insisted that the election of his 
successor belonged to the College of Cardinals and not to a council. Julius 
requested the College of Cardinals to grant the city of Pesaro to Guidobaldo da 
Montefel tro, the Duke of Urbino, since by his efforts it had been restored to 
the Church on the death of Giovanni Sforza. He refused the urgent request of 
74rbid., 199-201. 
75Ibid., 241-242. 
760Uicciardini wrote that Julius "ended the course of his pain.f'ul 1ife~1f 
~., 255-257. 
,. 
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Lady Fel1ce, his daughter, and others, to create Guido da Montefalco a 
77 
cardinal.- Julius argued simply that he was not worthy' of the dignity. 
Gu1eciardini wrote his View ot Jullus in ille a..'ld when he died. In all 
respects, he retained his "usual constancy and soverity, with the same ju~nt 
and vigor of mind which he enjoyed before his sicknesa.,,78 Julius ~ ad built up 
a toasure for the Church even though he had heavy e:xpenaes. But already at 
the coronation ot his succ •• sor, Leo X .. it was being squandered. The splendor 
of Giovanni de I l~edic1' s coronation did not please those *0 argued that so 
solemn an aftair called fer aeriouanese and moderation.79 
illon;:,o dtE.te carr.1ed the solemn Standard of the Church. He had come to 
Rome in great hopes, since he counted on the "gentle dispesi tion of the Pope,,80 
who did suapend his censures at the eoronat.1.on. Ciullo de t ~:edic1 carried the 
Standard of the Knights of Rhodes.81 He became Clement VII and was later 
intimately linked with the future of OUicciard1n1 and the whole of' Italy. 
In April Guicciardin1, atill in Spain, was sufficiently r ..... sight&d to sene 
• 
(j7. . 
The Lady Felice and Guido da Montefalco were brother and sister on their 
mother's side, ~., 257. 
78 Ibid., 255-257. 
-
79Ibid., 259-260. 
8~n an earlier W1"1t1ng, Ouicciard1n1 recalled the Bingle consolation 
remaining at Lorenzo t. death, 1'.1s aons. The greatest of the .. , he thought, was 
the youth}'ul 0i0'V'aJ'mi. In him there appeared hcharaoter and signa of probity 
and virtu," to thJl extent that it seaned that he would pl"OV8 to be "ornamento 
di quella degnita e della Chieea d1 [do, e che a. veninl mai tempo ehe el 8tm:am 
pont1f1cato 8i )i .. 81 per virtt.{, non per amb1t1one e .corrottele. cbe Vivendo lui 
insino aUa eta conveniente aveasi unaa. alcuno dubio a e.sere eletto .. " 
"Elogio," P. 288. 
81 ~ star!a dt ltal1a, III, 2~9. 
-no 
Leo X til letter brimming with sprif.,htly deVotion.82 twbtleaGly he had heard of 
the fan.t'are attending the election of Pope Leo in l-1arob. Although it was Lent, 
Florence resembled a town celebrating the Carnival. For five days honf'1res 
~ and noat. were built. Each evening one of theae was Wrned in front or 
the I1edioi domicile. The last one represented "peace" but was not ':urned in 
ord.;r to aerve .e an indication that wars would be at an end under the 
Florentine Pope. 83 
This earlT rejoicing in the city of the Medici could not conceive of the 
difficulties awaiting the peninsula during that very year. Mo" and more the 
Italian si~~;j Nl grew tense as affairs pointed to war rather t,han peace. 81& 
Especiall7 1rl those areas which had aper.i.anceci French control, explained 
Qu1cciard:in1, there waa real terror. as 
Fran the very beginn1ng of l"t.1s pontificate I Leo worked to expel the French 
hom Italy. Either he thought this was important to the security of the Church 
or he reeented the peraonal injuries be ha<i received £rom the Crown of Fra1'lC$. & 
IT , 
8~etter to Leo X, April 2, 1513, ParteE, I, 161. 
83r.uca Lant'bcci, Diario fiorentino dal !!t22. al ~ ed. wit.'1 notes by 
10000co del Badia (F~ze, rtmj), p. 337-:- -
81&stor:ta d'Italla, nI, 260. Note OU1cc:tard1n1 t s worda. Ma ~ la 
mutazione del ponGtice ntI altn accidenti butavano a stabil1re la quieta 
d1Ital1a, anzi g14 apertamente cominciavano til 1ndirizuI'si 18 coae alla guerra. 
8;Ibid., 262. 
-86rhe arrival of CharlesmI in Italy brought personal. sorrow to Giovanni 
de' Medici, later Pope Leo. Both he and his brothers had been driven out of 
Florence. Alter R~, he was taken as a prisoner to Milan and then into 
Franc~1 !!;!!!., 266-267. 
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While hie father, Lorenzo, and others of his famUy had been i'irm'l.y attached to 
the French, Leo thought that Louis favored fOpllar government and disllked the 
Jotedic1. It seemed that, whenever nng Louis, Francis' predece.aor, had eapou.~ 
their cauee, it was on\Y to use them as tools to draw the Florent1.nEPinto a nn 
French all1ance. Once this wu done, the King would again forget the Medici.S7 
Although the new reign had begun in a spirit ot Franc~-papal distrust, 88 
LeO X attempted first to end the Iiean Council. He entered into negotiations 
wi th King Louis on whose will the entire meeting depended. Leo also denied the 
report that he had paid the SwillS to ravage Milan. Rather he declared his wiah 
tor peace among Christian princes. He was grieved that Louis, by separating 
himSelf fran the Church, had deprived the Pope 01' the opportunity of 
datl0118traUng how IIUCh he was m: natul"!! incl.1rled to be the ling's friend. tou1 
realized that he could never hope to c.e to aDJ" agreanent with the Pope 1n 
temporal concems it their spin tual d1tterencee were not fil"8t cOJI.p08ed. For 
a better opportunity to pursue his particular policies .. he desired a 
reconciliation of h1a kingdom with the Church.59 By virtue of his poalt1on .a 
the spiritual leader of Christendom, Guicciardini stressed, the Pope would 
never be without 8'1 allyl 
The Pope wae not only reconciled to the French ling but al80 to the 
-
88n. following pages on Pope Leo '. politics reter both to Louis XII and 
to his successor, Francie I, who ascended the throne in 1$1.5, almost three 
years after Leo became Pope. Leo's pollcies toward France and the Empire are 
handled topically rather than in a strict chronological way. 
89~tor1a dtltalia. III, 282-284. 
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!fJnPcror ,,11th whom he cooperated against the Venetians. This resulted in vast 
df)\"8atatlon of Venetian territory. Venice was alarmed by this sssoc1ation and 
cor..sidered it a sign. that the Pope :'ever+ntended to 'break with her enemiesJ 90 
Venice's problems were indeed a microcoem ot the :problems of the whole 
Italian peninsula. The years 1514 to 1517 constituted one ot the critical 
periods in sixteenth-century Italian history. Pope Leo sought to enlarge 
Church holdings and Medici power in the same operation. To protect the Italian 
states, he first tried to steer a ndddl.e couree in the struggles of the French 
anc Spanish kings and the Emperor, but then felt that he had to be allied with 
one or the other power tor his own safety. In many cases, the Pope seemed to 
act agsinet foreign powen out ot family ambitions. The Aragone_ King .. 
oonvinced that the Por.e wanted the Kingdom of Naples tor his brother 
Giuliano.91 Ferrara was also a temptation to Leo. Altonso had promised to 
restore Reggio when his brother, Cardinal Ippolito d' Este, retumed from exile 
in Hungary, but he delayed. Alberto Carpi, the imperial ambassador and a 
hitter enemy to Alfonso, urged 1..eo to follow Julius. glorious example of 
extending papal danains. Many pointed out to him that the acquisition of 
Ferrara would enable him to bestow this great state upon 01ullano.92 
OUicoiardini felt that Leo did in taot, entertain this desire in favor of his 
brother and his nephew Lorenzo, but he was no less eager to get it a.f'ter their 
9OStoria d t ltal1a, III, 284-285. 
91Ibid., 325. 
-
r 
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Leo wanted Lorenzo to rule Florence. Under his jurisdiction, Florence 
vas allied with the papacy.94 Yet, according to Guicciardini, Leo wanted 
Ferrara more even than the re-estab11s1Dent of the Medici in F1or€'nce. But bis 
Medici re1sti ves teared that the addition ot l''''errara to the papal domain would 
make: t more formidable to all its neighborB. 95 Leo also had designs upon 
06 
Siena which he would bestow on one at his own choosing.'" 
Fol.lcw1ng an agreement made shortly before Julius' death, the Emperor gave 
the t'Ope the city ot Modena tor forty thousand ducata. !.ftQ wanted to erect 
Modena, Reggio, Parma. and Piacenza into a vicariate to be bestowed on Giuliano 
along with Ferrara whenever the Medici could take it. Here too, Leo manifested 
the close connection between pol! tical opportunism and family ambition. 
Guicciardini noted how jealous the French lA'.1ng was over the Modenese agreement, 
97 tor to him it was Pl'oof of papal agreements with hie imperial enemy. 
In Guieeiardini 'a judgment, Pope Leo had unwiae advisors who goaded him 
into hasty action. In 1515, tor example, these counsellors argued that King 
Louis might encourage Alf'onso ot Ferrara to seek tc recover Modena and Regrio 
and return the Bentivog110 to Bologna. It seemed a wiser policy for the Pope 
to cultivate the triendahip at the Bate and the Bentivoglio by giving up these 
94Ibid., III, 328. 
-
9SIbid.) IV, 279. 
-
96Ibid., III, 381. OUicciardini's words are "coniidente a etf ... 
-
97Ibid., IV, 279, and III, 329. 
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. 98 terri tOrl.SS to them of hie own will. 
Leo feared also that the Franco...cpanish truce of 1.514 and the cQCperat10n 
of HenI"j" Vln meant they would intensity their attempts to gain the peninsula. 
Leo remained firm in his early resolution, that the common liberty of Italy 
would fO down the drain if the Duchy of Milan were taken by the .Fl!:peror or by 
the French.99 
He knew well what the French King was preparing for and that he vented th 
Pope on his side. In spite of the truee, the EiRperor -wanted an alliance with 
Leo for the defense of Italy. He argued that toget,her they could detend Milan 
against Louis, since they had proved they were powerful enough to drive him 
100 from it. 
To Leo, ~aee was important. If it were achieved, there would be no need 
for alliances of any IIOrt. Guicciardini, surveying the larger complex of 
Italian arfairs, gave Leo credit for his atteml(ts to act prudently in his 
dealings with the toreign rulers tor detense of the various states. The Pope 
pleaded with Louia, and he tried hard to bring about an agreement between the 
F.mpel"Or and Venice. The Venetian senate, thinking t.~at its people were secure 
from French trcops in 1514, conai.dered the adjustment of their differences wit 
Maximilian, but no treaty materialized.10l 
..,. ., III, 
99Ib1d., 314-316. 
-
lOOIbid., 3)4-3)6. 
-
lDlxbid., 316-317, 319. 
-
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Then t.~e c:rowing power of the Sultan complicated Leota irresolution as to 
boW to rroceed. Guicciardini felt that it would be a disgrace f~r the Pope to 
encourp.ge Christian princes to go to war with one another. At the moment he 
should rather advise Francie to step r,is preparations. Francis' 4'>1"Ifl!'mies would 
make a French v:tctor.y a blood bath. 
Nevertheless, Fre:ncis continued to demand papal help anti Elrrr('l.el .f'(')r his 
Jolilanese plane. Though Francis dld not know it, teo intended to oppose an.Y 
rorei~ attempts on northern Italy. Just how he weu.ld do this was not clear. 
He was ltspurred on by his lnclinations and restrained by his fears. "102 At 
times Leo tried to convince himself t.'1at fYerhaps reverence tor tt~ Church might 
keep the King from molesting the papal states •• en though ho might attack other 
areas. Bu t the Pope would think himself equally inju red whether the French 
attackEtd the papal states or the other Itillan areas in which he had interests. 
Arter the Maripnano Victo~O,; Pope Leo had to accept the King's friend ... 
ship lest hls forces driye the Medic:!' out or Florence. And Leo had to uphold 
his f am1.ly f IS p.>s:t tion. Finally he ratified an agreement with the French 
ruler. An agreement seemed wiser than inviting a French attack upon pr,rMa and 
Piacenza or even Florence.1OU 
The alliance required the King to protect the Pope and states of the 
church, Giuliano anci Lorenzo de' Medici and Florence and to grant lordships in 
l02Ibid., 336. 
-
lO.30n september 14, 1515, Francie reconquered Milan by hie brilliant 
\I';ictory over the .swiss at Marignano. 
l04Storla ~i'Ita.l!!, IV, 370-371. 
U6 
Frsnce and pensions to Giulianci and Lorenzo. The Pope was to recall his troops 
!rom Verona where they were aaslating the Emperor against Francis' l".ew ally, 
venice, and he was to restore Parma and Piacenza to the French. As compenaatio ~ 
tor this papal lou, the !Uchy of Milan was to buy all its salt from Cerv1a, 
where the Church owned the salt mines. The Jope was to grant tree p,sssa.ge 
thrOugh papal terri tones to French troops on their way to Naples. To get 
papal consent for an attack in the BOuth, the King oftered large estates to 
LeO's brother and nephews. lOS 
Leo quickly seized the Duchy of Urbina and conferred it upon his nephew, 
Lorenzo,l06 so that he could devote all his attention to Fen-era. 
Ouicciardini expl.a1ned the Pope's almost excessive interest in Ferrara. Either 
he had been prompted by animosity toward tuke AU'oneo or the ambition to ec;ual. 
the y,lory of Julius 11.107 He indicated that }ope Leo hated All'onso even more 
than Julius though he did not bring this out into the open. loa 
By the end ot 1519 he conspired to gain Ferrara once again.109 It was 
financially and mil1 tarily strong, for the Cukes of Este had realized the 
precarious position of their state. Leospparently did not know this and 
judged Ferrara to be weak. t'eceit was more likely to succeed than open force. 
Leo judged that the duchy could· be entered through a broken wall where no 
l07Ib1d., IV, 6u. 
-
10Srbid., 279. 
-
l09Ibid., 63-64. Note 0u1cc1ard1n1 t s words, suggestive at Leots clever-
ness: H ••• non con ami l!'.aniteste rna con insidie. II 
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garrison was stationed. v.Jhen the Marquis of ~1antua foum out about the plot he 
informed Alfonso, who found it difficult to believe. In an;y event, things had 
been well 'Worked out and OUicciardin:1 fett that, L~ spite of the duchy's 
strength, the pl.ot might well have succeeded. Al.f()rl-so could have put up but 
11 t Ue resistance because of' his poor health. f<ialTf citizens were dissatisfied 
wi th his a<ininietration and would not r.ave risked their 11 VGS in time of 
attack.110 In arr:r event, Leo tailed. But he went on to new intrigues and in 
1.520 failed again.lll He had been clever enough to oblige those i!rinoea with 
whom he had made alliances not to reveal his maneuvers against Ferrara.1l2 
However, the most _r1ous problem ot Italy was the struggle for power aft«~ 
Maximilian's death. Pope Leo was interested above all in this silent war for 
he feared the accession of either li'raneis or Charles to the imperial ti Us &S a 
great danger to the balance of power and to the security of the Holy See and 
all Italy'. He saw that both princes were already $:'.I powerful that he had 
equal reason tc fear the victory of either one of them and he knew that nothing 
could hinder the victor from subjecting the whole peninSula.113 
By 1521, Charles V and Francie I saw more clearly t.~an ever that they had 
to have papal friendship if they were tc succeed and both tried hard to get it. 
Guicciardini thought that peace would have been possible had Leo remained 
110Ib1d., cJ-6~, 66, 279. 
-
lllIb1d., 72-73. 
-
112~., 279. 
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113;tbid., 57, 78. Since the matter was "far too important for Leo to 
depend upon papal authority with the '!!l.ectors, he had to devise more clever 11'1 
means to control the imperial election," ibid., .57-60. ,1111 
-
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neutral and ~lsed his papal authority to repress the enmity between mperor and 
King. But Leo aoted more to disturb the peace than preserve it. \·Jhen all was 
considered, what would he gain by war? It had brought him little success in tru 
past. In 1521 he controlled (-«tensive pa.pal estates, and he had full authority 
ovor the 01 ty ot Florenee. 1eo t s lova of ploasures and splendor would ordinarij y 
have made him opposed to war. Then too he did not have the money needed for a 
great m1l1tary campaign. But unfortunately, Ouicc1ardini stressed, he was 
"tormented with a restless desire" to recover lama and fiacenza and to get 
Ferrara. Ouiceiardini did not believe the possession of these cities was Ifa 
sufficient reason fOl' bi.-n Cr.eoJ to turn tJ:-...e world upside down. tI Rather he caul 
have temt.oriled in expectation of the right time to move.1l1 
illhen Guiceiardini looked back upon the status ~ ot lS21, he saw that the 
Habsburg-Valois clash was inevitable. Still Leo ought to have been wor1d.nt7; for 
peace. Ouiceiardin1 saw in Leo t.'1e case ot a pope suffering trom man' 8 greatss 
enemy, too much prosperity. Not only coes it ruin onets government but incline 
him to be bold in doing evn.l1S 
In spite of all th&t could be adVanced against war, Leo devoted his 
attention to fonning an al.liance to carry on an Italian war. Leo explained tha~, 
since both Charles and Francj s were unsuccessful in allying with him, they 
would cooperate afainst the Church and all Italy. whatever the Fope's argument! 
-
114Ibid., 77-79. 
-
llSIbid., 78-79. Note Ouicc1ardini's wordeu " ••• non hanno gU uomini 
maggiore-uiImico che la troppa prosperiti .. perch. gli fa impotent1 di sa 
medesimi, licenziosi (I ar(f,i ti al male e cu:,.,idi di turbare 11 bene proprio con 
COBe move." 
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Guicciardini judged him guilty- of breaking t,he r;eace.llt 
Cardinal de' Medici, to 'Whom Leo confided all his secreta,117 told 
(JUicciardini. of the Pope' IS plan. It the French could be ousted from Milan and 
aenoa , it would l:::e easy to fcrce the Emperor out of Naples with F~nch aid. 
Lea thought that he could get the Kine to assist him by creatine some of his 
candidates cardinals and by granting other favors. To Ouicciardird., Francis 
would want more for his 10s8 of HUan and Genoa, and would not be satisfied 
with seeing that his rival had met with no better fortune than he hedaU8 
Though trusting neither, Leo treated with both sides though more closely' 
with Francis. To prevent attack while negotiations were pending, he kept six 
thousand SWiss saldiere in the RDmagna and the Maroa tor several J'IlOnthf'. To 
the Italians who thought this was a needle.s expense during peacetime, Leo said 
1 t was to protect the papal states .from rebels against his author! ty. No one 
believed him but thought rather the troops were a defensive mea8'l.1l"e against the 
French or an indication that Leo planned to attack Ferrara inmted1atelyor drive 
U9 Charles out af Naples. 
The Franco-papal maty under negotiation provided for a joint attack on 
Naples, part of the terri tory to go to the Pope, the rest to the second son of 
Francis. The King was to assist the Pope against rebellious feudatories of the 
Church. 
J. 
116Ibid., 131. 
-
117Gu1ccie.rdin1 was a contidant of Giulio de' Hedici. the future Clement 
VU. itkte hie wordsr " ••• come io udi poi (:ire a1 cardinale de' !!leclici conscio 
de tutti i suoi secreti •••• ,tf ~., 19. 
118Ibid., 19-80. 
-
119Th:td., 80. 
-
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Francia 5usrected that Leo' e heart was not in their plane so he allied 
,n.th the Smse and retook Nav~. He came to realize that the rope v., ould not 
ttant him to take Naples for himself or his children. Actually, French possess n 
of both Naples and Milan would oonstitute a real threat to Rome and upset the 
balance of power in Italy. Francis t E'~dVieers showed him how fool'leh it w:::-\tld 
be to take the chance of lonne rt.1lan while he tried to get 'tJaplef!. The Fope 
would 'll.se deceit tc drive him out of Milan while he was occupied in southern 
Italy. Thua Francis put (1ft ratification of the Franeo..papal agreement made 
Rome.l20 
Leo began to see the advantage of a treaty with the Emperor. He vas 
concerned over the King's procrastination. Guiociardi:rd frankly could' not see 
the reason tor &.e new papal-im:Perial coneord. 1';115 it to recowr .?lU'ma ~ 
PiacenZ8, or was the l}ope provoked aver the insolence of Lautrec and his 
121 
ministers, who refused to allow any papal. deerees to be promulgated. 
! ... hatever the reasons, the Pope and the Emperor agreed to war against 
Milan. Charles vas r.1ad to be allied with the Pope I for the Lutheran problem 
was disturbing the Empire. Their agreement provided tor the C011IllOn defense or 
both parties I l'TI.entiomng ld. th the Pope the House of Mediei and Florence and 
declared the reinstatement of Franeeaco Storza in MUm and the dp..iense of his 
autborl.ty thert'h122 The papal-1m:perial force. were to retake Parma and 
•• t •• , ....... 1 
1225£or3& wa.s then in exile at Trent, ibid., 8.3. 
-
r ~--------------------------------------------------------------~ 
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Fiacenza for the Church. After the conquest of Milan, the Emperor was to aid 
the Pope in quelling disorders among his subjects in the papal states, and aid 
him in getting Ferrara. In the agreement, Cardinal Giuliano de t Medici was 
promised a r-e:nsion of ten thousand ducats from the newly-vacant archbishopric 
of Toldeo, and an estate 1n Naples with an annual revenue of ten thousand ducat I 
was to be riven to Alessandro de t Medici.l23 
They geared all plans to the oampaign against ~~1lan. It was to be 
att.acked from the borders of the papal dominions by the Pope.s soldiers, the 
Florentines and troops of G10van Francesco Gensaga, the Marquis of Mantua, a 
general of the Church. These were to be joined by Charles' army £'rom ~laples 
in addition to lome Oermans.124 
OUicciardini reconstructed a speech of La.nr1Cly, the Viceroy of Naples .. in 
which he argued in favor of a Franco-1mper1al agreement rather than one between 
the Pope and the Faperor. To support his argument, he reterred to the papal.-
imperial alUance of 1$21 when Pope Leo was anything but trustworth3'. The Pope 
had a selfish desire £01' security' from the French or, more l.1kely, an 
uncontrolled delire to take Ferrara ,12$ There was dupUe1 t,. also in imperial 
ranks. Pope Leo, who bore the greatest exposure d.ur.lng the attack on Parma. 
and many- others. suspected the treach817 of their comtIV'nden. It .. 9med V8r,y 
Ukel.y that these jealous officers were NSponsi ble for ending the siege of 
123Ib1d., 82-84. Cf. also ibid., 308, tor Guiecia.rdin1's reasons the war 
begun by Pope Leo and Charles V. -
124Ibid., 91. 
125Ib1d., 342, 280. 
122 
rrench-controlled Milan, for they thought that the Pope would (lisoontinue the 
e,q:ensi ve war as lOOn as he would recover Parma and Piacenza.126 
The Mse, wl'.o had been hired to defend the papal states and not to attaok 
French holdings, decided tb.at they would not attaok and favored marching upon 
lal"ll18 and F'iacenza.l27 The papal-imperial annies also laid siege to Parma. 
Al!01l80 d 'FBte began to war against the Pope in Modena 1:01' his own satety and 
to satisfy the French King. Ouicciard1n1 a.pla1ned that the Wke's ill-fortune 
in \'rJ.s war would aoon have reduced h:1m to serious straits had Leo not died 
128 just when he was aohieving continual victories. The 4xmy ot the allies was 
, 
victorious at Milan, and Lodi and PaVia feU to the League. Leo received news 
of theacqu1sitionct' Parma and Piacensa at the time of his death.129 The anti-
French cause weakened ccnsiderably at the t:lmtl of his death. Francis, well 
aware that the war had been 'tbegun and auppcrted" by Pope Leo, undoubtedly 
resumed courage at the death of 80 powerful an enemy. 1.30 The Pope was 
a<!n.1rably aucceaatul in still another of hi. major aima, bringing the Medici 
to renewed glory .1.31. 
Leo in Guicciardini ts jUdgment was "8 prince woJ:'tih7 of being praised as 
well as blamed on many accounts, who did not live up to what was expected of 
him." He had not been given credit for the prudence he showed at times but 
l21U.4.d., 1U, 120. 
-
128rb1d., 280. Guicciardini observed that Leo's death was "just as well-
timed for "A!tonao'a purposes as that of Julius." 
l~., 130-1.31. 
l3Orb1d., 130-133 
131W., 327. 
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thero was in him ttmuch less goodness" than any had suspected.1)2 In political 
aft'airs, Leo was careful to cover up his deceit. 
In his judgment at' Leo X, Ouicciardini gave his View on his ewn age and 
on the general character of the men who occupied the ~,pal chair. Leo was good 
as far as in genernl men .are concerned, .for he was merciful, cr.a.r1table and. not 
inclined to offend anyone. Guieci4rdini continued I 
I dare not. 8~ /that Leo vail of an apostoUcal goodness, fOl' in our 
corrupt times the goodness of a pop!) ~1s commended when 1. t does not 
exceed the wickednes8 of other men.1,;) 
The Popels greatest .fault was his ftxcessive liberality. The splendor and 
magnificence he disp1a.,ved would have been d.azzling even in a descendant of 
ldngs md emperorsl But Leo's liberality ~~ded also to the purely 8p1ritual 
matters of his office, tor be be8towed "all the tavors which are at the 
disposal of a pope. ,,134 There were thirty-nine cardinals at the eonelaw 
electing his 8ucceesor thCl;.gh, at his accession, there were only twenty-tour. 
Prior to the conclave which elected Adrian of Tortosa a8 pope, G1ulio tried to 
gain the votes of those cardinala who had benet! ted by Leo's favors.13S 
Guiceiardini charged that Leo "brought the spiritual authority into contempt, 
discrdered the eeon~ of the court and J because of his excess! "Ie exc)ensee I 
found it continually necessary to raise money by extraordinary means. n136 
... ~ 
l';'Ibid., 328. 
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134Ibid., 327~328. 
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'Ihe careers of GiOVa.i'llU and Giulic ·,~e' Nadici \olere closely l.inked. The 
assistance of Pope Leo's cousin, Giull.o, whom he ra.ised to the ca.rd1nalsb1p 
despite his illegitimate birth, was fortune 'a greatest gi.f"t. Leo allowed 
Giullo to manage all the importE:nt afft:otire of the pontJ,ficate. He restl"ain(::.c 
Leo's liberality a~:lJl.oderated many diaordera proceeding from Leote 
!. 
irresolution. Oiulio 'B serious demeanor and his dill.gence contrasted with Leo f ~ III 
indolcnc~, prodigality and inordinate love of pleasure and lTdrt.'l. It was 
corrm1only believed that Leo we easy-going, kind and desirotte of enj<>Y'.ng his 
reign and that Ciulto was high-spirited. restloss and ambitious. leo did not 
sss. qualified. for his importa..'lt oharge and was dominated by' Ciullo. Hany 
logically assumed that Giul10 had iMtigated the alliances, campaigns and 
conspiracies cf Leo * $ time. 'lrlhen Giulio became Clement VII almost hro years 
later, it became evident that he had been trrather the executor of his Leo IS 
, 
pla..'1.S than their direotor.l'l37 
name was proposed one rooming only to pass time, be was u.nan1mouslyelected 
pope at 80 troublesome a time in the states of the Chureh.l .38 0u1coiardini 
found it incredible that many of those we hardly lm.eM Adrian by name voted for 
him. He f.:ad in no .. lay ingratiated himself with the oti.ler oardinal3 and, above 
all, he was a foreigner who had never seen Italy or had any hopes of seelnr, 1 tl 
-
! 
1 
'1'1 
'.: ,'1 
I. 
'I' ! I 
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unaware ot its ow reasons tor electing the Fleming, the Sacred College tried .. ')1 
to justify this extraordinary step. They placed the blame, commented 
ouicciardin1 cynically, on the Holy Spirit, \1;110, itja said, inspires the 
cardinals in papal elections.139 
Adrian t s distant residence intenslfied disturbances in the Church 
terri tories. The Sacred College urged Csrdinal Giulio de t Hedici to go to 
Bologna to direct the recovery of R1m1ni, which had been seized by Sigismondo 
Malatesta, and squelch <ti.sorder in the Romagna. The cardinals promised that he 
would have the assistance of JI.arquis Gonzaga ot Mantua. OUicciardin1 explained 
that the 8mbi tion of the cardinals was the reason that no measure tor control 0 ~ 
the papal statea took etfect. Cardinal de' Medici's enemies prevented the 
passage ot eVer:! reaolt'tion which would tend to inczoease his poai tion. 
Adriants arrival would probably settle the contusion. To GuicCiardini, 
without the pope, Rome was more like a desert than a city. But even those who ill, 
were impatient tor the Pope's com1ng were uneasy because he was a foreigner ". 
inexperienced 1n the attairs of Italy, the papal court, and even those nations 
which were familiar to Italy_ A plague in Rome at the time of his arrival 
teemed to be a bad omen.140 OUicciard1n1 later confused that the papal 
courtiers were not diepleued at Adrian's early death, for they wished the 
papal chair to be occupied, 1.t not by an Italian, at least by OM educated in 
-
139Ib1d., 146. Note OUicciardini'a words: "Della qual. estravaganz8., non i, 
potendc con ragione alcuna a.cuasarsi, t...""8sferivano 1a colpa nello Spirt to I 
Santo" Bolito, secondo dicevano, a isp1.rare nella elezione det pontefici i 
cuon de. cardinal.1 •• _ • ft 
140 ~., 168, 170-171. 
r 
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their country.l.Ll 
Arter Adrian arrived in Rome, conditions got worse rather than better. 
:secause he was inexperienced, the cardinals flaunted his orders and kept the 
castles they had taken !rom the Church. As govemor ot Modena and ReggiO, 
OUicciardini was in a position to learn or the.tr conspirac:i.es and he 'hltiful17 
:informed the Pope. Once again, Adrian ordered them. to restore these castles 
to the Churoh.1h2 
But Adrian understo(Jd some of the problems which had long been the causes 
of riva:.l.ry. He wanted first to recover Rimini143 and to settle the differences 
be'bleen Alfonso of Ferra.r.a and his two predecessors. During his tirst month in 
I ,I 
Italy.. he reinvested Alfonso with Fen-ara and with all the Church la.l1ds he had ,I 
possessed betore Leots war with Franoe. The ruke bound himself to assist the 
Church whenever the Pope needed soldiers tor the defense of its territories. 
Under penalty of forfeiting his rights as duke he would refrain !rom injuring 
the Holy See in the future. Adrian led .Alfonso to believe that he would 
restore Modena and Reggio to him, but then he realiz.ed that this would not be a 
wise ltep and refused flatly'. Good will between the papacy and Ferrara could 
hardly last. In 1523, however, Adrian gained Rim1n1.l.W.t 
Adrian was well a.ware of the difficult situat.i.on in which he, as a foreign 
pope, was placed in view or the itnperie1 intereste in Italy_ Before his 
-
143cf. ~m, p. 125. 
1l"4storla d t lta1.1a, IV, 171, 17h, 280. 
I I, 
,I 
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srri"VSl in Rome, he had ben xeluotant to wait for the homage whioh the r:mpero 
bad promised to render as he proceeded southward. He suspected that Charles 
,dshed hill'! to put of! his passage into Italy while 8Waitinr his homage and he 
did not wish to give basis to the view that imperial interests would diotate 
hiS J-"Ollcies 8S pope.lJ6 
.I\ctually, Adrian VI hoped tor a general peace in Christendom. He 
entreated Charles, Francis and Henry to end the war, especially in view of the 
TurkiBh menace. Negotiations tor peace proved fruitless. The flnperor did not 
want a short truce bocauH he would gain nothing, and Francis would not consen 
to a long one. l.drian thought that Francis did not really want peaca and .. 
influenced by hie earlier Mendship for Charles, went over to the imperial 
,ide. He explained that his obligation as the Vicar of Christ was to pr.erve 
peace among the fa! thtul and to be tealous tor the publio welfare. He had no 
choice other than to join with those "who labored to crevent d:i,sturbanC88 in 
, -
Itsll because ~ !!:!1 depended l!!! ~ce 2!.. ~ wh0lti; world ... 146 In the late 
sumrr.er of 1$23, an anti-French leae,~e was formed under papal headship. Adr.tan 
desired the m&'llber:s to praUse that they would act on the principles of justlce 
rather than on military might.147 Venice was the onl.y Italian state which 
refused to jOin. 
The death of Pope Adrian less than a JOOnth after the conclusion of the 
lL$Ibid., 170. 
-
146Ibid., 187-189. F}nphasis added. 
147 flBulla propoeta latta d. Venezian:l d 'antrare nella lega centro i 
Francesi," 029ritti E2lqtt1c1, p. 120. 

THR BASr:s OF PAPAL POtrrICSt 
The events of C1E'.ment VII's pontit1cate are detailed with the politica1 
and d1plomatic struggles in the atom dtltalia. 1Jany problema at one time 
].0081 became entangled with foreign problema under Clement \'1:1 J like Alfonso 
ot F'ermra 1S a1l.1ance to maintain his territories against papal claims. 
The present chapter w.tll stress the pollcy of Pope Clermmt. as 
Ouicciardin1 knew it fitom personal axpt>rience and explained 1 t ln his po11 t-
ical tracts, and 1 te relation to the 2fflE!!!! and the. sacerdotium.1 This con-
aideration demanded analys18, tor tlw political st:r'!lggles of: the sixteenth-
centur:t involved also the claim of Charles V to the Ml exercise of his 
impc·rlal powers. j",:bat he maintained these powers actual.ly were eondi tioned 
his r0lationship to Clement VII. Seco~f since concll1&r1sm .. not only 
a religious problem but also a poll t1call.7 useful tool for enemies of papal 
pf)W('r, this ohapter will discuss too calls for a general council. Thirdly, 
it .1111 treat Gu1cc1ard1n1 '8 defonse of Clement \'11. Oulcoiardini was per-
sonally 1nwlved here, for he 'WaS one of the Pope's major advisers on foreign 
pollcy. 
-
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Arter a r:tf'ty-day conclave, Cardinal Giullo de I Medici succeeded Adrian 
VI as Pope in 1523. Under Leo, he had already handled many papal duties. 2 
Quicciardini was surprised that Giulio had tried eo hard even before Adrian fS 
election to win his own, for a pape had to cope with the explosive situation 
in all Italy and the papal states in particular. 
Guicciardini claimed that Clement t s accession brought security to the 
Church's territory. With the election of the strong-willed Giulio, Al.fonso 
d'l'ste temporarily abandoned his hopes of obtaining Modena, while he felt 
also that he could not trust the French who promised help. The Romagna, one 
of the most faction-ridden regions in Italy, became quiet.3 
Yet Clement's troubles had not really begun. Guicciardini indicated 
that, as Cardinal, he was knOTm to have favored. the projects ot Charles V 
and to have encouraged his Italian ambitions.4 As pope, he understood that 
continued friendliness to the Emperor might only hurt his own position. 5 
During his entire reign, Pope Clement was faced with the delicate poll t-
ical problem of how to maintain papal position in the power struggle. For a 
short time he attempted to maintain the neutrality of the Holy See and to 
secure peace between Francis I and the Emperor, then he tried to use the 
torce of papal diplomacy to assure the political autonomy of the peninsu.la 
2Cf. supra, 
3Storia d 'Italla, IV, 209-211. 
hE. g., cf. supra. 
5nGiustificazione della poll tica," p. 203. 
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or at l(~st the !.ted101 sphere of interest.. 6 He sought a delicate equilibrium 
bPw/cen 'France and the Filp1ret to be adjusted by the application of his et."'Il 
w:plomatio weight.1 But nu.morous and unstable .. r1abl~ elsted, namely, 
th€"l Pope's irresolute t~ent8 and the conmeting views of his polit1oal 
9 
advisers. Clement pursued no one course. 
- 6cl~,nt' s neutrality came to an end in December 1524 when he ooncluded 
a sooret agre~..nt with V <mioe tu"A Fnlnce ~YlI:It the H::~fCll"Or. 
The Pope did not mean to defy' the r::mporor as moh as to gu.arantee 
etattu", ~ in ltal..v, but the new shift to Fi'l!mce produced a holocaust in the 
p;:an;ili-wtdch rumbled all over ''''urope. On the very day of the publication 
of the treaty, Cl~..nt explained in a letter to Charles that the agreement 
with ~'leis -s a ltcounsel of peace," d_tlftoo to secure ltour ~ulllity" 
and the v;el:far;", of Christendom wi tbout prejudice to the l~eror or thought 
of private advantaget Morru.menta saeoul1 m b1storiam ~trsntia. p. SO, 
no. 35. The treaty was"({ese~'~ ~--v!!! as a d~ iO end the _r 
and to protect the Holy See, ibid., no. ,8, and to the G'ermtm ':!lectors as an 
attempt to gual'llUltee the Pope, Vdee and France ~edom from harm in a pact 
whioh Vias by no means hostile to the FmpiN, no. L.1. 
101• Pandolfi, PP. 14"149, 110-231. 
BOne of 0u1cc1ard1n1 '8 passages pointed up this dift1C".llty of the Pope. 
he regretted that he had sat idly by awi t1ng the success of the Battle of 
Pavia, for he was reproached for his timidity by his whole court and all 
I talyl, storie d 'I tal.1f., V t 10. 
9In politics, Cardinal Badolato, unlike !llIm7 in the CUria, did not 
thin..1{ in terms ot Modena or even or Italy but rather of Ohl"'let1an furope. 
HE" argued that the poll tical role of the Holy See should not be that of a 
self-interested part~ tmt t!1at of' •. father towards hia son, Arch. Vat., tim •• 
di Vf?rae 2.38 t Fol. 00 , c1 tad in Douglas, p. 39. Sadoleto stood for strict 
nootral1 t,. and poll tical detachment but Cl~t RS also sttbject to discord-
ant theories of inwlv~:ment prassoo on h.'1m by Giberti and the imperialist 
Hioholas 'VOn Sob.omberg. Castigl10ne and Cardinal Salv1ati, holl~.r.t assured 
him of: Cbarlee t p()QCeflll intentione. ibid., pp. 39. 43-44. 1U though the 
Pope gave b:i.e secretary, Sadoleto, a ~ with dispatches of mmcioa to 
Germany and f:!&stem FlU"Ope, he p.?rsonally dealt vr1 th those inwl ving I talian 
affairs and therefore with envoj'"S to tnt:., r\tlpt~l'Or and Francis I, ibip.., 1'. L.a. 
In the spring of 1525, 5. t seemed to Clement a '€lise policy to conclude a 
trt'!aty or "perpetual al.3.1.ar.H::te and friendship" wi "h Charl.. Ouiccia.rd1n1 
confessed that the Pope's association ".1.th the l~~ror at this point seemed 
wen-founded, 00" he criticised the provisions of their agreement which call-
ed for the r'f:tum of Reggio, Rubiere and other tcmns seized from the Cmroh 
by .Alfonso d tEste. It was cl~ to Gu1cciardini that Clement wO'tUd have 
contim.loo the policies ot Julius and Leo for the recover,y of' Church lands 
bad not m:>re serious problems como to demand his at'bmticn. t\s it'1i/as, the 
very oritical juncture of Italian affairs called for the reconc1.1iaUon of 
Alfonso and Clemmt and not for further trouble beti'leen them. 0u1cc1anHn1 
casti~ted the Pope for having selflshly il'Tltated his country's wounde in-
stead of having SO'tlght a method of healing them. He was certainly not to be 
~red to t110ee ph:fsicians who laid uide all care ot lesser bodiq prob-
lems as they diligently attended to that whioh seemed essential to the 
patient1s ove~ health. 
Still Quiccurdini paid no hem to the widespread though ignoranit 01"'1 t-
icism ot the Pope for ba'V1ng made this treaty, namely, that he had railed 1n 
his duty of un! ting tho Italians acainet the tlmpel"Or. In AprU 1525 
Guicciard1ni was not yet convinoed .tWit the imp:n:'!!.al l1l"C11Y could poes1b~ 
successfully be resisted.IO 
~','hile Gtdcciard:1n1 and Uach1awlli were studying the mill tary potential 
of the Romagna in m:td-1525 in an attempt to work out this necessary system 
..... 
lOxb5.d. , IV, 275-28l. 
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of defense against the imperial forces in Lombardy, the Pope \va.rml:y greeted 
the Constable of Bourbon, then ominously at large in northern Italy-.ll It 
_6 firebrands like these that Ouicciardini, Clement's prinoipal military 
adViser as well as governor of the Romagna, was desperately trying to 
iJnI!lObili2le1 In one of the most ori tioal periods of the papal reign, Clement 
seemed most undecided a.bout a method of prooedure and allowed his diplomaoy, 
as that of Leo X's period, to be steered into several directions. 
Guiooiardini t s detailed aooount of Clement's activities in the Storia 
d'Italia olearly indioates that his commitment to the LP...ague of Cognac in 
-
May 1526, if it accomplished nothing else, at least simplified the problems 
of papal diplomacy. Guicciardini defended Clp..ment's desire to ally with 
France though he knew that he could not find firm support there until King 
Franois was .freed. Policies of neutrality, equilibrium and appeasement gave 
way to war. Sinoe the fighting was conoentrated in Italy, most of the 
negotiations with the imperialists were oonducted directly between repre-
sentati ves of both sides in Rome. Curial business came to be oonoentrated 
primarily on military matters.12 
After the sack of Rome in the spring of 1527 J howeVer, disa®reement 
among the Pope IS advisers, both olerical and lay, was intensified. Cardinal 
Sadoleto oonfessed that autumnl ftWe found. ourselves in oonflioting opinion 
llMormmenta eaeculi XVI, p. 159, no. 115. 
12Douglas, p. 51. 
and tho!'(YJgl1l"v confused about wha.t we should do. flU But OI.:l.icciardini, who 
had a roa1.i.st1c knowledge of affairs, already saw the way mtters were 
wnding in S~temOOr of 1526 "Then he _8 L1'lformad that the attJioa of the 
Cnn"Ch were to retreat across t..l1e Po. For ra&lV monthe he had tried to make 
the best of a situation. rtmdered dH.'i'1oult by the 1"a1lure of the s1gnato1"1ea 
of the League ot Cognac to honor their obligations and a lack of cooperation 
amone them. The prestige of the ~e began to wane, and d1plcmlaoy proved 
to be no substitute for action. Gul.OOiardird·8 continued at~ts to bol.8ter 
ClemJ'mt t a flagging courage had 11 ttle effect. His deep con'ri.ction that the 
enef!lY could be Msily overcome because they were .. few in l11lI1ibor and bad 
li. tUe monqt teU on deaf" ears. He oame to eee that th:1.e undertaldng which 
bad once seemed "-87 and sClCUre" was now "difficult and dangerous," tor 
lh 
"the \,1.11 not to win" had settled like a claIld over the papal camp. The 
sack of P.ome. for all the ot.her factors involved, was blt the culmlnation of 
a lengthy succession of problems whioh the all1ee did not meet auccess~. 
Guiccl.a1"d.1ni • s long aamoa to Clement; (>..spocial17 at this eri tical 
juncture of war, Pl"OtlPted him. to urge that the Pope mat not allow 1118 lead-
ership to fail, hmos, he should avoid aI\Y coopel'l.t1on with the ~eror. 
He believed that this policy was os81?.ntial even Vthen matters seemad deepexste. 
.. 
13The curial counsellors could agree only to send rmneioe to all the 
kings and princes, into:m1ng them or the plight 0,(, Ibngar.y and tho urgency 
of peace, as well as of the Colon..,. 's Wmtliat1ng assai1~t on Rome, 
rtoIlUmmta saeou11 ~ I p. 244, no. 18S. 
14Lettmo to Gi ... tt,~ Gihf'.rt.1, July 31, 3$26, Cartegg:t, IX, 69. 
" ••• ].a yo~ di non vincere ha facto questa iq>roaa, d1 facile at sicura. 
di~~~cile at periooloea •••• " 
A continuation 01'" revival of the d.evious and uncertain course that Clement 
had followed 1<fould have htal implications for Italy. The sack of :Rome was 
not thl? only event that gave reason to Guiociardini' s judgment. "(\ten more 
\ 1n'Portant and more deadly for the l1bel"'ta dfltalJ.~ was Clement's ea:pitulation 
to Charles V the following month. Guicciardini thought it SO humillating 
The evolution of Guicciardini' s thinking on the papal role can 00 
leamoo from a study of his poll tical lvn tinge during the crucial years from 
1525 to 1530. He pointed out to Clement that rulers should always have the 
desire that things remain stable. Tranquillity alone would enable tbem to 
maintain their greatness and dignity'. Sinoe adversity could corne at any 
ti.'l'l~, however, they had to have a reservo of !)rud<mee and strengtb u!'On 
which to draw.1) 
Ouiee1ard1ni was determined to unravel the diplomatic corrplexi ties in 
wh1ch the Pope bound himself. He considered the dangers involved to leam 
which ones weN eert.e1n and. which were lesser in their bad effects. It 
certain one, similarly to take a remedy against an evil that is just as 
dangerous as the end itsalf.16 These werE> Quicciardini's criteria .for studyw 
ing the d1l"QQtione whioh ClemP..nt's policy should take. 
l$ttSulla proposta di alles.nza ratta da Carlo V a Clemente 'flIl .. " Scritt1 
~11 tic!. p. 15.3. Note Guiooiardird f s 'WOrds. " ••• bisogna che el 'OrlriClpe 
aia prudems1a e vir111 ta' per potere 1.11i1&rf'! 1 'una e 1 'autre. nelle" avversi tA 
si."1'lill." 
16n,id. 
-
He directed his examination to the grounds for undertaking a war against 
the ""~:ror.17 He knew l"()ll that the spiritual and the ~ral powers, the 
,acerdotiURl and the ~m, did not operate1:!!. vaCllO but rather us pL'lrt of 
--
the whi teo-hot poll tical milim. of the early' Cingueoento. 
On the one band, he thought it lvollld be most dangerous to allOW' a build-
up of p<)\vcr though, on the other, it would be very dangerous to run head on 
18 
against Oharles. It was right to believe that he wished to increase his 
power primarily by aChieving the dominion of Italy to which ho had very easy 
access. He was young, powerful and fortunate in all his undertakings and he 
had the advantage of being able to oloak his undertrudngs with apparent law-
fUlness.19 In:flaot, where there \1&$ some lawful basis, princes could actually 
convince themselves that t~.ir undertak1n~ were vcry just and holy'.20 
Moreover, a majority of' the ~eror's ministers ardently stimJ.etoo him to 
direct aU his aims and efforts to a nxmarcb;r bastlld on Italy' as the focal 
17 / Ibid., p. lSL.. To the Pope, Ouiceiardini explained. rt ••• 0 1& volante. 
d1 Dio Oli diapomione de' fat!. ahe 10 eoae tue sono ridotte in grandisaimo 
di ffteul ta. tl 
18 , Ibid. Ct. Q!Jieeiardini fS worosa " ... soo. adunehe 1n termine ebe e 
pB'rieolO a stare, per1co1o a fare. n 
19tfGiustif1oamione della politiea." p. 201. Guicoiardini 'a words area 
If ••• el quale aveva faeulta d1 eoprire 1e imprese amb1z1oee con ti toll 
appar(?nti d1 rag1one. u 
2~., p. 206. Ouiociardini here statesl tt ... che dove hanna qualche 
appa~di ragione 81 persuadono faoilmente 1e iJl'Jpraae sue essere 
giustissime e santtS81me." 
r.____---------, 
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pOint.2l An ambitious prince could easily believe that all his policies were 
fliSD, especially whm they w~re lauded and supported b:r his advisers.22 
Since Cbarle,s V aimod at total monal"lhical power, wl1ere did the fortunes 
of Clement VII f'1t in? Ouiceiardini looked l'lOt only to the specific dldfails 
of Cinguecento poli tical ~li ty but also to the h1stori.c connict between 
~ and sace1"doti~ sincn the oldest l'1:Qaon that the popes rear~ ~erial 
encroachment was grounded in exp('!rienoe. On1:r:rarely 'ttU there a state of 
concord and coopet"G.tion 'botiwoon the two powers.23 !Me did not surprise 
Gu1ccial"dird., for the pope claimed that spiritual care belonged to him and 
the emperor claimed that be _s the admimstrrator of all tes!7pOr&l concerns 
and in law, the lord of the whole world. Yet, in Guicciardini ts historical 
rC!'4ding, neither was wholl.y satis:f1ed with the province assigned to h1ma 
/ , 
Bono queste dua potesta, e10e la spin tuale e la t.enporalo, nomi 
eel arret-ti diversi, ma. tanto ~ene ocrrispondono e quadrano ltuna 
con l'altra, coo s~re e' r>rincipi hanno Oet'Q8to d1 ~rle quanto 
hanno ~tutol pam ad e t pontifie1 pigl1ano speaso piu della 
autonta t~rele ehe non rioeroa 1 'officio 101'0, ad Of prine1p! 
aecularl., sempre quando n 'banno awto occasiona, s1 sono f'att! 
padroni d~J.lo spiri tuale. 24 
He at~od to discover the basis of this desire and noted that thfli',s$ 
(l!VO'!' n.u.merous examples in history demonstrated the union of spirltual and 
2~d., p. 201. Gu1cciat'd1n1 here writest Dei ea.peva che era ardento-
mente .~to cia molU suo! ndn1st!"1 eli aprtre e1 SG.'lO a tanto ravon della 
fortuna, ~ dirilza.re 10 animo a fa":. uno monat'Chia, della Quale era el 
prine1pals .f'ondamento stabilire a wte SIlO le COle t,tltal1a." 
22nProposta d1 alleana, It p. 15$. 
23"Giust1t1ca1£ione della poll tie&, ft p. 2~1. Note Ouiceiardinits 'WOrc:hn n... ra:re volte t1'"4 qu~e ct;ll1 fJ",lp~ potesta e state. vera unione e 
concordia." 
24Ibid. 
-
tC1:!Poral rule. Among the Hebl'C\'lo, many timos one man was both prince and 
hieh pri.ost and, if not one man, them the hicrh !'rlm~tJ usually a son, brother 
or nephew'" was a creation of the prj.noe and dependent upon h:.lm. The romans 
Guiooiardin1 t";xplained that, in the Christian ere, the precepts of 
%'f':ligion did not pemlt this conjunction to be easy. The early C1'llrH'lrora, 
thctugh Chr1stians, wanted the papacy to be dependent upon thE>lll. They had 
suoh ~t authority that no pa,al election could be effective without their 
conf1rrnat!on.2S 
a1.,~cciard1ni looked to th:~ vcl"7 recent past to confirm hie statements 
on 1q)erlal ambition: Still ~eh is the tk-:::mory of Mu:1m1lian, CharlEl6 V's 
grandfather, who. as a widower, planned to :make himself pope.26 Since 
countless rulers have desired. to um. to splrl tual power to the t~ral on 
thr-ir climb to uni verse.l rule, Guiccia:rd1n1 wondot'f;,;d if any would marvel if' 
Charles had a similar thought127 The iltt>erorta politics were unquestionably 
The papal states and Rome togoth~r with Florenoe oould not help but 
-
,2elrbid., 202. Ouioc1ardini noted th1a as only one ot ~.mlian·s 
ohimere;-tft. also ffPronosta di alleanH," p. 155. 
27"RagiCni ch@ conaigliano a Clemente VII d1 aoeordarsi con Ce.rlo v. 
In Contrarlo,lf p. 18u. Note (h:ncoiardird.·a words. " ... semp~ ehi ~ stato 
grande ha desiderata un1re al.l..a pot~ia temporale ,.a autorl t4 spirt tuale .... 
Che e1 marav1glierem se uno ponsicro e1mile nasc~ra in Cesare pl"t18oote, 
quando veggiamo cbe per le pedatr:> deel! al tri grandi tende &1 oar;mno della 
mont:!. '!"Cbia? It 
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attract the attention of a ran 'who sought un! vereal rule. 28 One who bad 
struck at Venetian and French power would find the l2,q«er 2! ('Var"l ~ ~ 
esoncialll :Y.!!! .2! Clement, verI formidable. 29 The Pope had to watch all 
-
princes who bad an opportunity to obtain these territories. It vms logical 
to assume that the satest method for F'ranc:e to strike at t.'1e Pope would be 
by an attack on Florence.. eri ties of Francis I could not construe this as 
IJTeVfO"rPnee for the Church..30 Above all others, however, ClemE!'llt had to 
280uicciardini felt that the French would realiZe that Leo Its power 
would lead to the y;eakerdng of their power in Italy. ~';ith the ancient domain 
of too Church the Pope now held theRomagna, Bologna, and Florencel " ... e 
tanto pill' quante per e t progress! di questo papa. _ramo capaCis8imi. che a lui 
dispiaceia ~te 1a grandezza loro in ltaliaJ e ].a potenzia sua avendo 
congiunto al, dominio antiquo della Chiesa 10 state di Romagna, di Bologna e 
eli Firense, e da teneme conto, e mass1m.e venendo el fftltello e nipote in 
opinione d1 velere attendere alle a1"!'M3," "Disoesa di Francesco I," pp. 116-117. 
29nProposta d1 e.lleanza," p. 15S. f1Ilphasis added. ?~te Ouiccie.rdini's 
\'fOrds In ••• pereh~ inaino eOO lui non ha ro'vinato e' vinis1an1, non ba battuto 
e' franzesi in Francia, la potonzia. di ogni papa" e la tua massime che hai 10 
,tate della Chiesa gr&ndissimo e queUo d1 F1renBo, • form1dabile ..... n For 
Ouieeiard1n1 's strong statement of the tooaning of Medici a.nd Church power in 
one r'ttl~, cf. "Oretio acousatol"'1a," Scrltti autob1:K:f1~rLt. 2191 "l!e' ~ / 
buona 0 vera distinzione dalle coss dl ttrenze a qu e de Chicea, perehe 
,e tu ell avesei ved:uto n:alvolentierl graneR a Firense, arest! awto anoha 
per male ].a grand.sa del ponti.f1cato. e 88 tu amavi quella, amavi anehe d1 
necessita' questa altra, perohe' erano congiunte e connesee in modo 1ns1eme, Coo 
non potovano ruinare nell t una che non ruinassine nella altra." 
30nDieeasa cii !Tanceseo It" p. 117. Note Ouioeial"dit'.1's O'ml 'WOrdsl I 
" ... vineendo etiam Milano e Napoli, s1 astenessi da toecare la Chiesa. S8 g1a 
pE'r mf'!tte~ un freno in booed al papa e d1m1nulrlo assai d1 fOl"'ZG, non 
1'01tassi 10 state di F1renae, parendol1 che non sendo co_ ecclesiastica, 
questo uno modo da battere el papa same. concitare 11 altri prlneip1." 
tea:!' the !mperor, who pretendt:!d that he bad t1 tle and right to the papal 
,tates and to all Italy as well. 
Ouieciardin1 claimed trat he considered these possibilities only ~ause 
be was ccmcemed for the papal welfare. Perhaps the:Pope realized mren more 
tbIln he did that prince,s cannot trtlst one another when their ends eonflict 
and 1Thm l'ihat is useful to the one harms the other.31 Clement must have 
krtCJWTl too that the power of the papacy had already suffered eclipses in the 
past when the world had grc&tp.r revnrence .for the Holjr See.32 JiUrther it is 
the nature of princes, though they may be :f"ree from ambition, to be gl*e4tly 
.rfeetPd by disdain or the suspio:lon of others.33 This was the danger which 
the whole Utpe:r1al plan brought to the Pope, who stood, to clash with :1 t head-
on. He had to consider his mPthods of meeting the dangers to his position. 
To Charles, Clement was too great an obstacle and unquestionably, the 
Pope had to rear him, eS1k1C:1ally ",hon :1 t "'las almost a certainty that Charles 
'IOUld mov~ against him.3L. Ouicciardini went so far as to say that perhaps 
31 , ( frProposta di alleansa," p. 155. Ouicciard1n1 writes: " ... non puo tra 
principi assere AmOre 0 confidermia quando a f fin! non solo sono divers1, ma 
quello ahe ), utile all f uno nuoce allo altro. If 
32Storia d'I~) IV, 268. 
33ttGlult1 f'1C&Bione della poli tica," p. 206. 
I 3L.uProposta di aUeanza," p. ISS. I Note Ouieoiardin1 '15 roq>ression. / 
It1 adunche da t~re di Casare pereh~ e eorto ahe non si/provedE;'ndo sara in 
poteet,,{ SlUt el tart! mle, eO. ~ quasi certo ahe to ne ftlra. n 
~------------------------------~ 
W. 
eVen Charles t personal hatred for Clement inspired his action. 3~ Moreover, 
the somewhat vague prerogati~s attaching to the imperial offioe constituted 
a t"l"!al snare tor the papacy. The maintenance of good order or the rf!lformation 
of abl.1SeS wi thin the Church call@d for the cooperation of the emperor. 36 
The ~erors advanced the opinion of justices favorable to their cause 
that t,he-y 'Were simply 1"E'.1ntegra ting into tru empire what their predecessors 
bad heM.37 "{,hat certainty did Clement have that Charles 'WOUld be aatian.ed 
to restore the empire to its Mrly majesty simply by appropriating papal 
dominions. He might even attempt to oontrol and dominate the POPE" and to 
make him dspendent upon the t~ral power.38 Ouicoiardini teared that 
Clement l'muld be too slow to s~e Charles' intentions and that he WOtlld be too 
trnsting of him. In view of the !:nperor's past racord, it would not be 
prudent for the Pope to trust in his so-called goodness, but it 'flOtud 00 in-
viting danger to his own person, to the See of Peter and to the common good 
3S"Qiustif1cazione della politica," p. 206. Ouieciardini's words are 
" ••• oon chi .£'one aveva odio." 
36nproposta dt alleansa," pp. 154-155. Ct. Ouicoiardin1's words here. 
n ••• nolla quale pl"Ovinoia tenendo 1a Chiesa apoetolic~ tanto state quanto 
tiene, ad a te essendo aggiunto 10 state di t1renze, e treppe. parte questa da 
ess~re disprezzata da uno che aspin al tutto, ed in termtni pari _rest:! da 
temere da ogni principe obe avoss1ta.nta opportun1t1{, ma mo1to pill'dallo 
imperadore, el quale non solo in lb_, e nelle alt" terre che time 1& 
Chiesa, ed in F1remse, pretends titolc e ragione. me. sa a.neora chs 10 
imperadore 18 una certa oonnassit4 oon 1& Chiesa, cbs in uno certo modo gl1 
appartiene pensare alla reformu1one e buon1 ordini d1 qualla. If ... 
37Ib1d., p. lSS. 
36t10iustificas1one della politica.," pp. 206, 203. Uote G'J.icciardini's 
1'IOl"dss " ... d.epri.m.ando 101'0 0 reducendogll dependent! da ea." 
r 
of rtaly'. Ouiceiard1n1 pu.t hir:'lself in the olass of "wise men," who under-
stand that no prince or privato oan be judged securn from others ,vtw"n there 
is any possibility that they can Sllffer injury. 
Guicoial"din1's pessimism is strongly indicated in his statemMt that 
one's insecurity is guaranteed if he depends upon another's good will. Flach 
pm:-eon uses his :tree will and can ohange his mind as o.f'ten as he desires. 
All things are as obscu~, uncertain and. fallaoious as the hearts of men are 
tull of dark recesses and labyrinths. 0u1ooiard1ni seemed to be looktng to 
the brute realities of his own age when he Obs9rved that a prince who truate 
in others and al.J.owa h1.mselt to be led is powerless. Such a one retains cmly 
the name, garb and aceeuarias or a ruler.39 Gu100iardini advised that a 
rulr;or has to aot with indept'ttldenee and dooision. 
After bav.l.ng described the power of Clement and. l'xnr Charles 'WOUld seek 
to d0Stroy it, Ouiociardini turned to an examination of the method Charles 
would use. Tak1ng away but a 11 ttle papal power would not be enough tbr him. 
Charlf.!s oould begin by taldng Florence and oontinue to WMken the Pope by 
taldng a g'n'.at part' of the papal states.40 This done, Charles would have no 
39nm.ustificasione della 'l"\olitica,1t '0. 206. 0u1ee1ardini's aotual words 
Y /' / I 
AN> significant. Ifni poi che 0064 piuoscum, piu incerta, piu fallace ehe a' 
ello1"1 delli uo.mi:ni pien1 di infi:ni te latebre e laberinti .... e quando b~rul) ne 
potessi resta~ aicurissimo, aiascuno pr1nc1pe ebe e veduto depend,re in tutto 
dalla discrezione d1 altn, l"Psta sensa rlpu1ialione" ssma degn1ta:, sensa 
meata, pili' presto col notl'19, con l'ab!iO, con~gn: ornament! di principe ebe 
con la potesta, con la sustanzia eel effetti. ft 11rlphasie added. For the im-
POrtance of reputation in Guiooiardini's thought, of. infra, 
40"proposta eli alleamsa," p. 156. 0u1cciardini 'SI words are. " ••• a 
ridtl.rti in termine OM non abbia per Qonte MSStUlO p1u da temerti, 11 ohe non 
petra' fare se non t1 teglie buona parte dello state che tiene la Chiesa. n 
~son to fAar Cl~ment. The attack on nor~nce would be follOT!OO by the 
disarmintr of' the 'Pop~ and finally the OCcu1')Qtion of P.ome. He.re, Charles \':ould 
hlVC:> to make use of Colonna troops and, 'Very possibly, Clel'.!lMt could be taken :, 
as anotMr Colonna had seized and disgraced Boniface VI!I.41 
i1nt tlw.l"e was another way, and Ouicciardtni infol:'ll'.led Cl~nt of it very 
directly. Before Charlms ~er pasaoo into Italy or before the Pope could 
cone to make an alliance with tho r:rench, the ""'Ir!pel"Or could roa.lce Clement to 
th~ status of a sm111ns1gnifieant pope. He lvould simply destroy his posi-
tion. RfO'l"'e the conciliar theory came into diroet plq. Tho r.'ltperor could 
assert that he, as supreme overlord of all Cbrist(~ndom, was roepons1ble for 
order in the Church. Through the means o.f a council, he could attt.'!!lPt to 
have papal author! ty cut to nothing. In the mld. he would haTe a pope whom 
he could manage, a llttle bishop of Rome, not pope of the universal Church.42 
Clment knevl the lnf'ini te particulars of the ease better than 
Ouiceiardini or anyone else, but Guicciardini feared that this alone would not 
l!I)Ve him to action. He cautioned the Pope not to 00 decei vad by the protesta-
tions of the '1!peror. Pven if he does not move on the papal. states, a 
possib5.1i ty Guiceiardini always st~sed, Charl(cls would try to takr:'i £'rom 
Cl,CInont lrl.& authority, dignity Il.'ld _Jesty. As pope be 'would Of:! forced to 
ob~ all imperial wishes. Ouieeiardini \vrote forcefully. 
-
Ulrbid., p. 1$7. r~cciard1n1 wrote of a possible imperial occupation 
ot RomeT""": •• questo sarabbe uno grande smem.brartl. 1f 
42Ibid., p. 156. FOr a discussion of' the eonciliarlsm under Jullus II, 
ef. sup1f. PP. 103-106. FOr the suggestions regarding a emreh ecrclncil under 
Clenrmt .1, et. In.tra, pp. 153-159. 
••• che ~ queUo graM che e' eaJi dioono che uno princi!(~~ debbe 
fuggire Quante 1.a mo~e, porche quando ~ condotto qui, ~ principe 
in nome, ma in f'a.tto e ogni altra. cosa che principe, ad a chi d 
uso/ a dorninare, el mondo ed e.ssere stimato ad ambito dB. er:::ndissimi 
principi, e quello cbe e solito a dare el fOOte alle cose, come en 
tu a tr-mpo di Lione, (:' come da uno tompo in qua sone stat! eli 
antMe5Sori tuoi, io non so quanto sia m1nore male che.la morta e 
la p~l"dita deell stati) el rldurei in condizione tale.43 
Tho world of the latter 1520's wes a world ot hard r~lity. One had 
to preserve one's authority. Guicciardin1 advocated that Pope Cl~t should 
take the offensive and meet Charles h!3ad on, for there was no other choioe 
bUt ru5.n.44 Of course, this involved other dangors but they had to be risked. 
Cl~mont's defeat by Charles would be his ruin. Charles would trAat him as an 
eneT1'!'lJe '3ut it was tar bettor to suffer in noble self-defense than to wi tho-
draw and not face the issue. At the ti.'f!le of the f1z1peror t s overtures to the 
Pope, Guicoiardini advised him to nm the risk of the greater evil with the 
4$ 
mpe of final ll.be-1"'t7. 
In latfitr y98.1'"8, when Guioe1ardini attempted to justify Clement's lead-
ership of the League of Cognao and his anti-imperial ventures, hI!) usad. sim-
ilar arg'tunants. It is incorrect to assume that Clementta decision to W'ldEll"-
take war against Charles was imprudent because 1 t failed and !"Csill too in the 
.ok of Rome, the Popete 1qlrieomnent and other cala!';:eities. He argued that 
whoever y;ants to condemn the ?ope of rash action mst, if he does not wieh 
43Ibid., p. 157. 
~. Gu1coiardini concludes. QUa womodocumu~ sit, n~ssuno non 
negh€'l."a ehe se non e1 fa opposizione a quEIJsta grandezsa, tu ba:1 a temere 
Krandissima ru1na •••• " 
lt~-'id . 11'" .'1.~G· 
"']b el",·. ~;JtUl.} 
lJt$. 
to nak~ a snap judgment, dilif':~ntly examine the :N'.Asons which motivated him. 46 
Ouiceiardini further discussed his basic cr! teria for entering into any 
war, first, n~ess1 ty, and second, 1'ac1li ty. One bas to be threatened :more-
ovf'1', and has to have good gl"O'nnds tor victory. To begin a val" is not to be 
considered lightly, for all mer.' its risks. So is the case .for a"f.lY prince, 
and mch more is it necessary tor a. Roman pope to take a good look at the 
$ivlstion. Guicoiardini admitted that a pope has the duty to maintain the 
sPiritual 'W~ltare of his nook a"Kl that the temporal power was giVf'l1 to him 
41 
only secondarily. It was justifiable for the Pope to take a.rms to defend 
the authority of the Holy' See, b'J~t he admitW he wa.s not too certain when 
1 t CS!!'lO to measures aimed at the recovery of the tetlporal st.:'1tes of the 
Church. t'h~ther these canst! tuted sutf1eient justification tor war, 
Ou.ieeiardini hesitated. 1'"ere this recovery in the interests of the faith" 
""'11" \'lOuld be justi:.f'1able.48 
It C1El'ntel1t undertook _1' tor &l\'f reason but defense of his poSition 
and the Ch!.u."Ch, and, if there were but 11 ttle hope of vieto17, he was con-
demnable. If' he had insuffiCient forces, he -s foolhardy. 'Aut none of these 
statemmts applied to the present case. At first. Clement saw that the 1..m-
perlal domination would diminish papal authority and that of the Holy See in 
46"Giust1f1casione della politica," p. 198 
47Ib1d., p. 199. Ouicc1ardini's words are imoortant. rt ... di chi • 
princi~la cure. apirl tuale, ne gli e state. data" la potesu( temperale s. 
non p~r aoc9ssoria e sustentaeolo di quella •••• " 
halbid• 
-
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genora1- At th(l! time Clement delayoo. maldng a decision, ()uicela.-rd'lni argued 
that ~!i.r \18S necessary and arms could be taken 'with soma hope of suecess.49 
Since there existed. widespread realisation of the strength of the ~ria1 
rorc~sJ Cuicciardini tanned the best possible remedy to be a }"rench alliance 
with the Pope, the Venetians and the other Italian powers and. the Swiss. Of 
COUrse, danger existed, uncertainty of the end. The imperi.allets already had 
a strong hold in Uxnbardy. 
Arter Pavia there could be no peace wi tbout Francis' frlOOtdom. This 
complieated all negotiations to that end. The French, by their half.hearted 
coopAration in the .'1', made matters more di.N'1oult for the Vonetians and the 
Swiss. Unde:ro the cil"CUlDStances, it seemed wiser for them to defond the few 
areas tMy" hfl'ld in the north ratMr than to attack the st:roong impmalists 
in l~lan. 
Guicciardini was a;WQ:re of the unQertaintd.ee of the remadies he suggested 
tor carrying on the war. He did not k'n<m' if the allies could hope for con-
tinuing Msa allegiance or whether the Venetians 'WOUld remain on the allied 
side. ~,t;mey was essential ft)r success, and all looked to the papal puree. 
It was almost a certainty that the first blow of the impl'lrialists lVoul.d be at 
the papal. states and F.lorenoe, not at Venioe. C1E!lllellt had all1~s but be had, 
J1X)l'f"j otten than not, to work alone.SO 
It seemed to Guicc1ardini that lack of' money W8.S at the bottom of the 
~('Its lOS8 of l'leal-t. Rls resources were insuffioient for a long v»'1!I.r whioh 
- 49 
"Cdust1rlcasione d(lJ.la. politica, tt pp. 199-200 
50lt'proposta di alleansa," pp. 1$9-160. 
r 
this was likely to be. Gu:1oc1ardird. argued, however, that Clement could have 
overcome aome of his dif.f1culties 1n the latter mnths of 1$26 and the be-
ginning of 15211! he had taken advantage of methcda of raising money which 
other popes had been accustomed to take ·oven tor oarry.lng on amb1 tioua and 
unjust en1;.$rprises.· '!'he need for mney, Gu1.cc1al"d1n1 thought, would lave 
j1lst1fted the a1mord.acal creation of cardinale, tor the Clmrcb itself stood 
in a most serious state of j~.S1 
Nor did Ouicc1.a.rdim hes1 tate to make such a augeetioD pereonally to 
hie master. Be was certain tba:' Clement would ultimately have to provide 
the needed ttmds, even through those methods which he had bvmled upon.52 
'then he 'WOUld lave onl7 the blame, 1'lOt the benef1 't. 53 Gu1cc1aM1ni 'IIIliabed 
that the Pope could 8ee the a1 tuat10n a8 he d1d aM act accomingly. Near 
the end of August 1526, Ouico1a1'd1rd did not know vrhere to tum far aeaiat-
ance. 'l'he signatories ot the Leape of Oognac continued to tail in their 
obligationa, military and JDOnetar.r. The Lictenant's frequent PEqueats to 
the Datar1oS1r. and to SI.1v1ati had met with unttatia.tacto1'7 responses, and he 
5lstor1a d 'Ital1a. V, 60, m. 
52Letter to Clement m, August 21, 1$26, Cam' IX, 163-l6h. Note 
Oaicc1an!1ni '. t.rank word ... ifF!. 8e 11 .. ~. auo ordinarJ. gl1 !IVi1'.IoC8nO, 
credo abe la oons1der1 OM 1& G nec_s1 tato 0 proveder'd atraordinaJ"1.am&nte 
o deponen 1e ame. 'Flt queato secondo ha in e8 tent! male. che e mali del 
primo eono piooola co_ a comparat!one d1. questo .... Pezod • nee.sario che la 
dellberi, et ... d1.latione d1a principie a quelle pzoovi8ione ahe sono manoo 
contra alla mente sua .... Il'l8O!!Da io veggo tante di.t'f1cul.tA nel deponere le 
ame con mdo ragionew1e et eiouro. ahe 10 sono certo ehe la necess1 tA 
conduma Vostra Sanct1ta • provedeJ'e de d.anari. et1am con quaUi modi cbe bora 
gli displaec10n0 ...... " 
S3stor'1a dfltalla, V, lJ6. 
~ Data.r1o was the papal bursar. 
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was greatly concerned. ~b1ne would collapse it monq were not quickly 
!brthcoming. ~ee in caq> were great and the;r were rendered greater be-
cause ot King F:rancis f Mlure to contribute. Guicc1ard1n1 rtminded m. 
Holiness that soldiers were not paid tf\'dtb designs in air." Above all, it 
was necessary to have the -money in time lest, to all the other disorders, 
another 'WOUld be added, that ot having provided too late.>S '!'here .. no 
time to quibble in so vital a concern, tor upon cold cash depended the 
preservation ot the ril~ See, Clemant's mm safety. tM 'Welfare ot F.l.orence 
and that of all Ital;r.SO 
\1b:t1e Ouiceiardin1 understood the ~ papal probleme in 1$26 and 1$26, 
he eontimeCl to be bighl:v ar1 tical because Clement did not seem to be able to 
help bimeelf. Not onJJr did he wish to awid any simoniaca1 daal.1ngs, when 
there were many persons who were willing to P&7 mge sums for ecclesiastical 
ti tles, but also the Pope let eT~e know of bis poverty and fear. Tm8 
the boldn088 a:n4 lr;)pee of those who sought to attack him i~sed. 
In Ouicciardird'. judgment, the Pope'. actions indicated his ~. 
1 • 
$Letter to Clement VII t August 21, 1$26, _ Carteggi~ IX, 163-l.64. 
Guieciardini concluded. UlFa la prudent1a Qua b1aognac cons1sta in questa. 
di !'Ula in tempo eM gli giov1. et non tardare tanto cbs, oltra &111 altri 
disordini, si aggiunga &nCO_ questo. d:1 bave" proviato doppo a1 Wmpo.tf 
$6 ~ 'fete Ouicciardini'8 lofty words. fl~ la prego qJtmto posse OM, 
per conservations della Sedia Apostol1ca et :ma, per bene.f1c10 della SIl& 
patrla et pmr la saluto d1 tucta Italla, non wdia piu d1fi'o-:rend.o Hl 
risolversl a fare gro_ ~e1one d1 danari, peraru{ altrimento non ci 'e 
rimedio .... n F1o:t"'et'1Ce was tt SUA patria. ff 
r 
Ih,9 
HI':' had not even entered the war 't't.!. th fla aui table and f'lrm rGSOlution ... 57 
Not only was the terrltor.r and poei.tion of the Cblrch endangered as a result 
of Cl(!!loot's irrasolution but also the F.1orentinc state and the Pape's own 
1nfluenoe.S8 But, if he moved fast, he might $'Vert yet get the VenetiantJ to 
cooperate with him. J.tUan _s already loet and 10 was Alfonso of F~. 
Ouieoiard1n1 saw that the next papal move hinged to a great extent on 
that of Franee. He could only hopE! that Clement, could defend himself while 
the French were naki."'lg up their r..inds, and _intain the !t:!tup ~ in 
TI1orence. If the Pope tmmd it necess&r,y to take the otftmsive without the 
French, then he bad to act fast. $9 l~le he _s to lnOV0 onl\?' with reason, he 
OUght to reallie that despel'\1ltG cases call tor aotiom that mtght appear rash 
but are the beet that can 'be done. In the state of affairs Gu1oc1ardini .. 
considering, one sdmp17 had to act. 60 To sit around and wait for ruin and 
doath seemed. 19nom1n1.oua to him. Ouicc1ard1n.1 argued. that 
., P' 1 
57 ~ Note GuicoiardiDi fa woma. " ... U ponte.tice, 11 quale non era 
entNto~ guerra eon la eost.anza dell f ard..m oonvonienta ...... '* 
\ ,S"Propoeta eli all~,ft p. l61. 'fbte G-.licciard11U'S words: " ... 1'.1 
am .to:ree mtato sotto 10 state d1 lI1renIe." 
S~. 
~, p. l.6O. Guicc1aroini's words Wm'"G 1'loll-chosen. The allies 
faced a (Jesperate situation' " ... in tale caso 1& neoeBS1ta'la strlgne a 
g1ttand. a ogni ~o et1U precip1toao ••• " 
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regions ed ogni aperem&, effett! tel1c1asUd..61 
Guicc1ardini later discuesad the plan 'Of action be bad laid out to 
Clement and wbich the Pope final.ly tollcJWed. vJhen lTane18 was taken prisoner, 
aU the 2"!llers 'Of Italy, especially the Pope, were prq to the imperlal pow". 
Tension waa wb1 te hot wt th the imperial occupati'On 'Of lfUan and the ruin 'Of 
SfOrsa. The ~1'Or put MUan under Bou.!"bcm and th18 Cl"e&t«t serious 
difficulty. As an invetere~ en., 'Or Francia., be ... ~letel.y dedicated. 
to Charles. 
That powe1" I'6&Cbad its might wi til JI'ranci8' freedom, fer the Kins Jield-
ed his lfil.ane8e cl.a1u with promie. that he would inteJ"V __ no f!K)re in 
Italian affaire. Charles' ~ wtth Francia .. a clear e1gn that he 
I' 
wanW control '0£ the Perd.n8ula. He knEnif that b1a artIblt10na 'WOUld be stopped " , 
it he had to oppose ltal.y' and PRnce together.62 
Clement ful.l7 reali_eel that the all1ea could not resist the ~eror it 
Francia would 'Observe the pl'Om!.Se8 he made to obtain his &eedom. It.eaned 
quite likel7 that the King lIOUld lE'l8gl1e with the Pope and the Vmet1ane and 
assist the Dl1ke 'Of Uilan. lIem7 nn con't1nwal.l7 promlsed that he too WCI.1l4 
join the League. Ou1cciardini a8kedwbat .. Clement to do when he .w .. 
possibility of Victory?63 
Neve1"'t.heleae, Clemem was t~ to negotiate peace through deal1Dp 
.. 
6l.n.u., p. 16l. 
621fQ1u.uf1OUione della poll t1ca, U pp. 200, 20).204, 209. France, UDCler 
ita regent, Loutse 'Of SaV07, 1!IOUld go to war tel" Francia' releue if it coold 
be 'Obtained in no other \V87. 
63nnd., pp. 20h-20B. 
, .. Ii 
"I' 
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td th Cmrles t agents in Rome. He thought he might obtain very favorable 
terms if' Charles came to realize that lirano1a might 1rI;>art nmv life into the 
teaC'lle. Then too, Oharles' ministers and captains, who had. always advised 
_1', nmv wanteci peace. Ugo di 1foncada went to Rome to come to SOl'IlG accord 
with the Pope. t{e explained that the 1mperlalists might ha\"e to abandon 
}.H.lan tor they were in serious etra1 tall' The Marchese del Guaato and Antonio .1 
I 
di Leva, the 1IOSt important of the in:pe1"lAll military captains, wrote ot 
their desire fbI" peace to Iomada and to the Duke of Sessa, the 1rzrper1al 
ambassador in Rome.64 Moncada's commission met VIi til 11 tUe success. Clement 
eaw that less .. to be gained by peace at this point tbI.n by a just and 
honorable war to 1"efItore the Du.clV of Milan to Sfofta. Ouiccia.rdini explain-
ed that all Italy wanted th1e war, ttneoeesa.:r1a alla 8'&lute univereale. u6S 
I • 
Guiociardini turned suddenly to fa dotaUed discuasion of the papal role 
\ Y1-.t:! .... v:t.1 the ~ror in Florence. Plrst, he explained tthat the Pope dtd not 
aspire through thi,s _r to occupy the lands of otbera or to acquire ~ng 
66 
1'01" the Church or for his fa.m1l.y. lht rather be was concern('d tor F.loren-
title _fEft;y. Yihen the ~eror came into Italy, he wa. disposoo either to 
destroy F.torence because ot her French incl.ination or to take a::,vay the 
6hThese letters and those of Moncada to Charles en route £rom S1ena 
- .................. ~ inte1"Cepted, ibid., P. 210-
6StP1d., pp. 208-210. 
~p., p. 210. 
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Signoria.67 Perhaps his ultimate plan was to make her the camera ~ imperio168 
-
At the very least, he would seize Pisa, Livorno, Arezzo and the more important 
places in Tuscany. Clement's one consideration was to save the patria as far 
as he could. Since he thought of himself as a Florentine citizen, he found no 
other expedient than to capitulate to the Emperor at Barcelona, but with the 
promise that there be no change in the cityfs administration. It was to have 
free government with liberty for all Florentines and it was to pose no threat 
to the Pope or to the French King. 69 In 1530 Guicciardini agreed that, what-
ever the plans of Clement and Charles for Florence, it could only yield to the 
Empire as the other allies had done.70 
In the Storia d'Italia Guicciardini took a somewhat different poSition on 
Clement and Florence from that taken in his earlier political tracts. He 
emphasized rather that the Pope's dealings with the Emperor at Bologna in 1529 
and 1530 were prompted more by his long-favored and hidden project of rein-
stating the Medici in Florence than by his desire for her security.7l In 
67The executive and legislative government by the priors, known collect-
ively as the Signoria, dated from the constitutional reforms of the late 
thirteenth century, Hyett, pp. 46-L7. 
68 Guicciardini thought that the central location of Italy might influence 
the Emperor to make it the center of imperial government rather than Spain or . I~ 
Germany. 
69"Ragioni che consigliano la signoria di Firenze ad accordarsi, con 
Clemente VII," ,Scritti politici, pp. 214-215. 
70I bid., pp. 217-219. 
-
71Storia dtItalia, V, 215-216. 
1111 
I 
C1.dooiardin1 'a judgment, Cl£ftent'a nogotiations with Cbu-las nt tttts point 
eo{::!tted more sincere than his promisee to the allies. Il$ observed that the 
two h:J.ChABt powers of Chr1stendo."!1 "treated Imre about private concerns ... 
than about the un1 vemal b.lsil1e8S ot peace. n 12 Guiociardini arr;'tloo that 
Cleme..¥it, thcnl3h realising the darleer of Charles' ~, felt ~~t he oould be 
rr.ore easily induced than King Fm..~is to restore the Ued1c1 to Flormtine 
rule. 73 Nol" did be Ml to cr.ltic1ae the Pope fbi> al.lowit'.g puni&l:!meniie of 
~)11hli~..na in F.I.orenee afi',er hm." SllmmdV. In .fact. Gu1ceiardini placed the 
bl.at1e aqua~ on Clem.ent's ah:mldersl tbia ftwq the intention of t.."le Pope 
thou~h manifeated to few." 1h 
still another aide ot Clement 'a re1gn ~ to be discussed. This 1. 
Clement's pol.1c,- toard the SWl.'ImOning of a emuoh ~ which -s to handle 
Cblrch rat"oftl end the metl:'lOd of reestabl1sb:lng peace among ChrletUna. 
In a atud7 of papal policy, the Popel. efforts tor Cmroh reform carmot 
be omttted. Though Leo X did notlttng to ~r the retorm sent1msnt eo ... 
plioi tl3 demanded in the LateJ'8n 00unc11, Clement' a pol1cy.. even mre 
caut1ona. It 'flU "~benod by the doubt8 or op~ ~e of llImJ' ~ 
dinals 'Who were mYare ot the political d1frieultiee it woUld create. The 
.' 1 
72~. 24.3-2hU. 
7~., ab.9. 
~., 299. .l\t the time,bmlevex-, Guico1a.Z'd!ni de!.'ended these bIreh 
l"eel"'.1..tml.M'Bone as neceaaar.r for ~ oonacl1dation of the state. Ot. ~ 
P. 
I' I! 
i'l 
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~ umarcha oould use the 1esue of reform to cmt doml the Pope'. poai-
tion. '!'he UIIljori V of the Sacred College and the CUl"1allsts looked upon the 
conciliar NtOl'mf$l"8 with suspicion and tear. "IS 
1alk of ~"J am1d8t the din of ~.r, was l1nked closely 'vn th the 
proble of .. council to treat of Cb.trch reform. tbth Pope a.'1d tnperor claS ... 
~ a vital role in the preservation ot un! ty' ancl ord'3.r in C~ettlom. 
Clemmt reiterated hie cla1m that q pope he had the dnV to 'm)rk for peace, 
.. fact ~ch h1ndered bim from e~ ftvor1 tism to an:r ruler. He argued 
publi~ that it was 1::Ji8 dnt.y' to c~e quarrels 8lll)ng the pr1nces and not 
to C:l"~te them. And. comlCil mtgbt J'81se more problams than it 10.114 
aolve.16 
In ~~ lS26. Charles mx1lftnc1e ~ to request the Pope to give 
public not.1C8, as econ as poee1ble, of a gmlel."Il eounc11 to treat or peace 
among Chrlstlatls.71 The p3:'Oblen .. that _r not ~ w:rGOked C~ 
and split it up the ldddle, 'With Italy as the t.tu-get and the papal. statfJI 
and Rome the ~, btt that peace atllOng Chz':tat1ans irrvolvad ~oue th«J-
log.tcal 1881l.. One can~ered on the Intberans, ~ gone .from the fold, 
and the other IlOUlt a politiC&l1nYas1on into the powers of the eac!!l!gt1um. 
.. I • Ml 
~ ArcHbishop John l'1aber of Rochester _mad that the tul.e tor ~ 
c1l1aUon with the heretios hid pa$l!~ and that a ~8 to a COWlCil now 
'fmUld be tantamount to a conceea1on toward tmee who bad n$1 ther the 'Will nor 
the intention to abandon thm.r l!t"ft)!'S, Dmlglas, P. 38. 
1'?torla d'ItAl1a, IV J 2ho-2h9, eepee1al.ly 2hh-2b5. 
77Th': rulers _moo to organize a ~gn against infidels and heretics 
and bave the Pope gnmt a general Crusade for three ~, ;b1d.. )SO. 
one can only recall that the struggles of Pope Clement were based on the as' ... 
old con£liot of saoerdotium yersup ~ 
Clement ~eatedly answered the demands .tor 8 general council to treat 
of peace and reform. He apolOgized for his inability to lead the Christian 
priMes to compose their quarrels and to undertake an e:x:pcd1 tion 8.[!:ainst the 
po'W"rtul and advancing Turks. Just as Pope Leo had made a mtiOl'1 tor c0n-
sultations to be held among the pl"1nees for a war against the pcm~ Se11m 
and his hot'de,78 80 also Olement was concerned that the Tum would t17 to 
I 
secure the whole Iingdom ot Hungar.r to the detriment of 1a:!t !c! l!. Cr18tiant.~. 
He did what he could to stop their march. The Pope explained that he had 
conUnually exhorted the Chr'1st:1an leaders to make peaoe among themaelve8 to 
term a united front against t~ts from outside. Amidst 80 many other 
weighty conoema, he gave monetary uslstame to lJunpl7 tor defense against 
the TtL%"b. 
The Pope said he went to war against his wUl, Gu1cc1ardini related, 
because ot his al11&nce w1 th the League. There was no peace tor the Ho~ 
See in Italy. Clement observed tbat God wished tbat the head of Christendom 
be wounded, perhaps for some good end. He tried to look to the ~n weJ.,.. 
tars while the t.emporal beads ot ChJ"1stendom were distracted by ooncems not 
conduci va to the Christian commonweal. 
rlhenever there 'lmuld 'be a _spension of aru in ltalT. Cl.ant promlaed 
tbat be would meet w.l. th the Christian princes and obtain a ut'd.:vereal peace 
among Christians by prayer or persuasion. He begged the Cardinals to ase1st 
him in hi •• anta 22~.19 
• 
78nM.,h2. 
19-Ibid., V, 16-18. 
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The i~r1al vlctory and the accord between Charles and Clement at 
Bro.'Celona led to more spoci.f1c plans against the heretics. The POPE-': agreed 
to use apiri tual ~es to bring ller'ctics back to the f'ai th "mile Charles 
and his brother F.~rd1nand W011ld cooperate in any "fR!J.Y they could. CharlE'tS and 
his 'brother WOttld use their mlli tary strength against the heretios if tMJ 
~lned obstinate whUe Cl~t would see to it that the oth~ Christian 
pri!lC0S vmnld give mli tar,r assistance too. 80 
So 1'IUJ 'l"&1g1on oven 8eoo~ to eldgenc1_ 'Of' papal policies, of 
papal rule, and, .fu.ndamentall1, of papal. EJlistence itself. Peace among 
Christians, sp1r1tuaJ. unitY' within OM fold, l1I.r against irt..t1dele, ratorm of 
eceler.r'AStical arosee-tllase wert'. the issues which made continual esna for 
a general councilinG'rl.:table. In 1$30 the ~1"Or bltansit!ed the ~esta 
fOr a CO'.lncU which he bad made earU.~ at Bologna. lie Ydshed to oatisi)' the 
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d!':1l'l8l1de wb1ch bad a!"iseZl all over G~. and it was conducive to hie own ! • 
affaire thore to suppreu all 0pp01"tu.1'1tties tor a display of the "ttmnltuows 
and ref1"actory diaposi tim of the peoplo • .,81 
The ~eror well Ul\d.~ that Cletl:lt'.mt reared a council and its 
possible ramifications. He promised that, to ~Ve all approhenai<me of 
danger to papal authority, he would be present at the :meeting to take partio-
ulAr care of Clement. Noth1ng ".s more displeasing to the Pope, but he did. 
not want to anger Charles. Nor did be th1nk the prcm!.8~S or the }l1;>eror 
tltlfriaient fw hie em seourity. Clement teared that a ooum11 mtSht even 
. , 
8O:n:nd., 260. 
~1A •• 30,1. 
i 
,I 
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remove him fl"om the papal chatr in f,Qvor of' another cand1&ate. In 
Otdeciardini', judgl'iWnt, Cl~nt realized that he bad stinro u!i al'limosi ty in 
his (Mtl count17 by' f\.is involvement in the miseries oX war, and th&t counoil 
~ers would not. judge th1s in his favor. 'l'hey would furt.h(~l'" tnnti to con-
eid.(~r his activities L'1 F.lo~c as aimed only to aa.t1.si7 the atlbitions of 
his fa.uly. At least Clement's ~enta 'Would use these argum(~l'lta to erJit 
their own purportes. 
Clcm!3tlt told the cardi."lBls who vlGre to discuss a eon.mil how he abho~ 
it. The Pope flmPlainoo that Chr.1s~dom was tom by disputes in 15'30 lU'ld it 
was 'U.l'mise to 1nwlve 1. t in the ~lrthor dis8et'1.non 01' a oo1Jl'JCil. To saUrdy 
Charles, 'however, Cl~ mentioned that he would AgrM to the COl'!."!J'o(uation ot 
a concre.l COUncil, provided tb&1t it 'WOuld be held in Italy' and that Charles 
WO'J.1ld be present. r:i>~er, the IutheNns and other heretics were to be 
in:'ormed that they should abide by the group's decisions and, L"'l the ~ 
timo, show by their actions that thq intend«l to 1"0t>Jm to their Ol)ediAnCG 
to too ibly Boe. 
In Ouieoiardini's judgment, the insistence that the mthm."fuw conform to 
Catholic Chrlst18l'.i ty obstructod any possible pl"O~. ~ could not be 
induced to forsake their doctrlnnsand rites be:fbrc a council, and it l'I&S 
common'l7 believed that thq opposed such. meeting for the"Jft>lt it )l{ollld 
mc~ :reject their opinions. fJ.reactr tomer OOlltlOUs Md condomnecl thma q 
he%"QUcal. Still,.:m1Il1V' Iuthnmll8 cleverly called for such a meet1ne. ThEfT 
f01t quite ce1"t.ain that the Pope 'trould not grent their rPCtueet and thq could 
.. • 1 .. 
3;,0 
bOlster up their own authority o.mng the people by explaining that the Pope 
rillS afraid to face the issue of their beliefs squarel.y.82 Papal policy ... 
in difficult straits, for the Chllrch's attitude toward reform lrould be con-
.At Bologna in 1>32, a cot;,nc11 again _8 disC'.;tSGoo. when Cha.!"'les insisted 
that Clement issue a call ~atcly. The Pope 8l.'l8"IroreQ that the time did 
not 5<cEm ripe, for the French and !'nglish ld.ngs were not '\"filling to cooperate. 
Al'.d, ira meeting l'tera held without them, notJ:J.ng would be ace<.mrllished. 
Such a councU could (f"\'~en give ooooeion :for a schism. 83 
Guicc1ardini oont1nu~ stressed the i'act that Clement appolled tile 
council for the "old l"ehOna. Q Bh He advised the Pope alwar-s aJ.o."1g the 8Ql'lle 
linE:s, 1'..a.ma33, that tho Gasiast way fer the <!:m2er1u;m to abase the ?ape lIiIl8 by' 
~1S of a council.. iJa:r.r Sft this" hoiva'V'cr, u the only'l'll0thod of coping i.'ith 
the wt~~. 8, lbt the papal poei tion was Guicoiardinils pr.1.Dar..r concern. 
Hothing could overturn it like a eou:ncill 
B2Ib1p.., 30l-3~. 
83I'bid., .310-311. lfem7 '.;"'rn: 's agents had aL.""'eady ini'omed Clement that 
they 'fJOU-rcrtake their 1d..ng's eaUSf3 f.rtom him to a Council. ~ thought 
HJ?11X7 had gone too far., ibid, 315. 
Bhn,id.. 308. 
85uQiust1.t'1OUlone dell4 politica,· p. 206. Guicc1ard1.ni stated that 
Charles could depress the Pope ftper v.!.a di conoil1 des1derati e ricercati da 
molt.i. como nace.sari per 1a oresia di lut.her coo ogni ~ ~jliaw, e POl' 
mol tl disordird. abe eono nella Chiesa." 
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/ ... / Ia f'B.cilita ebe ha di farlo e grande, pel'Che oltre aUe provine1e cbe 
lui eomanda, sa1 cbe per el malo eoncetto 1n aha ~ el clero .preaso 
.f lAici, 1& Germm1a non de«l.dera altro, e la ltalla vi sara prontaJ 
e questo modo, lotre a ebe pu~ parere 1ustif'1cato, porche'si tara 
con coloN di regiona, puo a.tlChe parere iusto aUo ~radore, 
presulJl'Orlendos1 lui la ref~~one del claro la quale poi segu.i terebbe 
o no, secondo cbe Dio "fOlou1. 
Of ooureo, Gu1ec1ardini could not prediot the COl.U"t1e of divine aotiOn8, 
," 
I I 
II 
, I, 
'I 
'II I, 
,! 
I', 
I, 
\ ,I 
bUt eoneider:1ng matters, he was quite certain. It it were in the ~e%"Or'. '! i 
power to depNn the Pope, be would l'IBke USG of t.he occasion "either out of 
4mb1 tioD, which 18 natural to emperors against popes, f't»! his own secur1 t7 
or even tor revenge."S7 The dee1re to bring the popes to ruin vas not laclo-
1ng in the m.lnds of an)" Of the great princes of Cbrl.stSldom. Elven Francis 
of :!Tame Img that no pope could be ruined unlese he lost his epir1tual 
power. tet not evan a rea:rte ~t could be made b7 ant one pr.tnee wtt.b. 
out the agreement ot the other princes of Christendom. 88 
86 
"Proposta d1 aU..-," 5crltti pollt101, P. 156. 
81~rla, dtftalia, IV, 325. 
88yn thia case, the French ruler would need the acquesemce of the Empire 
and of Spain. "Ue( td puo battere, 0 a dire meglio, c'l1st'ar'e 1nt~te el 
papa, non gl1 togl1t\ndo 10 apirlfualaJ e queato non s1 pad torgli S8l'lma el 
ooneorso della Magna e di Spagna, a quali non 'e a Pl"Opoei to eM ~1a a1 
!aceia oapo eel autom d1 una tanta 00., e pero sam' facile oosa. ... tt 
"Disc .. d1 Franceeoo I, It P. U 1. lbreover tlwre seeed to be an inv1a1ble 
hand preventing the matdall.Ucn ot these plana of ru1n~ ng the Pope in the 
spiritual sphere as a step to hie political 1np)tence. Ouiceiardini indicated 
that it. al.wa,ye seemed wisor for Christian rulers to bave the Pope'. Mend-
ship, mther than his animosity. Note his words; "}.fa questo ba emelle 01 
contrapeso, pe:rcM og:n1 volta ebe non fuse! rlaoluto a non mnomettem el papa 
nel doml.n1o ecoletl1ast1co, parrebbo pitt prudenzia oercare d:i banef'1oarlo e 
farselo amico e cont.1.dente, in abe non 11 manchere'bbano at modo, ebe volerlo 
per inimioo ..... " ibid., pp. U7-l18. 
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Cl.em.mt VII died without al'ly d1m1nution ot Me spiritual autoorlty. Yet, 
as a CtI!Eooento pri.nce, he suffered some of the severest defeats any prince 
fJ'Vcr ~er1enced. 'hue, the Medici line continued to rule in Florence, but 
his familyts fortuMs should not have constituted one of the Popots ~1l'Jdamen­
tal concerns. Perhaps. t:rom the Stor.ta d'Italia one can see that firm lead-
ership on the part of Clement and. solid cooperation on the part of the aili. 
ot Cognac would have saved Italy. In any avent, with his defeat, Italian 
politics as a deciding factor came to an end, so weU EDtq)llf'led in Ms 
blm111ating peace w:f~ th Charles V; 
Guico1a:rtRni's position in the service of the Pope and the League 
associated h.1.m ld. th their tf'!'R success. as well as their ult:L'7l8te i\1ilure. 
His pt)1i tical account of what blppened in the ,.. against Charles was in great 
measure an apology for himself u well as Clcent. Gtdoc1ard1n.i. admitted that 
his own m1ser1os came troll hts deliberate decision to advise war from whioh 
all these mJ.s came. .t;anta ru1nalft89 Yet" as pol1 tic1&ne who taU do to-
day" he caution«1 that none should ecmplain against the evi. Be ~ 
placed himself' in this category ot wise men, who however saw all along that 
the Pope's timid and irresolute poliO)" destroyed the poesibU1ty of succees.90 
Yet the opportuatty tor papal v1ct.0Jr7 s~ V'eJ'7 prom1a1ng.91 V!ea1c:neas-
os r.ere evident within imper1al ra.n.k8. !here were 1neu.tflc1ent i'b!'Ce8J there 
89uconeolator.ta." Scrltt1 a1.ltob1ograflc1, p. 166. 
90:0:,14-, pp. 117, 176. 
9l~, P. 117. ~ cone1demtions toree one to confess, Ou1cc1aldln1 
noted. tbat ff ... che rare ~lte 1\1 per alcuno panc1pe presa ~resa ncJ s1 
giuata TJ,f( s1 neoesaarta, ne con maggiore sperttnu della vi ttorla. Q 
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.,.s a laok of money) there was the 9n!!1i ty of the J;Jilanooe populace. TM Pope 
alSo had with him the French Kings the Ven~t1ans, and even the VCgtlEl ~thT 
ot the Fngl1sh tr1ng. Un~.lm~.ly, F.n1mc1s did net consult ~,. of the 
allies on his policies and nev~ helped the League. 92 
He SPOke of Pope Clment as "that poor and ~hed pr.tnee who bad so 
u.nhaPP~ become a prisoner of the Spaniards. n "Tuttoe1 mendoR Ta8 affected 
by the1P unfortunate uc~ in ltal7.9.3 Too late had t.he Pope come to 
realise what Ouiociardin1 and other prudent paraous had ~S8ed, mmel.;rJ 
that mna:; would have conViruted eigniflcantl.y' to the 1nsa.rance at least of 
papal and RmDan sarety. 0!'1l7 a few dan bef'oftt Bourbon .n~ the citlr, 
Clement oreated tbrae cardinals £ott a tee, which, beo«u.ee of the lack ot 
time, could not eve be paid therll9l. The vagaries of the princely role of 
the popes t.rom Innocent and Ale:xander through Clement OIllm1nated in thi. 
histor.!.o tragedy. 
At h.1.s death, Pope CJ.ement left an abundance of jewels in the caete1 
Santf Angelo and several offic!ala 1n the papal oourt., 'bu." a Yel"Y small 
q'.lanti t,.. of monq. Gu1oc1ardim. "tfl'Ote. 
Pbr wbat happiness can compare mth the unhappiness of his 1r.prison-
meat, his having wltnessed tbe sack or Rome with INch horrible rav-
agee, and his having been the cause of 80 gNat a ruin to his OlIm 
country? ire died hated by the court, suepeotOO by the prina~'3. and 
with the ch.ar8cte:r of be:l.ng rather of a moroae and di~blo than of 
a pleasant and a:.f'mble teq>~. :hr he Wl:18 reput~ 4var1ci~, ~ 
to be trusted and mtuNlly av~.me from doing a k1.ndness.· 
92Ibid., pp. 116-177. 
93-~., P.l66. 
9hStortA d'Italla, v. 136. 
~1b1d., 317-3lB. 
Ouicc1ard1rd. t s 'WOrds evidenced the pess1mLem that worked t,.~h the 
entire stor1l; and. the pity and shame ~ng the ruler to whom he bad 
devoted a signif10ant pa.rt of his active life. He ackn.owledged that Clcent 
mort ted pmee ~d tol" having taken up ame through neoessity and not 
ambition to pre$~ h18 person, the HolT See, the 11ho1e of !~ and the 
world. 96 tht eepeoial'1' poignant _. the tnlged;y of Ou1cc1ardini b1mselt. 
thoUgh an "aoc1dente," ~ to b1m tar deepel" than that of b1s _titer. 97 
- 96 \' ~ 
"Sua Sanct1ta aara laudata se bavend.o pres. l'ame per necees1tA at 
non per U1b1 tione, :tare. ogni cosa per non JlOYlnare 8e, queUa Sede, I tal1a 
ta1cta Eft el mndoJ ansi, non 10 fIlccendo, ~ beetemmi.ata da opuno," 
letter to Oiammatteo Giberti, Auga.st 22, ]$26, Cart.eggi, IX, 115. 
91"conaolator:1a," SCr1ttt autobtoef1c1. p. 166. 
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CHAPTrn V 
In the storie ,!lo!, -Mltine, Ouieciard1ni studied the history of Florence 
.frOm the uprising of the C¥!mil in 1318 to 1509. He thought that an accurate 
tmov;lodge of' past happenings would help him better to undeo.l'Stand the con-
temporary F.l..orentine Ed tuat1on. These early res~roM8 into Florentine 
history ro~ the faotual basis tor Ouiooiardini' s pol! tiC'Al thought. 
!Ie recognized that Florance had been spl1 t by factions throughout her 
history and that the orten f1erce struggle among them prevented the estab-
lishment ot a stable government there. Guicciardini held that Medici ascend-
ancy in Florence was the almost inevitable result ot the cityfs long history 
or 01 vil discord, but this instabil1 ty further produced t,he theocre.cy of 
Savonarola and the republio of' Soderini.2 There is a recurrent theme in all 
Gnicoiardini fa Florentine wr1tlngs, the deoadence and final tall: of Florenee 
lrrbe Ciompi were of the lower classes of Florence who revolted in 1318 
tor SOCial, economic and political grievances. Democl"llCY in Florence reached 
i tEl zenith immediately atter the uprising and then continued steadily to 
wane, except, for a short-l1 ved revival in the days of savonarola., until :1 t 
disappeared oompletely under the later :Medici rulers, Hyett, pp. 188-196. 
2.ntese points tom the whole ideological current of Guieciardini 'a 
Storie f1orent1~~ ~ ~ !! 1202-
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, 
and of Italy.) 
'Machiavelli too studied Florence's past and in his Istorie t!orent1ne4 
plaoed its events within the larger scope of Italian affairs. ~~obiave11i 
judgod them in the light. of l't.is ideal, the Roman Republic. His Istorl.e in-
co",orates some of his f\tvorite ideas, namely, the constitutional cycle,S 
the v:',talizing effects of party struggles on civic 11fe, and the amral char-
actf:ll" of success1\ll political action. It reflects a lll)()d of pessimism, even 
an almost tragic despair. He cont1mally rerlected upon the reason that hi. 
own city did not come up to the standard which Rome bad set, a ~e repl1blic 
of virtuous clU.ens etrlv1ng for fame and glory in the servioe of their III 
goV'nrnment. In Y.l.orent1ne history lI.ach1avel11 found conUnually in operation I 
atrt.lggles based upon private ambition, egoism and a thirst f'or personal 
power. m. own experlMlCes as Secretary of the Repub11c bad given 111m a 
first-hand opportunity' to observe these vices at woric.6 
)Passer1n d' ~es, pp. 160-161. 
4xn his history U&chia:velli included events from the barbar1an invasions 
in Italy and concluded it with the death of Lorenao the Magn1.f'1cerrt. 
Su.,cb1avell1, like Po~U8, believed that not only does human histo17 
tp~d to r~pea.t itself but aleo that in aU states action and. reaction alter-
nate. out of prosperity comes dec.y and out of' diuolution rebirth. Monarchy', 
the first tom. of government in most states, becomes tyrannical and. is 8110-
ceeded by an oligarc~, a demoonley and t'1Mllyanarchy, a condition which 
mkee for a revertdon to monarchy. MachiavE!'lll noted that the cycle is onl¥ 
rart:'ly oompleted. Cf'. J.S. Al1~ A H1storz..2! Political Thounht in the 
Sixteenth Cantu" (New York, 1960),-pp. J&5:4s6. - --
6p'el1x Gilbert, Introduotion to the Torchbook TJd1 tion of ~acooiC 
1.e~el.!!!iHisto!7 g! Flore~~ !:!!! g! ~ Affairs .2! I?:lZ (~lew York .. 1960), 
PP. AV., • 
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Both political giants of the Cinqueoento tried to understand the prob-
lems of Florenoe and realized that they were but a part. of the problems that 
beset Italy. They knew that both these situations were intimately related. 
Guicciardini explained in his Le cose :r.torentine 7 that in 1375 the city was 
--------
free and self-governing but, from that period onward, it fel1 under the per-
petual unhappiness "a non essere mai caduta in uno governo bene ordinato, di 
essere stata sempre piena di sedizione oivile. M8 In addition to these major 
internal struggles the city faced, there was the external invasion of 1494, 
for Guicciardini the beginning of Italian ruin. Perhaps that was the reason 
for the termination ot his Le oose with that year. 
--
But Guicciardini and Machiavelli differed on the remedies eaoh proposed 
for solution of the Italian illness. Guicciardini saw no value in the gov-
ernment ot the Roman Republic as a model for that of Florence. '1'0 him, it 
was unwise to praise the defects of a government which were the cause of 
disorder. 9 Guiociardini valued the benefits acoruing to Italy from her strong 
7Le cose :f'i~rentine was begun at F.i.nocchietto at the end of 1527 J aban-
doned in September 1529, taken to Incca in March 1530, then to Rome and 
Florence until Guicciardini _s nondnated governor of Bologna in July 1531. 
He oarried it to Florence in 1534 for certain corrections and then abandoned 
it. Of the four books in Le cose,the last two are incomplete, Ramat, pp. 64-
65. --
8 Cited in ibid., p. 65. 
-
9"Considerazioni intorno ai Discorsi del Machiavelli sopra la prima deca 
di Tito Livio," Book I, Chap. 6, Scrltti pplitici, pp. 13-14. 
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l!Ilnicipali ties while Machiavelli stressed the neeessi ty of strong monarchical 
unity. Guio.ciardini agreed papal power had been one of the chief :factors in 
keeping Italy disunited and that the conservative function of the Church in 
Italian history had hindered the formation of a monarchy similar to that of 
Spain, France or mgland. But Guicciardini could not understand the value of 
Machiavelli t s point that I taly might well be saved by becoming a national 
state. To him, whether this would be a good or a bad thing for his country 
was debatable. The monarchy which Machiavelli so desired Guicciardini seems 
to have conteJ'llplated with fear.10 
The Italian states, Guicciardini believed, had perhaps -$Uffered more than 
they would have if' united. On the other hand, the establishment of a central 
government in one city would have depressed all the others, and Italy would 
not have developed so many nourishing cities as she had. Fbr this reason, 
it seemed more likely that union would have been a misfortune rather than a 
11 benefit. 
While Guicciardini did not have what might be termed a "national con-
science" and remained through his entire life a citizen of Florence, his 
political acumen enabled him to see that the interests of his republic could 
lONote Ouicciardini t swords' " ••• doppo tanti naufragi delle COse di 
Italia e poi che questi prfncipi aranno combattuto assai, para ragionevole che 
in qualcuno sia per rimanere potenzia grande, el quale cerchera di battere e' 
minori e forse ridurre Italia in uno monarchia," "Del modo di ordinare il 
governo popolare," Discorsi ~ regemento s!! Firenze. p. 218. 
llnConsiderazioni," Book I, Chap. 12, pp. 22-23. This is a fragmentary 
'WOrk, consisting in a series ot observations on various chapters of the 
Livtan Books of Machiavelli. Ct. also J.W. Allen, A Histo:J of Political 
Thought in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1960), w. 497- 00. 
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not be promoted unless they 'Were considered wi thin the total complex picture 
of Italian interests.12 His vista was even greate r, for his sojourn at the 
Spanish court had enabled him to view the immense panortll'1JB. of international 
life as it was then forming. 
The forms of' government in Oinquecento Italy compelled the attention of 
both Machiavelli and Guicciardini. Maohiavelli on the one hand described the 
strong rule of a prinoe13 and, on the other, popular control of government. 
In the Diaporsi, he upheld government by the majority. It seOO1ed logical 
and just and afforded possibilities for Ol:ider and benefits to the state.14 
Guicciardini found neither of Maohiavelli's political plans wise or 
feasible. He was particularly opposed to the plan outlined in the Discorai. 
Absolutely no stability could be looked for in the people. In the mouth of 
one Barbadoro he put these words, supposedly delivered to his fellcw-citizensl 
, 
You carry ftne! euore el desiderio della liberta, non per altro che per to~ 
mento vestro, poiche non siate capaci n' a cognoscerla ne a usarla..n15 The 
people know as moh of the meti ves or even the acts of their government as 
they do of events in India.16 To speak of the people means to speak of a mad 
12Palmaroccbi, Studt Guiociardiniani.. p. 88. 
l3.rhis is the subject of his most well-known 'Work, II princi12e. 
14Allen, p. 498. 
15Le ~ fiorentine, ad. Roberto Ridolfi (Firenze, 1945), Book II, p. 81. 
16 . 
Ricordi, II, 14l. 
l68 
bellst, mthout taste, disc~t o'Z" stab111t:r.17 BrperiencA d~t:mtes 
18 that !'6rely does anylihing happen thtlt the mlUtude expects, for they are 
'.lS'1811y mre pleased by specious than sture cmmaels.19 Aceordi!\..g to 
tho m~an.6 of reaching it. He pointoo praotically to t.1w cbaoa tU".d t'tttrane 
per:t1 to whioh the Ci2!E1 bad conducted the e1 ty. 20 
!r~ fact Florentine oiVil life seemed so 'Warily baaed to Guieciardil1.i that 
it "ms easily disposed to fall into e1 tiler ~.ny or popuhr d!ssollltion.21 
Until the ott1msti, men of quality 1n whom lay the best hope .tor stability 
within tho state, were brought :tnto the oity's political aff' .. 'dra, Florence 
cO'.lld scarcely hope tor e stabJ.e government. His cooperation ltith "d.ly 
tyran.rd.O£I.l rulers, in his later years, stemmed pr*...l1'la.:r'i~ from a desire to 
take advatntage of a possible opportum t'<.r to inaugurate rt.s own gm'crnroental 
plan.22 Actually, constitutional J"f"f.'erm ".'/813 a Ene 9.':!!.!!?Jl to e!l.E.ble Florence 
.... 
17Ib14., lbo. Ouioc1ard1n:i's words are strong and bitter. "Chi disse uno 
popolo dine vera.mente uno a.n:imale paazo. piano di mille errori, di mille 
confi.lsione, sanu. gusto, aan.H delatte, sanaa st&bi11ta(. tI 
18 
storia d t lta;l1a, n, 16. 
19nnd., IV, 277. 
2<\'C089 tiorentine," Book II, pp. 72-74. Ct. also "La deeima soalata," 
DiSoorst-A pp. 215-216. 
~'n govarno popolare," ibid., p. 219. 
22Agost1no Roesi, mneeseo Gniociardtlli El U tT'S':t1:tO fiCtrentino dal1521 
al. lSho, (Bologna, 18~), !, 104. EOss! tii'i'ds-t ft'OrenUne SliUatIOn"1.il 
]5)0 his basic reason for attampting to L"liI.ke a pmct1cal application of his 
theo:ry. At this time, Yed:Loi domination beca1l1e inevitable, therofore, 
C'l1licciardini f'avorOO mald.ng th(Sil" r~g:lme stable by providing oe.~1)le and __ 
J>erienced oitizens to participate in the govel'lltMnt .. ib1d., 2U. 
i I 
I . 
, 
I' 
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!.fl tht'} notorious Pass! affair.21 It ... not an 6!lSY task to rule a city 
v:ho1"e matters had to be oonduetod u.."lder republican forms. Thi$ necessity 
lW.lpod to mke Loremo eol'llOWhat dcfinnt and sllspieious and at ti."ll'~S lad him 
to act firmly.2B Moreover, the Pani conspiracy obviously provided mtivos 
tor the cruel actions with which I..orenso i'1G.S oharged.29 
To Guieciardini thePazsi a.ffair was ind~~d fate:f'~l for Lora.~o·s 
1\lture. It oonat1 tuted a dang,:;r both to his stat.:> and to h1s life, btt ul-
t.1JtI,a.tely it afforded him -great reputation and utility." He was recognized 
as patron of the cit)" and in a l1.II.nnwas lord of the state. 
che in .futurum 1"'1mase libe~te ed interamente arbitro G quasi 
signore della c1t~J e quella potf'n:zia eM insino a quallo d1 era 
state. 1n lui grGnde ma scapettosa, di ventO grandissima G sioura. 
.. l 1 
21~e han Conapi:Ncy' of' lb78 was mgineerad b;r G1rol.aloo Ria.rio, the 
lord of lmola, and FNnoneco Pan1, a mronber of the well.-knmm banldng ~ 
in oompetition vdth the Medici, with the assistance of Archbishop F.rancesco 
Salviati. They planned to mu.rder Lorenzo and Giuliano de'Medici and to over-
throw their ~ Oiul1L'lO '!liaS assassinated a."1d torermo mrr'OWly es-
caped dr::atb.. S1xtus IV, allied. vd.th Ferrante of Naplea, and from 147b. on ill 
tonne with Lorenso, exccmmmicatcd him and placed F.l.orence under intordict. 
Venice and Milan, Lorenzo ts allies, aided him in the subeequent military con-
mct. In 1480 the WiU' of F.1.oronoe with Naples and the papacy ended. The 
'l\trk:teh appearance in the sO'.lth in.f'l:n.enaed Sixtue to renove his aoclesiast.1.cal 
censures. SehevUl, The Medici (New York, 1960).. pp. 123-136, and FloN>llCe, 
pp. 382-386. Cf. alsocea:m ~4 .~, Lorenzo de1 Modic! and R.e.naisS8.nee 
Ital;z: (tandon, 1955>, Chap. 8. - _.. ... 
28stor.te fi.ft"MttM, p. 18. Guicc1ardini noted, bow aver, that every time 
the eour'Sfl! of. Cosi:m.o and Lorenzo t~ed to reduce matters to blood ar.d further 
violence, as at Pel'ug:ta and Bologna, at Florence, givm the conditions of the 
e1tyand the nature of the state, they rather hP.J.poo to destroy thar!. to in-
Qr(!4se their ~..atness. ~~ t!f&;!.!epto !!!. !i1renze, p. 25. 
29 ~., p. 78. 
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Ouioe1ard1n1 intimated his view that Lorenao. bl" putting an and to the 
F1orontine CUl"$13 of factions, accompliahed a great benefit. In the ~toZ"l;e 
f,Lorentine. he displayed an enthls1um. net to be tound in the Storifl d1Ital1a. 
-
.tter Me daya of diplcmao7 and diaillue1onment" save in rare cases 11ke his 
re!~renc$8 to Loronzo.31 
H1s most solid and valuable contributions to Florentine life" like thOse 
of Cosil!lO, resulted from h18 prudence in consulting his council. Their type 
of tyranny, was not oNel or rapacious rut instead ft17 mild. Since they weN 
desirous of increasing the cityts power, they performed llIUl7 good deeds and 
few evil ones ao!!.rt tpose !2. whtch neo~v !!sl1nduced them. The ear~ 
Yodiei wished to control the government with aa moh ci v1ll t7 as they could. 32 
Lorenzo SM"Ved not only Florenee but the entire peninsula. He acted as 
an able mediator in the str1fe brought about by the ubI't1.olJ.8 and scheming 
Italian pr.tnc~. Florence was ftdi ~rl in SOUlB gloria e rlputuione" 
through hie eldlltul manipulation Of 61 tuatlons 1":raught with potential danger 
tor the mtire I tal1an seene. 33 
30Ct• ibid., Chap. h. esp. p. 38. 
3let. storla d'Italla, I, 2-3, S-7. 
~'P' 25. 
33norenee,. lofty position and l'"I:vputation stet!'lllOO, according to 
GuiCCiardini'8 description, "per avera un govemo eel un capo eli grandissilna 
autorlta, pt'I'.J" aftre f'ra~ anpliato 10 imperio, P" oosere stata in gran 
parte cause della salut~ di Ferrara 0 poi del re Ferrando, per diapon"e d1 
Innocenssio interamente er e8sare 0011 ta con Nit 11 e con ~,tUano .. 
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C""Uieeiardini intisted that Lorenzo t s death _s a tttming point in the 
hif)tory of Floremte and of ltal,y. Here was his hint ot tr:lGedy, ir.ev1table 
siMa it seemed to he in thi..ngs. Heferring to the succession ot the lfiS8 
Lorl"ntlO b'/ his inept son Pil!l"O, Guiec1ard1ni explained that "vanna 10 stato 
pM:" eredita e $pease volte d1 UT&O saviO' 'Vime 1n uno pasllO, aha poi da 
ltult1mo tuffo alla e1t~.3b 't"Jh11e Lol'emlo's pce1t1on strengthened a1'ter the 
POli vtar and the crfNltion or the COJl81lY=o ~ .a~.35 the :ibu.ndation ot 
Medici power in the 01 ttadini dello atato ~ned at'.lbstantiaJ.ly the same and 
continued after 111$ death. 36 Fiero does not seem. to bave approoiated this 
!'llly. His aawhet' treatment of the leading o\t1mati and his 1nereasing reo-l' .. 0; 
llanee on ~e1 clients'7 %fIl7 bave $p1'\lDg iNm a m1ataken belief that the 
Iii 
eeS0re quasi una 'bUancia di tutta ltaJ.1a," storle fiorenti:no# p. 73. Ct. 
also the reasons tor l'l'lorence' s "pote •. '''1I1a e riputu10ne grandeft in 1516, "Del 
JlX)do d1 ase1curare 10 stato ana. ca. de t Jledioi, "DiecondJ _ P. 269. Ct. 1b14a, pp, 74-75, for Guico1.ard1ni t s account or LoreiiiO'. tl."'iendship vdth the 
various Italian powers, the Pope, the Ttlrks and. the French. This laudatol7 
passage should be c~ with one he w1"Ote five years later in JS13, "Elogi~ 
pp. 223-227. 
3b~rle f1or~~?,:;:,J p. )6. 
3~f) Conrl(lio ~li!'ttantaJ €mtherilr.:<i 'bY' to!"f!lnf;O de 1dedioi in 1480 to 
ticlrl;,en his: oontrol In 'Ftorence after the Pull1 1'Va1", ~Neded all maUng 
oQ'Jneils. Fbr eff.lcit;iney, how~(:'r.t its n:cst essential poW()!"!'3 wp~ d(lolegated 
to 'bYO per:rmanent CODI!d ttees, the yttr entJ"Usted VIi tb .t'breign and mil1 ta17 
affair'S, and a group of twel.ve, \"1- e handled t.tnancial a."'ld ~rt.tla.l 
matters, Sohevill, ~(d'l pp. 145-146, and F1orence, PP. 396-397. 
36RubiMtetn, PP. lb9-1S0. 
370t• Storie t1o~tine, pp_ 84-86. Cf. also "Del modo di aaaicurare 10 
ltato," p. ~'m. . 
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Medici re:ai1l1e 'm3,S sufficie.'1tly on the way to institutional permanency to allow 
him to pay less attention to the feelings of his ottimati supporters. The 
popular rising against Piero in November 1494 \'mS probably successful because 
a number of these leaders had deserted him.38 
The rall of the Medici brought into the open many political and personal 
feuds among both their adherents and their enemies which made civil ival' 
possible as soon as Italy lrould be freed from Charles VIII's army. It was 
at this juncture that Savonarola. intervened wi. th a plea tor a more radical 
consti tutional reform. Ui.s authority in Florence rAd been vastly en.l-Janced by 
the apparent fulfillment of his prophecies regarding the coming of the French. 
He .flattered. the F.Lorentines in their hopes that the French king would restore 
Pisa to ther.l while all Tuscany would come into their possession.39 In his 
sermons he predicted that the calamities ot t1ha Republic would be turned into 
prosperi ty and the increase of dominion. By 1496 he was denouncing terrible 
judgments on the Court of Rome and the rest of the Italian powers. 
His intervention in the internal poll tios of Florenoe, at its acme in 
December 1494, was one of the principal faotors leading to the reforms which 
transformed the foundations of the F.1orentine constitution by establishing a 
~ Consiglio on the Venetian model with the exception of the Doge.40 
38 Rubinstein, pp. 149-150. 
39storia d'Italia;,J I, 258. Guicciardini accented the diplomatic traditio 
of long-standing which linked Florence and France as well as the importanoe ot 
Florentine connnercial interests in that kingdom, storie tiorentine,l p. 121. 
4<JRu,binstein, pp. 154-155, 151. 
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Qu:i.cciardin1 stressed the bbiguities in the Oren Corudclio and in the elfICt-
oral reform. 1';'as the cc1.meil aristocratic or democratic, more in favor of the 
ottimJ:.i or the E2P2lard? 
-
Tht~sc chanees aetually led to a ~orary waning of ot;t1mati prestige, 
'bUt b:Y" the end of 1495 once again .. cons:td~ble proportion of. the hie-hest 
orr-lees .. ront to t.he, $.;me fa:ml.l1ea that bad held thea under the Medici and 
41 
earlier. 
/' In spite of 2~'!Mv aoquiascence in the new regime. Ouicc1ard1ni did 
not look upon it with total approval. P~r eare bad been taken to prevent 
th~ OOll'ImOn people r.rom breeding disturbances, bu.t c1t1sens of. the first rank 
were not eut'!'1c1ently d1stinguish~ &om the com:raoners. Some of the most ig-
norant poople gave advice on vital matters while the S".lpreme magistracy, 
which datar.m1ned matters of the utmost importancu!t was changed. monthlT. 
Gu.:tceiartlini pointed to the confusion thus bred in the government. 
Adding to this chaotic state of affairs _8 the great author! ty of 
Savonarola, whose listeners formed a party. As otten happene in gove~, 
Chlicc1aftlini noted, the common good was les8 regarded than the dq>ression of 
the advaree party.42 Han:y of the ~ortant cit1zeJlS looked to the mnk, 
"some out of' simplicity, 'SOJlle Oll,t of ambition and others out of tear." lever-
hlcr. storie f1orent1ne, p. 137, where OuicciardW states that in 1508 
or 1509, "ginmdo 18 elcsione dmgli utlei in poeM e str.tgnendoslL a un nwnero 
eli dugento cittaD1ni 0 poch1 piu.n 
42Stor1a dt1tali4, I, 283. note Guiociardini's perceptions " ... i per 
q:n!"'cto css~dosi maniresta~ntl"' divisa la eitti, 1 'una parte eon 1 taltra ne' )' 
eonsigl1 publici s1 urtava, non Ed curando gl1 uomini, come acoade nelle c1tta 
divisi, eli 1mped1t'el 11 nGl'le comtU'le pel" sbattere la r:toll.tzzione docll llvv __ !1 
11S 
thelooe "nIUl7 judicious persons" despised the preacher and his pred1ctionalb3 
~ power,a"l the impact of Savonarola on the internal and fbre1gn 
polioy of Florence be1:.ween lh94 and 1498, Ouiccia!din1 felt that he .. onlJ 
partlal.l7 responsible tor the varloua changes there. He did not lfllCOeed 1n 
altering substant1alll' the soc1al etlucture of F.I.o:Nnt1ne poll tics or in 
solving i te probleae through the reforms of the !!!!i! ~~. '.l'ho thorn ot 
Florentine polit1., the poe1t1on of the ott1aat1 in the .tate, remained.. 
Ultimately what _ttered most. were the poll tical t:red! tiona and ditf1ou.lti. 
of a c:1 ty wb1oh, as Ouiociardin1 said later, was ~ old and set in her 
WIQ1J_ 4L. HeF troubles \lVOU.ld oont1me to be oaueed "le male cond1a1oni d1 qu 
cittit nella quale era tat e1tte.din1. non p1ccola d1via1one cauaat.a dalla i!:)~:).:.: 
tors del govemo. flhS 
Ouiccian11n1 took into account 8a'VOMrOla t..:role. At the "9'017 tim. that 
the monk believed he .. ~ed in bis atterlpts to transform norene. 
into a 'mJl.l,.oJ'dered political state on .. eolid spiritual tou.ll!at1on, he be-
came the instrwntmt of her oonfl1cting torces_ Some of Gu1oe1ard1n1 '. ad-
mired ottfmatl, but especiall,. the e1t1 __ who I8d belonged to P1ero's ltato, 
w!.she4 tor a curtailment of the govo~·8 or1.m1nal jurisdiction for the 
h6 
avoidance of wboleeale measures against Ued1ceane. The pl'Otectton accorded 
h3 ~., pp. ~8-2$9. 
Lhma;!eE. w. 81-82. 
lCStorla d tlta~. I, 283. 
h6stori,e t.lo~. pp. 107-108. 
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to ?Jedici partisans by Francesco V2J.or.t41 andPiero caPPOniu8 _s i..'1Buffie1ent 
for orderUnl\1!U in Flortmee. To prevent violence and disorder and to bring 
ahOtlt "la pace uniwmale," Savonarola tried to lrldle exeesses by·illl'.'YWing 
appea.ls to too Signor.ta49 and took measures to eul'b ubi t10",. Ouiccl.ardini 
fnlt this .,.. }:ave been hi. ftutdlim(~ntal ftotivation for the inst:tttlt:ton of the 
Gral) Consiglio.SO In an objective anal.yeis, OuicoilU"dint foom it necessary 
-
to adnt1t that these :m.easures alone ~ught the salvation o-r Florc'..nce a."ld 
benefitted both the varq'Jiahed and the new ~e. 
FbI' Ouioo1ard1n1, the pcJj.t1oal problem ot Sa:vonarola became an i."ld:i:v1d-
ual one, .. molSl one. l¥as 110 a great prophet- or a great Dm1 and -s h$ good 
or bad?S1Ueadm1tted that too r€8l question _s savonarola's own lite. lie 
bid some pride and ubi tion, bttt & scrutiny of his life ind1eated not the 
least vestige of avarice, l.mm.ry'or an;y other weakness or passion. Inete&d he 
r I 
47PancefJOO Valor.1, ~ted ~tlN in 1491, was an eners~c 
21ae n1 atat.eeman devoted to Savonaro , §Chev111, !1eE!!!Q!. pp. IJ49-hSO. 
h8p!el"O Capponi, a l'11El!lb0l' of one of' Florence's f&mil1ea, 1s noted .for b1s 
obs'f:J..Mto displq of resistance to Charlee VIII when he entered Florance in 
1494, lbi,d, PP. h37-438. 
4~ a law due to Savonarolan initiative, an those who wore polit1call1' 
condEl7lled acquired the right to appeal to the Sig,nol'ia. whioh could render a 
def1.n1t1ve arrest onl7 after the p&8aage of .fc;eai:YlS &om the 1n1t1al 
judgment. '!'his gave popular passtona time to oala them&dvee and ultimately 
!'awl ted. in the aafet7 of mat of the aceuaed, Oeftr07, ttUn poll tiqu,e 
1 tall. en, ft P. 969, n. 1. 
508tor1~ ftonmtuu'.t_ P. 359. 
~t, pp. l5-l6. 
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led a truly religious life, ~ln of elVirity" pray-or a'ld ()b8€'J."\lUnCe.~2 Th(~:re 
.,.8 !lnva" 80 much religion Md vil:>t"110 in F.lorenoe as during his lifetime. It 
decrc .. ed 80 signi.tlcantly aft.t.~ his des.th that it became evident that "the 
good of hi. time bad been Cl':'?sted and Sl.letainoo onl;r by' him. "S3 He axplained 
that. it was not O'llt of place to 6p~k at length or hie 19nondn1m.lS death" 
since ~.t "'as ct\mp&ftlt1valy rare in his ~e to see a re1ig1.ollf' in ,~ there 
,'rort1 00 nm:r virtues and so llIlch authorlty.Sh 
In spite of the mnk's trial, excoJl'l'm.Uli.cat,ion and death, ~ did not 
cease to bel1ov(! that he had bean ee1'l.t by Oed. Gtdcciardini did not know 
whf:·thal" to bol1e~ thia himael..f at the time he lfl"Otc b1s ~:tor.t,ft tlorent1ne, 
but he felt certain that t1a:1 'WOUld clear too doubt. 'r~o:«irlly he concluded 
tr.at Sa'vtmarola b£cl been ainceN, a tp'0&t p;ropik¥t and • ve.t.7 peat man. Byen 
~ it proven t}at he had bean a "d!.~ knaV$," the Wepondenee or h1s 
spi:ri t and hie capabill t7 tor deoai 'f'1rJc so 1Atn:y persona tor so mIllV ~ 
alone would load one to adm.1. t that he bad poseessed brteUigG..11Ce, genius and 
an ~rdintU'7 proi\mdiV.$ 
.. , til • 
S'2Qu1cciard1n1'$ l.anauage i8 metapbor1eal.l7 clewrl •••• l1OIl nelle 
cort.ecoie .. nal1a trtedolla del culto d:1'Wino,. 1b1d.. P. 151. 
S)Ib14-, pp. 156-158. 
~001.rd1n1 t 8 deep ~t1on for S8YOM.1"Ola can bast be gleaned :&om 
• ~le of h1a deecdpti ve langu.a.gel ..... neUA etA nost:ra, ne &nOlle • t nostr1 
padr1 ed avolt non v.1ddono ai UDO "11«1" s1 bene 1zlatl'utto d1 molt. virtU 
ne con tanto credito ed autorita quanto At 1n ln1,," stol'1e f1~e, p_ 156. 
SSNote Guicoi6\rd1n1 '. tell1ng statement •. ·10 ne 8OnO\ dubio e non 01 be 
opinicne ri80luta in parte alcuua, .., m1 r.i.8et"VO, ae vivsl'O tanto, al tempo ebe 
oh.tariftl el. tutto. !til bene oonohiuggo questo, ohlt 8e lui tu buono, abb1ano 
't'edu. ~ Of tempt nostJ-! uno gnmde profeta, .e ltl aatUft, uno uomo ~aa1I'1o, 
r>ercbe, oltre ane 1ette!:l Iile aeppe &d mlare at publ.1cament.e tant1 amd. ura 
tanta 00_ ... euere acoperto in UDI. talai ta, b1sopa contea$l.1'e o • 
• "eea1 uno giud1110, uno 1naecno eel U1'»l inver.uI1one pro~, It 11;lsJ,. 
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IRs estimate of savonarola in the storia d tltalia of some ~Ars l~ter 18 
more coldly faotual and, 1n tact, al.nx>et non-eldstmt. Though he vtl"Ote that 
ffnivine authority was made to appea.r in the counsels of menn in the muth of 
this monk, ha spoke mainly of his troubles with the Pope. He did not consider 
Mrs his tdgnifioant oontributions to the 1ntemal peace of Florenco or to 
the :re:fom or men t 8 manner of 11 ving. Though savonarola died 'Wi th constancy, 
one mst remain unable to promume on 1118 innocence or hie guilt.56 The 
affect that the exp~.r1enoas of Guicc1ard1n1'. active ~ bad on his judgmimt 
is apparent in hie poJ"'tra1t of the monk. By the "t;1!;}t!) he lIl'Ote his major 'WOl'k, 
be vas .. re that Cf!B!OCento ltalJr called for more tbIIm the idealism ot a 
Savonarola. 
A realistic political th1.nkor l.ike Ouiceial'din1 found it wluahle to 
compare recent perl.ods of penintlUlar b1story. In the time of the mnfaloniere 
Scder!.n1, whoso republio succeeded the Savonarolan ~e, be expla1ned that 
the city of FloNnC0 sa moh more stable than it was 1n 1527 and tbat the 
affairs of :rta~ 1:00 were more settled and secure. To hia laudatory Qst-i.."'l&te 
ot Soder1ni and hie vlrtuou.e cba:re.cw..net.1.ca, he added the note tllat under 
him none fMnxi the govnrnm.ent of the republic.;7 
Yet Ouico1ard1n1 _s not tNly imprassed w1 th Soderln1. Fie was a good 
01 tisen of good ~ 1tho would probably have done very well in t1m~ ot 
'P~ce, but be was baaically of mod~te calibre. Ouiceiardin1 expressed the 
cencral judgment of the ott1mati on Soderini. Prior to his appointment, there 
nas a weU-recogn1aed need tor governmental reform. '0 come to grips with the 
S~:r1a d'Italta, I, 298. 
57 HOratio annn Ao. ..., JD ft tm.. 227~~ .. 
I' 
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inDed1ate probl(tD, it scOOlOd oost palatahle to all groups to elect a 
,G2Pfillonifi!'l!!, for life, ·~mo would asaut'lO the laadorsbip in a long-l'tlnge plan 
fer reorgmuling and perf'ooting the government. As a cc.q>romis(!l bottveen the 
desll'OO of the ott1mat1 and the populace, the Oran Consiglio, wru;re the elec-
tion was held, chose a Il8n who bad lWEIt courted their favOl". Since Soder.ln1 
had never refused a cODll.i.aeion 01" an EII1lba8ay, he -s toought to be a strong 
SlPporter o~ the popular state. Gu1ce1ardin1 explained that tho people, 
1litnt:~ng hie "ervie_ utilized mre than anyone 9l.so'. and not ooneideri.ng 
that the reason .. that his equals avoided office, thought he wst be more 
ablo than the otherrs. sa 
GuieC"....ardini admi ttod that Soderl.n1's republic ~ provod in one 
Sen$('! beneficial tor norenee, it not pleasing to the ott1,s1:S;- The populace 
dur1.ng this time and the Savonarol.an period preceding it "tasted the sweetn~ 
or pormhr 11 ving.1t The Q¥t~ Co~p had become vcr.y 1n{>o:t"tA'1t to thlml as 
an area all.cming their active pe.rtic1paUon in polities and public administ.m-
tion.>9 By lS'l2 the citilene of nONnCe catilEI to feel their equality and de-
sil:"f~ ftmoro than ev'm.',n a conti.."l'Uation of tbc".d.l* free and popular gove~nt. 
It was difficult for them to adjust to an;r stlparior, let alone the ra1nstated 
VOOic1, "so greatly and enUrP.J.y of absolute will and lord of' ev~h1ng.60 
F.I.orcnce otmt1nuoo. to be beset, however, by bel' usual curse. In 1511, 
$SStot1~ ficrmtine, p. ~. 
~9nOO govemo d1 Flrensc dope la res1:.atlta1otle de' l:ed1oi ncl. 1512, ff 
~seorei. PP. 2$-266. 
60:r01~., pp. 261-262. 
I! 
" 
I 
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approaching the end 01' Soderin1 's r~g1loo, the C1ea1'tleOS amng !'lorr"ntine 
grer:lp$ over the ~ 01.' their 01 ty deepened. Ono group streeaod t.he 
need for a powerf"ul execllti ve and anotl'lor, the importance of a strong popular 
council. Ouiooiardin1 maintained that not onl.y was the mrJ}alo?1;t~!!N "not 
acting his part" but alao there was, Il8 the ott~t?- bad long been suggesting, 
no ~rdained senatorial body. This .. s. requil!d.te fOr the right in-
sti tuUon ot • ~lblic. The most able c1 tisens would be promoted to nm-e 
hono:reble positions wi thin the conmcnweelth. and 'both ~ liOtlld be served 
by this COli:Prom1se.61. 
The .t&ct1on that professed cml.y' the desire tor a ~.edici rotum was ul-
62 tfmtely satis.t1ed. The Medici weN to tmJO)" their ~ as private per-
so."l8 living inoonformtty'ldtb the magistracy_ 63 Holy- Leagae affairs played 
into the hands of the Medici proponents, and the Congress at Mantua in August 
of 1512 dec1did that such a reetoratton would be conducive to tho allied 
success against the Jr~.nch. J."ofmr 'WOUld be taken out ot the bands of 
Soder.1ni, who was entirel1' ~ent on the K1ng of lihmce, and placed in 
lib 
those ot the oonfede:retee. 'I'l1o'ueh the F.1.orentinee did not vdeh to depose 
Soder1rd. they were fbreed to take the Ued1c1 back and to join the ant1-~i'tmch 
league.6S Once Soder1111 bad been deposed, this as;reement _s easily obtained. 
61stol"ia d'Ita~, Ill, 125. 
62lbid. 
-6'~" 224, 228. 
6hlbid., 221. 
65Ct• ibid... 231-23.5. 
" II, 
,', 
181 
This" supposedly' in the security of all ltal.y. 
In the ensu1:ng ref'orm ot' the gt'.)Te~, the nmr ~n1,eJ:! was to be 
elecW by the Grall Oo!,¥,iS!!o not 1br life 'but for a t~ and to hold otfice 
tor foUrteen months. Jacopo Ouicei&rd1ni 1nf'~ his son of these changes 
in Florence.66 Glavan Battista Rtdoltl, :related to the ldedic1, l'88 c.l-tosen &8 
,opraloR1~. Jacopo ciaracteriaed him, aceonH.ng to t.l'w g~Uy ~1l1ng 
santimmt at the beg1m1ng of Sept~ lSl2, as a man who had "a good and 
civic mind." At the ~ of Me ~rt to Francesco, things WrG still 1n a 
etate of flus. fho-J.gb the future of' the city app~ ob~. it .. IInot 
without some ray or hope lor the popular l"ElPublic ... 67 
A e1gn:1n.oant mmber rallied to the Medici f07 selt-:tnteroet but then 
took courage and retilm$d to at least maasured action in :f'a'f'Or of pre8erving 
the republic. !boT observed the oontinu1ng existence of the eonei~ and 
little change 1n the form ot the governmtmt, thottgh it was 1"~rted that a 
mov~ 8" 'W1derwa:r to create a e~lon1ere tor a tbr>ElG-yea1" period w1 th 
'fe17 llmlted authorit7.66 
66Ouioc1&rdin1 bad conplained of' his lack of !llm1Uianty with Florentine 
events since hi. Spanisb 1"osidenea. "~, poi che 10 pa~ d1 ~rmseL;:se 
e imo_tosi ~ tatto el mondo, talmente c~ 10 non m1 potova ab'ba.t " .. a 
esa~ 1\1or.t in t.eqpo cbe 10 avess1 a aTet" pitt wglla d1 sap~re delle coee d1 
costa .... ft He pointad to the little concern or the meiatratee and hie own 
Mends in commnrdcating with h1m. " ... 8e non .fUsaino gll am.ai ito avuti ... da 
quoott nost:r1 morcantl, a cbi 110 a andare dr1eto per _~re delle move d1 
J\~e, ne eap:Nd meno ahc d1 queUe della IndiA, ft Lctt;;;r to hie brother 
luigi, JtlJlC 27..Jul7 1, l5l3, ~,I, 188-189. 
61Lctter of Jaoopo to Fi'anc0SCO 0u1cc1ard.1n1, September ~, lSl2, t~4., 
97. 
~d 
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Only at the beginning of their restora.tion did the Medici allow repub-
lican vestiges of government to operate. Nor did Ridolfi persevere in the 
f'lrmneaa and rigor that had characterized his policy at the very beginning ot 
69 his term. In mid-September all popular F.l.orentine liberties were abolished. 
Not only did the :Medici dissolve Florence's military organization but also 
the ~ ConsiSlio. Soderini was banished. Ridolfi reportedly desired to 
/ 
"stay no more than two mnths," but he was forced to resign. The cou2 dtetat 
was quick but fart-rea.ching in its etfects, for Florp.llee reverted to the strong 
control of the earlier Medici rulers. A.ffairs were ultimately managed by the 
Cardinal de t Medici.70 
/ The enemies of the new regime loomed powerful.ly" for they realized that 
they would now have nothing to say. Between 1494 and 1512, a segment had be-
come implacable opponents of the Medici who awaited the ~rtun1 ty to do all 
they could against their state. others in Florence were natural enemies who 
felt their lack ot any participation in the state and teared that, not of the 
Medici circle, they would miss out on the honors that would be distributed. 71 
This discontent was concentrated in !2. universale of the City, but the roomed 
classes and the merchants too feared that they 'WOUld be subject to heavy tax-
ation and dictation in their business affairs. 72 
Under Giuliano de' Medici, :ftunil;y policies crystallized in practical 
69Jacopo Nardi, Istaria della cit~ .9! Firenze (firenze, 1858), II, 2-6. 
7Oct. Ridolfi, Machiavelli, p. 130. 
71 
"Del governo di Firenze," p. 263. 
72Ibid., pp. 263-261c.. 
-
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action. At bis death in l514, he was succeeded by Lorenzo, the Duke of 
Urbino, in power at the time of Guiooiardini's return from Spain. His obSel"-
vations on the Medioi tyrant are interesting, both for the light whioh they 
east on the character of Medioi rule and for that vlhich helps to illuminate 
him. 
1':nen Guicoiardini €'ntered the city, he was reoeived by Iorenzo, whom he 
had never seen, with great honor and denr>nstrations of oonf'1denoe. 
Ouiooiardini explained with satisfaction that this aotion, together with later 
favors, indioated his entrance into the intimi. Ria later imaginary critic 
pointed to these favors as evidence that Lorenzo found in Guicciard1n1 "a 
friend useful to the tyranny." Every tyrant looks to that whioh is desirable 
for his greatness. Perhaps Ouiooiardini fS ontic was correct in his judgment. 
He knew that bis association with Loren&o would give him. riputazione. But 
Franoesco explained. that he gravitated into the MOOici cirele so a.s "not to 
lack a way of being employed. n 73 
At this point in Guicciardini' s career, he seems already to have en-
oountered his major personal diler.llla. Should one's political affiliation be 
based upon devotion to fundamental political prinoiples and beJ.iefs or should 
he aot opportunistically to secure riputazione? His fmoou2t "~~g<?~~ 5!! 
Logrono," Which considers a plan of political reform to effect. in the city a 
government bene ordinato, 'WOUld suggest the tint alternative. 74 
--.. 
73nOrat1o aoeusatoria," pp. 216-217) in this work, Oliociardini invented 
an aocuser who found fault v.'1th the aotions of his oa.reer. Cf. also 
"Rioordanze, n p. 7$. 
74.rhis work is also anti tled "Del roodo di ordinare 11 governo popolare," 
Disoorsi, pp. 218-2$9. It _8 begun during Guiociardini fS residence in Spain. 
I 
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The ?Oli tical tha.Jght or Guioeiardini rested on ;. sound cxp'~rimt1al 
\ 
falmdation. ";' grande errore parlare delle cose del r.nondo, indistint.aull.<mte 
\ 
ad asoolut.amente, e per dire cos1, per regola," are his strong and significant 
1fOr&s. 1S & likEm'18e wrote that political science 18 leaml'lld not "in su. lib 
da' t.llc8ofl, - con ]a ~2er:J.anJ!:. e con l.! uiani, ehe • U nedo Yero dello 
,,76 imrAlrare. 
Ouicoiardini then did not stress abstract notions regarding the natu:r-e 
and origin of the state but always comddercd a concrete and actual fom of 
govornment. He affirmed that aU raonarchies bad a ciolent. origin,77 but 
:neutralised. hie position by the statement that Re t1loscfi voellono, ct 1& 
" raglone natura.le 10 eonte.rma, ahe!l wro"D19 ~ HJ'lO ~ .! ouonojl S!. 
rqigl1or,g Sl tutti.- The "good government" of which Ouicc1ard1ni spoke was 
that which operated for the welfare of the govo!ned and not for the honor or 
utili t,. of the govemor.78 'l'h$ p1"'1Doe was not ftpadt'one me esattore e d1epen-
satore a benef"lc1o d1 molt!. ft 79 No person 'WOilld havo placed h1.m8elf in a 
cond1 tion of seJiVi tude 1d thOut reason, as would neoeasarily have been the case 
7SR:t~rd1J II, 6. 
7601 ted. in Palmal"OOOhi, p. 9. 
11R1cord1• I, $S, II, 48. cr. also ~ P. 1631 " ... butt! gll &tau, 
ahe bene CO'iiildel'B 14 101"0 Orl~!, sono oen, e &&Ua republ1che in 
fuora, nella lore patri.a e non oltre, non 01 e potesta alcuna che 8~ 
legitti_, e meno queUa dello 1mpi:1ratore che e in tsnta autorlta che dA 
ragionc agli altriJ ne" da qttfl'..sta l"'egOla ecc@ttuo e pret1, la Viole-mia de' 
qual1 e dopp!a, percM a tenerc1 $Otto U80nQ le anne sp1r1.tuale 0 10 temporall 
7~, P. hI. Pmpbas1s added. 
79n,id _. 
il 
1'1' 
I' 
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if the princely ofrioe had been founded silllPly for the glory of its 
80 OCO(Jpant. 
Quice1a:d1n! 's concept of' tho violent origin of monarohics '1IS..S not in-
conpatihle with hla view on the rightful rol.o of a prince. lior is his praise 
for a rulf!r who p!lnJUes m6asures for the general. welfaN of' his p('~le opposed 
/ to his preference for a republican r9g1me and the fie!!l"nO 1!I£t9. 
In spite of the violent origin of monarchies, there could be legitimate 
onoe. ~en a U8Ul"P1ng monarcb was boun:i to obsc:r'V'o the l"!11c8 of justice. 01 
Ouioeiardini 'a objective criterion for k:naw1ng which gO'l7C:rnfMnts were good or 
bad stf~lIled .f'rom their orrecta. O:rd1.narlly, a violentlY e'dl eovEll"l'J.!OOnt oould 
only act w.l.ckedl;y.82 Nor could a goTomment be considered good if it justi-
fioo a war ot ambition to increase ita dominion. K1ll.1nes, rapes, burnings 
and other 1nt'1n1.te evils were all aspects ot war. On the other hand, it 
8.3 
could justJ.:r have such a war in defense of its lands. 
i • 
BOoutcc1ardbli "TOte that princes did not originate "per raro beneficio 
a 1oro, Pm"CbG nessuno at eara'hbe f:lOSSO in semtU gmtis," !!t.OO,rdi, I, 92. 
Blou1cc1al'd1n1 concluded "ehe so f't1881 po"1bi~ dare uno governo 
usurpato eOO 81 tenesoi con quel11 JlJ)d1 p1aoevol1 e buord cbe ai PU6 tenere 
uno govemo amoravolc, ehe quetrta sola ragione d1 eesere usurpato non 10 
farebbe peggiore ehe quell' altro," ~. P. lh. 
82"10 credo ebe Ii oognoseere quale spezie d1 governo 81& pin buena 0 llIIIln-
co buona, non si consider!. in sustanzia altro ohe gli eff"ott:t, echo uno 
govemo viol.ento soglia essere gludicato catt1vo, perche onttna.r1amonte suole 
producere ~ftetti cattiv1," ibid. Ct. also "del modo di USria'.l!'Sro lo stato," 
P. 281, whm-n Qu.1cciardinl oauilons the lkdici to exeroie~ a good :rul.e, for 
v;ieknd go'Vammente cannot dre&m of br.!.ng:tng forth good effects. 
83n,i!l-$0, PP. 162-163. 
nt11~ and la_ have but 01'10 purpose, the gen~1'1U good of tho c1t1zenr:r. 
TbA gems of the empirical division betwe~Xl praotioal life and the religio-
zaoral spbere are eYidmt in Ouiceiardini *8 thought. '!'be end of the collective 
organism of the state and its Vf!ry mlson df~re was conceived of s1mpl3' as to 
asStlrfJ aU c:ttitsene the ~e exercise of their civ.tl r.tghts and to work for 
the oommon good. 1','1se legislatom consider reward fbr good action as a 
stirlllus end punisbmfmt fb1" bad action 88 a brldl..0 tor any S',loh f\Jture acta, 8h 
and laws are made only ftper rlmova:re la forM" or to cu.rb individual ego1em.8S 
Ou1cciardin1 fS ~bas1s on the qualitiefJ necessary for a prince,86 on the 
ideal ci t1.en~7 and on l1bert;y°8 in one sense linked themselves 1!d. th the 1m-
mtablc doctP.ln08 of Ch:ristian lOOral1 ty and in another 14th the peli tiCG-ClOral 
climate ot Renaissance lta17. ms worda on the violent origins ot one-nan 
rule corrt""spontiod greatly to the ~enturies old situation in Italy, the 
o:rt~n usurped s1gnol"1e, suworted in power by the ps.n;dp,tt!eJi. Uts apparE".M 
justification of usurpat10n if the wmrper renders just1ce to those in his 
charge would seem: to indicate that Guicciard1n1, in one respect, tlttOO into 
the prevalmt a~here ot his period in recognising the r.tta!i9! !po, while, 
.... . 
a~cord;t" I, 3. 
8S"Se 818 lee1 to oonduJ'T'O 01 populo alla buone 10ggo eon 18 forM non 
potendo tand alt~mt1," sc,rl:t~ PJallt1#. p. 229. 
86ct. R1cordi, I, 92. 
81 C:t. 1n1"M" P. 
asCf• in~,1 p. 
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in anotbnr, he stood above it by refu81ng to give .Y' in absoluto principles 
of right action. 
Guice1ardini Ml.d that all ideal vimns are rell.rti'¥e in vi<M' of the sta~ 
9llS. or ~allty. Although he preforred a republican form of COVel'T.lmOnt, he did 
not 800m one-man rule 1n the proper si ttlation. Like Montesqu1m" he felt 
that the mode of gove1"'nl!'lent met val"!! aeoo't'ding to the gmrGmoo. n 11 
/ 8Q 
migliore govemo ebe B1 po .. mettere in una c1tta sia el suo natuna.le." ,; 
For F.loretlCe, "el suo nature.lo" consisted. in the crtab111zation of th.1.-ee 
pillars of F.lorent1ne go~t, the Gran CPl!F:aAAo. a ~n1fi£q tor a 
lengthy or lite term, and an IlSS.,:q of wise cd tiaens tor grave lX1blic 
deliberations, which would consider the needs of both the conservative pr0p-
ertied group and the popol.l.no. 90 
From ita "Vf:!fl.7' orig1ne to Ouiceiardin1's own period, the 11o:rentine COJ)lo 
stitut1on, thougb adaptocS to popular CM.."lgeEl, tad rEmained substantially the 
same. There 'dIU an executive, whether consul, prior or Enfaloniore .... and a 
senate and parl.iallmta17 bodT.91 Guicciardini considered the 4evel.opmant and 
application of the principles both of Uberty and of state tmtborityand also 
roceived some stimlating ideas :rrom the V~net1an oonstitution.92 The sig-
89ntaloE' P. 18. 
90nIl (JOVa1"l'1O popolarc, tt P. 228. In the discourse, Ouiocia~.ni dis-
C'J.SSOO eacb "pillar» in detail. 
9lAmedeo CriveU.uco1, Del ~rno~OOlare di F1~.me (lhjh-~) e del 
duo r1ord1namM~.. secondo !1 ~t:eCli ~ ~A:_;1.arl), p. 30. - -
92 Ib1d.,p.312. 
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rdf10ant increase of senatorial pow~r in his new plan~ did. not appear to have 
altered his basic concept of the e~r.no m1sto. 93 
Ouieciardini indicated hie balle! in the wisdom of t-he cours(~ alNady 
follovmd u-p to the t1r4~ of his lof'..rono discourse. namely, the removal from the 
gons1S110 of' all who had not participated in the gov~t prior to 
Savonarola's r(~ro1'WJ. Tbe..'1 it would not include so man,. ordiMr"J' oitizens. 
Although a part of the cou.!JCil oome to include "alcun1 paaai, molti ignoranti 
emit! mligni," the exteM10n or the eutf.rage was not ~"hony displ!~ing to 
Onieoiardini. It was in tact this very situation tInt kept Flormoe tree 
from 00l.ing under the heel of a ~t. 9b 
ULe cons~tive bent together'lrdth 111s strong Gmpha$is on Uberty led 
Oulooiard1ni to adweate a t)tpe of modm'Gte traditional d~J'. The 
political and social atl¥>J1gth of' the VU'1ou8 ~el"8 of too lta.l1e bod;r, for 
all tMir separateness, was essootial. to prevent their subjugation byarw 
foreign pc:mer. He ws pa.rticu.14rly concem~ over the tate of his I!!trJ.fl. He 
linked the fate of Florence ill g'!"eQt measure to the presence of t'bre1gn 
• t .. , p q 
93A echolarly dispute has developed around the actual meaning of the 
proposoo reform. Crivelluoe! naintains that the increase of senatorial povmr 
was insufficient to change the f:!!$sential nature or the popular government and 
to convArl. it into a plain oligarchy or an aristocracy. Ratlvlr, Cuiceiardird 
'WaS concerned with "cheold.ng and bal.anc1ng" the autmr'i ty of f&oh rn~ of 
the republic and, thereforto), w.tth ~J.arantoei.ng llbertyand strengthening the 
popular regime, pp. 209" 323. In opposition to W$ T.Lew, tht.t Guieeiardini's 
plan was s1mp~ a return to the ~ mm or antiquity is th1lt mteh ~ 
plains that Ouiee1ardim, by eoneentraUng so Bleh power in the sem~, was 
t'.stabl1ahing only all "aristocratic tyra-wy, ff BmoS-st, pp. 1.t)S-156. 
9U..I1 govemopopohre," pp. 228-..."'29. 
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cause for desperation. tor li1orentintl! ills could 'be cured. In l5l2 the task 
soMned difficult to C';uieeiard1n1 but not impoasible.9S 
The UMS of his project of refom which we1"& not strictly political 
srn:'J!1ed rather u.topian. They evidenced noetalg:1c longing tor a reblm to the 
n01"(fl1CC wltLch had existed under the ftrst Coeimo det M«tioi. Thero was a 
need for restoring the old ~ and customs. l!oderation in dress and the 
abandonment 'Of the prevalent ltl%tl!'3' in Florence llOUld ~ the ObV1ous 
difference between rich and poor and the lesser c1t1lenG 'm'JUld not bUlger for 
wealth. rior would the 01 ty bocoJOO impovcrtebed by the emdus of TlDnE'W in 
payment tor ao ma:n.y imports. The dcwr.Y should be reduced to ~ble SUlIIlI 
for the maintenance of.' equality among parente and for the bene-tit of the 
virtuous ~t POOl" men tor wh>m it.. necessary to marry oft their daugh-
ters. 96 Lack 'Of thrlN.nea and the 6'I1statlCG of soc1a1 and eoonomlc ~ 
ages affected the vsl'7 boalth of tho Plorentine oo1l'.lllOrmealth. FOr all their 
~haais on the rightful reoroer.tne of th& city's ~, t.ho majorlty of 
Ou:ieeiardini • s D1acond aro actual socio-poll tical treatises. 
I 
In spite of the ~ct intemal div18iona 1%'1 Florence, he explained, 
she bas long stood in JJ..berty lime!' fa popular gove~ with the Y2eri'Wl} and 
ft, U 1 
~Ou1ce1ard1ni wrote. "Questa l'8gione m1 famo malo sperare di noi, _ 
non deepe!"aJie, p.!rche 10 cred~ coo Be De pot-ssm sanare una gran parte e 
ahe ee bane la eura e ttolto d1ft101le, non s1a pere U:poae1blB," l~d.., p. 219. 
~d. ct. also "Del mdo di au1curare 10 stato,·t p. 281, ,~re 
C'ft.lioc1a n1 E",xpla1n$ that, in the matter of men·s and women's draas, the city 
ms "so weh run above i te f'oroes t..,..t thia could o.nl.y have a 'Very bad 
effect in ~bl1c and in prlwte," p. 281. 
I i 
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leadorship of tuscany. In the affairs of Italy, she alvmys has had a sig-
n:i . .fica.nt ~.rtat1on. In add:\. tion to favorable g~bical poei tion, this 
/ 
supremacy Yl&S due to the virtu of the citizens thoo.lse1ves. Florentine mm 
al-ys worked 1ndustnoualy and, by thrtft, achieved a good condition of life. 
not all the ra~ble aspects of Florentine lite could 'be attr1.but:x\ to $1mple 
_ 97 
fOn>une. 
To mep the F.lorentine 01 tizenl7 content, it wae necee8a~J to hoed three 
sProifie though lnte1"'rcl.atc-l(i aroas of civil Ufe, namely,fiscal politics, 
justice in the civU order, and freedom .t':rom the opp~sion of the weaker 
and lese powerfhl cituens by too g~t('>....r and IOON poWP3M. Hie various 
D}.sc9l!l1 also $0110 these tMmee in the inte!'f!sts of a solidly-baeed conmtOn-
Wt'?&ltb. 
/ ~;bn~ is f\mdamental .for a cOO1tUne 'a interest. In order to ha'V"e "piu 
rS..putA'&.d.one ~r tu:tta ltalla," strict attention mat be paid to money matters. 
"''here it 18 laoldng, expenses mat be met b.Y ta:l:ation of the citizens. Men 
mst be made to understand clear~ tlvlt they OWl do business and reap gain yet 
not be atructed by t&at1on. l-Toi"1 ts met be distributed usefUlly and well. 
In c~:nal cases there could 00 ~t.er la.rshes¥t but, in civil cas_, 
justice should be firm and st.rict. with sGCUrity for Wt!l"':I POftJOn. Througb 
favors and do£erence to wealth, e1vil matteftJ should not. be dra'Ml fr'om ordin-
ary tribunals into extraord:i.nal'7 ones like the Signoria. C~ums pt;rt'1d1ng ooi'bre 
/ 
tho pod.~ and the ~ntant1!-", wE~re the prl.nc1pal judg<2tB of too city hold 
COtlrt, should be ~-ed to run tru"ir 00l.u:'8e. 
,I 
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state tlfeed on something," they will not be its partisans or \7arnl to its 
benefioio. 98 But gra.t't oould only make enanies not only of those vmc stood 
oppressed but also of those who witnessed suoh serious dishonesty. 99 
Guicciardini's treatises on the su1'frage and t-aDtion give the views of 
the conservative group and of the P.2P2lani. In both, Guicciardini utilized 
his cautious method 01' balance between thesis and antithesis, namely, the 
moderate-conservati va thesis and the eloquent RgpOlano anti thesis. This 
peculiar treatment gave evidence of the ferment long brewing in the city. Re-
garding the method 01' electing officials 1'or the Gran Consiglio, the thesis 
advocated no enlargement of partiCipation in the council. Each citizen was to 
stand equally- under the laws with no distinction between rich and poor, be-
VNeen the powertul and the less powerful. El.oh was to have the assurance 
that his person and his property would be secure under the laws and ordinances 
100 
of the city-. 
This moderate conservative notion of liberty did not satisfy the 
popolani. This group held that law8 for the defense of property would per-
petuate economic inequality-. They also suspected the conservative argument I, 
that liberty, besides providing equality under the laws, wt>uld guarantee pub-
lic goods and honors to all. In such a syst_, each person would partiCipate 
98'1'he saying is "se e t cittadini delle state non si pascono di qualche 
0000, non saranno partlgiani e caldi a bene.ficio del10 S~'lto •••• ff "Del modo 
di assiourare 10 stato," p. 279. 
99Ibid., pp. 276-279, 281. 
l00UDel. modo di eleggere gli u1':f1ci nel Consiglio grande, n Diseorsi, pp. 
175-176. 
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as 1.71Uoh as possible and reap as much as he could frultihlly handle. The 
~clano spoaker fms suspiciOUS of 'hhe conservative qualifioation that e»-
-
t~.sion of the right of partiCipation in oolll!lU'l4l attain should not bring 
disorder or any harm to the public good.lOl 
According to the .P!m2~n.i., sup~r.tor1t,. or the dominant class 'l"lnS not 
/ 
founded "in anlle virtu, in sn t meriti, in Bulla pJUdanzla, me. in cose eli 
fOrtuna. d1 favor! e di guadagni IUd ti. ,,102 '!'heae 01 tis ens Rnted t.ruly' 
f.'ree laws making them equal to the great. The grouP's ~ 11'1 
Gllieeiardinits discourse cergatietall;r concluded with a threat to the powerful' 
ltg sa da wi m.ad~ rlf1utate el cOl'l1llOdo wstro, ~rete aansa 
tutti quasti beni, ~te .em, veramMte dapoch1, ad alla tino 
cognoseerete cbe oostoro 'Vi banno date ad Intendere di. avel"'Vi se1"i tto 
per compe.gn1 in su' llbri d1 questa bott0ga, ma che in f'atto eiate 
garzord, e OM al ealda~de' conti a vol ~/la fatica, e 101'0 
saranno tutti gl1 utili.1G) 
Florentine history could not be undorstood -without aout.e Observutlon of 
its subatl"8tum or clase struggle. The evil effects of the social division 
'Would hinder any atter!pts to stab1llse the government. In economic mttere. 
a sorcpoint betw'eM the conservatives and the R2D9l.an1 consisted in the 
doe:tma sc.alata.lOh ll&re Ouicciardini made clear the popular vieT! i.n bitS the-
sis and that of the rigid conservatives in bis antithesis though thtdr posi-
10Lrnese arguments are given in dataU in !..~a., pp. 11(3.16$, and are re-
fhtfd in "Del l1'lOdo d1 elagg~re gli uffioil in contrarlo," ibid., pp. 186-19$. 
lO2Ib1¢ •• p. 191 
l03Ibid., p. 19S. 
1~8 1'I&S the progress! va tax levied at the time of' the l~ ":art 
"La. decima scalata," P. 196. 
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ti<m l'mS elcakoo in a democratic guise. 
'The popolani argued that the decima soala~, which had not yet paseod the 
council" 'WaS just and that a lim! tation of valuable property would 'be of 
grf:'!l!lt monetary benef1t to tho City. Besides, those who lived by the retum 
of' their great poss.slone were usoless and pem:1cious to the general 1'1Gl.fare 
of the 01 ty.10!) l!erchants alone the speaker excepted, ror thase were dUigent 
and industrious members of F.!.orontine society. They desired thoir city to be 
quiot and the world to be at peace. They made palaces, CWrcMs, fabrics and 
all things to give honor to the of ty, and they lent lDOniV' to the oonmma. 
'2h11e they had ties with the -whole world," they remembered to give to the 
Florentine poor. Ttl. taught the sons of the popolani, to 'WOrk in the shops 01" 
other establlshments and, in ganem, demonstrated their usef\ll.ness to the 
106 public and private good or P1orence. 
The ooneervati ve spokesmn observed that the type of equall ty prevalent 
in Florence ftS founded on true liberty which did not mean licence. He .... 
plained that CfOd o:reated diverse eNdes ot men and things tor the na1ntenance 
of universal health.l.07 No citizen oould oppress another for all were equal 
lOSIbid., PP. 196-2Oh. Note Ouiccial"d1n1 's words as expressed l>J' the ~w. 'eadera ..... t~rreUl abe·1& oi tta non ba e' pin ed Of pin 
pem1S1oa1 cittad1n1, ebe qt1f:1t..st1 che v1vono in aulle entrete grosse delle 
posse$81one. ... Costom sono co:nuttorl diUe Citta .... " i~d., P. 201 
l.06;bid., w. 20h-206. 
lO7t~te OU1cc1ardin1 'e important worde' nPa~ b1aogM ahe in uno v.tv~re 
l1hero s1a amata e .favorite 14 equalita moderatamente, e non quolla aha levi 
Via at gradi e 10 dist1nsione dc' c1ttadin1, percha'Die ha fatto in tutto el. 
l'Ir;)ndo divend. at grad! dey,li uom1ni e delle cose, ed e state distinto, con 
10 legbo eli tutto al mondo, e1 tuo dal mlo, perche con e. necessaria a ...olero 
llantenere la salute umvereale,ft ibid., p. 209, of. also P. 210. 
I, 
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under the laws and in the council the vote of one was worth the value of 
another.10B The function of liberty was to serve as fIla ministra della iustizi~n 
and not always to be an equalizing agent.109 Were the Florentines equal in all 
things, even the magistracy would be open to the capable as well as the in-
capable and the city would be reduced to chaos.110 This conservative egotism 
held that the very stability of the patria was at issue in considerations on 
I 
the class structure, for "Ie liberta non !urona introdotto per a1tro, se non 
percht ognuno posss sicuramente godere e1 suo. "ill Further, it would be 
impossible to persecute these pillars of stability While simu1~neously 
proteoting the merchants, for they would lose the important patronage of the 
112 
wealthy. 
To the oonservatives, the ftoEQlani were "rash and licentious men with new 
and exorbitant proposals". Any inauguration of their plan in the realm of 
praoticAl action would open the way to the subversion of the old and aooustomed 
way of living.11J The decima scalata would bring nothing but terror to those 
nobles who hope to be able f~vere siouro alIa ombra di questo governo e 
,/ 114 
conservare 1e sue rioohezze e qualita." 
10B''La deeima sealata: in oontrario," pp. 208-209. The most signifioant 
words here are: "Io oonfesso ohe la ~9.ualita e buona in una republica" anzi e 
necessaria, perche e il fondamento della liberta; ma 1a e~a1ita che S1 ricerca 
consiste in questa} che nessuno cittadino lossa opprimerel.'aliro, ehe ognuno si 
equalmente sottopostc alIa le~(l ed a' mag st:rati e che Is fava C!.t OgmllJO che 
e sbile a questo ConSigliO! aDbia tanta su orits i.una guanto l'a1trs; Cosi si 
intende Is equftl~ta nel1e ibertat e non g~neralmente4one ognuno sia peri in 
ogni cesa •••• , ~., p. 208. C. also r.1a1ogo, p. 2. 
l09aicordi, I, 143. 
110''1a deoima sca1ata, IT p. 210. Cf. also pp. 214-216. 
11lIbid., pp. 209-210. 
l12Ibid., p. 214. 
-
ll3Ibid., pp. 207-208. 
-
1l4Ibld., p. 216. 
-
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Guicciard1ni carefully expouncied the extremes of both eroups in his 
treatise, but his own position, linked with his concept of communal good, seems 
qui te clear. Theoret! cally, he stood with the people, for their human logic 
was ditficul t to oppose. Yet, as can til.' gleaned from the tone of the anti then ~ 
on the matter of the decima soalata, the conservative in him and the borghesets 
treai tional realism, led him to rear the subversion or order in steps toward 
the concretization of the egalitarian ideal. An ottimati ad.herent could hold 
no ether p>si Uon. The words which Guicc1erdini put into the mouth of the con-
servative w1thotlt doubt expressed his own eentimenta: 
La prima COd a cbe ha pensare chi ordina gl.1 stat! e le republiche, e 
disporrs Ie cos. in modo che ognuno abbia nel grado suo a contentarsl 
rag1onevolmente, e che non ala date a nessuno cause giusta. 0 Mce.slta di 
desiderare coss nuova; perehe 18 oi tta e uru.' corpo di tutti e c1 ttad:l.ni .. e 
quando uno membro e male condi zionato, non puo el resto del corpo stare 
bene, ne si chisma liberta, quando una parte della citta e oppressata e 
male trattata dagli, altrl, ne e questo el fine a clle,turono trovata le 
liherta, che iu che 0f:~nuno s10uramente potessi oonaervare il grltQo suo J 
ansi e una tirannide lieemioa., 0 una liconsia t1ranniea, la quale non 801 ~ 
e iniqua mentre che dura, ma per le discordie e per e' mali e.ffetti ~h~ ne 
nascono, dura poco, perche dove una parte e male contenta nascono le 
ciivisione, e dove sono le divisione non puo e5sere 1s stal1llta. anai, c~ 
dice e1 Vangelo, bisogna ahe e1 regno in se Oiviso vadia in desolazlone.1l, 
Ouicciardini observed that theee lund.ental concepte ~re operative in 
times orma! tramontanti, the ~riod of Lorenzo and of Italian equilibrium. 
1 £:; 
He fully realized tJlat tll~ grandezza dell' uno tempo all 'altro non e comparabll '" 
but his backward look enabled him to maintain a kernel of optimism 8'a'en in his 
most pessimistic momenta. Be strongly' intimated his admiration for the great-
nee of the House of Medici and especially for Lorenzo, since there he 
found the oi vic ,tranquil! ty requisi to for a state of true excellence. 
He construct! vely advanced the poasibil! ty of defending the existence 
-
U5I bid •• p. 211. 
-
116"Del governo d1 Firenze," p. 262. 
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and independence of his city cs he addressed himool.f to polltical probl_ 
and socio-econom1c problans erect..Ed on a poll tical base.1l7 
O"J.ieciard1n1's devotion to Iorenso was based to a great extf'.nt on the 
order in Florence, fostered by hie f1rm yet indirect control of imoortant 
_tters.U8 StUl there remained sufficient room for F.1ol"entine initiative 
to operate. U9 A bal.ance between authoritative rule and rz.eedom for individ-
ual action constituted Ouicciardini's ideal. 
I'ith the Medici restoration, OUicciardini ~1ated the manner ot 
stabil1sing their rule for the bene1'1 t of Flcrenoe. The situation in 1512 _. 
not what it bad been in lb3h when their house f1ret came to power. ThEm the 
various factions fought until a supel"'iol' leader arose onl1' to be dieplacGd in 
a short while by the ~ or another group. Ci ttsens of mediocre worth found 
this deplorable situation profitable. for concessions gi"m for sup-001"t enable! 
the to improve their status in the city_ 
This situation did not al.low even the mre perceptive citizens to realise 
the power ot the Medici. The state which came into their hands in 1434 did 
not seem to have been taken £);tom Ifal popela, .. a uno 1IlOf;Jsar Rinaldo dag11 
Albla1, a uno JIle88eJ- Palla StrozSli ed a altr1 simUi particular1." P\.lrt.biel'-
mora, at the beg1ming, the 'Medici ~ not abcJolute paQrnn1. but their power 
graduall.7 increased until it reached its height in LoreMo.120 
.' '.1 
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Arter the restoration of 1512, Modie1 supporters comprised t".'110 groups. 
One, not "1nte:ramante pazzi," 1l8S forced to stake 6v'erytbing .nth t.he .Medici, 
for their mambe", would be odious and Ul'm'elcome in an.r stato. They were gen-
e:rally content nth their' lot. The second group, whose mEtnbers were moetly 
noble men who bad fbmtioned importantly- in the popular state, also room it 
neceeS4l7 to woric nth the Med'1c1. Their new status in the ~IOY of the 
Medici rnlera mad. thaa fear !\lriher change by aJ:l7 ag1 tated grou.p of ci Uzena. 
All Mendl;y to the past I'Ill1ng r~ 'WOUld undoubtedly tJUtff!Jl!' great perll.l2l 
FOr these personal reasons, thq zmstered all their tore_ tor the state's 
conservation.122 Thaee ',f)artisBna would not have to tear Uec!lc1 jeelousy, 
though the :rolers ware SO strong tb.9.t the.r could ruin even a power1Ul ci t1zen 
at the f1Nt sign of danger.12) 
Although the Y«J1ci state in 1512 was a tar cry from Ouicciard1n1's state 
under otUma,t1 control, he consider.red how "questa berea" might sum. VEl the 
mugh _ters of 8'll8P1cion and an1mosi 1i7. The Nlara would find :t t necessa17 
to deo1de prudently em whose alleg1al1Ce they desired above all others. The 
support of 10 untyersale would require the distribution of honors with as moh 
l2lA.rter the t11"st expulsion ot the Medici in 1491::, their M.ende, who 
"el fiore della c1ttA," were all.owed to remain and to participate with others 
in the gove:mment a~..r Olll¥ .. fmr l'lI)nths. Such would not be the case if the 
Medici ~ to be expelled again, "Del modo d1 a881curare 10 state," P. 215. 
122nDe1 go'V9Jl'flO di Fireaae," P. 262. 
123"Dal modo di assicura.re 10 stato," p. 216. 
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equality as possible with attention to the security of the lesser oitizens 
frOm the greater. Guiooiardini found the alternate OOll.ree the wisest. A. wise 
ruler vrould restriot his favors to a select group of partisaDS on whom he 
would confer all honors and bene.f1 ts. 124 These adherents WOllld plaoe them-
selves in every danger to maintain the power and wealth they had received f'rom 
the new re'gime and to avoid exile.12' 
/ Just as the regime t s partisans stood also to lose by the ruler f s loss of 
power, the Cinquecento state had to choose its supporters and to increase 
their benefits lest it:ftlll. Already' in 1$l2 Guicci.e.rdini realized that 
I , 
Nessuna. amiciJia oggidi si mi.sura se non quanto e aocoopagnata 126 
dal.la util1ta, e dove non 6 questa non si puo avere nessuna fede. 
So strong "ftOtlld this partisan support be that it 1'IOuld have respect for 
nothing in order to maintain its power.127 In his own period Guicciardini 
found no other method of securing princely rule. Enemies remained powerful 
and Mends few and unwilling to risk their safety by courageous action.U8 
Men were led by their own particular interest, lila maastra cbe ne mena tutti 
124"Del govemo di !i1ranze, tt p. 26$. 
12'lbid., p. 266. Cf. "Del. modo d1 assicurare 10 stato," pp. 27>-216, 
where GuicCIardini points out that these partisans DUst be "discreetly managecU 
126lbid• 
-
127lbid. Not only did the tear of change extend. to loss of honors but 
also to 'ifl'Ertaculta' e la vita, e pero sarebbe forze cbe non aves sino riepetto 
a nulla per mantenerli. tt 
128xbid. 
-
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129 gli uomini." Cinquecento Florence was unlike the ancient periods of Greece 
and Rome" when magnanimous sentiments could be found. Guicciardini wondered if 
any Florentine, if he perceived gain himself" would not turn completely to a 
/ ' 
new regime: 
/ Non sono piu e tempi antichi de' romani e de' greci, ne' quegli ingeuni 
generosi e tutti/" aspiranti aUa gloria I nessuno ~ a Firenze che ami 
tanto la liberta ed e1 reggimento populare che" se gli e dato in uno , 
altro vivere piu parte e migliore &saere che ~joPensa di avere in 
quello" non Vi si vol ti con tutto 10 animo •••• 
By 1516, the Mediei were not able to consolidate the Florentine state, 
though in 1513 great hopes for a return to better times had been prevalent. 
The election of Giovanni de t Medici as Fope Leo X seemed a '*miraculous 
occurrenee" for the city under Medici domination. Neither his power nor his 
youth could compensate for the continuing presence of discontented Medici 
/ 
friends and of a generally jealous and suspicious populace. The Medici regime 
still had no truly powerful partisans.l .31 Four years after his original 
discourse on the Medici restoration, Guicciardini was still advocating a method 
for strengthening their rule. 
Leo X's personal greatness obscured the weak foundation of the Medici 
/ 
regime, a dangerous thing for its seeurity. 
l29t1Del moch di assicurare 10 state,," p. 274. 
l30Ibid• 
-
l31Ibid." pp. 267-268. 
-
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perch' le quaUuI de' tempi e felioita' a1 mtltono, ad ~ cabole ooaa 
essere tutto rondate in aulla vita di uno UOI"lO solo, qualf.iuanao 
morissi, 131 vedrebbono li etfetti di qussti dsordini •••• 
Serioua problema oould ariae even during Leo 1 s lifetime. Guiceiardin1 t a 
hearers remembered well the sudden cataatroJile of the French inVnsion ot 149l.t. 
Selfish indi viduilletie action amid the contusion showed that none considered 
resisting attack tor the welfare at Florence.l )) 
Ci tizens were not apt to put time and energy into an endeavor from which 
satisfaction waa not likely. To aid in oonsolidating thenorentine state in 
1516 Guicciard1ni adVised its rulers to make the state great and important. An 
extension of Florentine boundaries would give Medioi lordship a strong 
.foundation. t-:ithout this any other endeavor would be ruined with the f1r8t 
adversity.l3ij 
1)3l!?!.2., Quicciardin1 noted Hebe a cgni furta eM tusai Yenuta, nessuno 
era ohs avess! penaato a reSisters, ne al beneficio della citta 0 della state JW 
solo ciaacuno a -' proprio." To avoid such a pi titul 8i tuation, OU1cciardini 
argued with an appropriate metaphor. Prudent marinera repair their Ships and 
all its instruments either when they are in port or ,",,'hen things are goinr. well 
so that they oan resist any .future tempest. So also should one 'Mho steers the 
rudder of the etateindustriously repair its weak spots and urge its members to 
have power in reserve tor every aeeident that might arise (valem di tutto e1 
nerve e virtU' sua) I ibid. I - -
~.. ------
l340Uicciardini equated Church holdings with Medioi holdings. Under the 
Medici. Florence tried to expand northward, but already' they .found it necessary 
to abandon Parma and Piaoenza. Their pos.881on or Modena and Reggio was un-
certain. Not only were Ulere Mrious weaknessCts in these areas but they were 
in dispute with the Duke of Ferrara, ~., p. 270. 
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Not only W!lS it important to have good and futhtul partisans, men of 
"riputadOM,1t for }1edici strength but also they had to have a knowledge ot 
current Florentine attairs. Since the major.! ty ot Medici partisans had grown 
up in r.:erioda of civil troubles, they had been "nutrit1 fuora e non avezzi alle 
cose nostre." It these men would learn Florentine ways and what is "8E~+/1al 
for good goverment, they would not be apt to advise action that mir)1t lead to 
troub1,e or diSOrder.13> 
Ou1cciardini believed that he knew what course was beat tor Florence. 
/ 
He could uphold a rule under "questa ombra di civilita e di liberta." He did 
not agree 111 th the rather prevalent view that the Medici would be more secure 
it they were to seize absolute and open control of the City by title as well 
as tact. In time this course would prove Uroost pernicious tor them and for us" 
and would lead to ultimate and intense cruelty.l36 
vlhlle he proclaimed his loyalty to the Medici house, Gu1cciard1n1 admitted 
that he found contemplation on gowrnment ('tanto bello, tanto ororevole e 
magnifico pensiero. ttl37 On governments depend the well-being and health of men 
l3>Ibid., pp. 271-272. 
l)6Ibid., p. 281. 
- " 
l37He hoped that his considerations of Florentine goverment would not leac 
to his classification "come i.ngrato." He had great, even extraordinary, 
obligations to the Medici. Two popel of that house, Leo and Clement, had 
employed him in their servJ.,ce and had honored him exceasi vely, "come persona in 
chi hanno avuto, eel he plt1 che ma1 Clemente, somma confidenzia." None should 
i.nfer that Gu1eciardin1 had "animo aUeno dalla grande""za loro, ni che la loro 
autoriti m1 disp1accia." He compared 'his own situati?'"I with that of Aristotle 
and Alexander the Great. The philosopher was not Alexander's enell'l2Y because he 
had written the lolitica, qialoso, pp. 3,5. 
'I, 
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and the success of all collective act1ons.138 Discord in Florence was more 
dreadful. than eYer du.r1ng a :period when there were foreign amies wi thin the 
peninsula, "breathing slaughter and destruction ... 139 
In hIs tialogo, Guicciardini considered the fundamental problem of who is 
to rule. Its two boob were written dUring the period 1n which he served as 
l1eutenant-general ot the Holy see and a8 commander of the papal troops 
leacued with France. Although he despaired ot ever seeing the original. freedom 
of Florence regained during this troublous time, there was nothing to prevent 
him from considering the ideal republ1c. He thouf)'lt that one of the ordinary 
accidents in hum.rm aff'airs might occur to return Florence to the type of' 
government it had under Soder1:n1. This would indicate that "the people were no 
yet so corrupt that they should be regarded as incapable cf liberty. ff Further, 
when Plato meditated and wrote on the republic, he did not believe that h1a 
system woUld be adopted by the then wry undisciplined Athenians. He noted 
rather that he despaired of ever seeing them govern themeel ft. well and he did 
not care to become involved in their attain. Like Plato, Gu1cciardini would 
consider only the ideal.1hO 
The scene is the year llt94, several months after the expulSion ot Piero 
de t Hedici and the early stages of Sevonarola fa preoominance in government. 
l)8Ibid., p. .3. 
-
139 rlal0io• p. 126. 
l4OIbid., pp. )-b. 
-
i 
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The three s~aken are Fiero Capponi, who had been instrumental in Piero'. 
expllnon, Pagolanton1o Soder1n1, the mbassador to Venice who. though a blood 
relative of the Medici, had opposed the tfTanny of Plero,lU and Pietro 
Quicc1ard1n1, Francesco's tather, who had tilled several. important posts under 
tr..e f-ledic1 rulers. All were young, zealous, find enenoated by the events of the 
recent Medici ouster. Bernardo del Nel"O,lh2 an old but wry wise man who also 
had i"u.rIctioned importantly under the Medici, did lv.)t teel that the revolution 
was a triumph. He could not share the young men' s enthusiast:ic hopes for the 
future, because he realised the often trifling nature of govel"l'mtntal changes. 
He testified that he based his jUdf!l"18nts on common sense and experience, 
for he had not studied the works of leamed philosophers. Of the three 
possible fOnQ of government-that ot one, of several or of all-onl.y the t1rat 
appeand geod. Be po1.nted to the desirable effects of the Jtledicean government 
in contrqt to the 1_ beneficial reaults of the two other type.. Irt their 
corrupt period, Bernardo felt that theory should be abandoned and a govel'J'llMmt 
was to be jUdged only by'its results. 
Tm. trio or queat10ners tel t that experience alone could never be the 
final detezm1nant 1n poUtlcs. Rather here, as in the sCience oJ.' moraU.ty, 
certain basic principles daninate all actions. It these prinCiples aro based 
14Lrbese ligures should not be contused with Piero Soderini and N1ccol~ 
Cappelli. 
lb2upon the e::couragement of the party of Piero de Medici and the instiga-
tion of Venetiana who desired to keep Pisa, Bernar::!o del Nero, the pro-French 
inf'alOniere, plotted a Medici return. when the plot was di $Covered, Bernardo 
1 Nero was lentenced to be executed for pretem.ng fr1endahip to senice, 
gtoria d t ltal1a, I, 2th, 297. 
-on reason and truth, experience must verify them. 
The thJ:ree applied the cn ten a of virtue and vice tc the actions of the 
Medici rulers and found them wanting on the very baSia of experience that 
Bernardo was so wa:mly advocating. They lamented "che VitUperiol che 
vergognal It aa they considered that the noble and respected c:1 ty of Florence had 
become a slave against her will as ahe tell under the heel ot toreign forcea. 
This they blamed pr1marily on the Medici. The conclusion, expreeaed by 
Capponi, was that, under the Medic! rule of one, fam11y interests affected 
even such weighty matters as foreign affairs. Upon the shoulders of one man, 
talented {lr otherwise, rested all grave concerns. Honora went to favorites 
instead of to deaeniJ:1€ 01 t una. Under such an admin1stratioD, justice i8 
alwaya corrupted, not always because the ruler desires this but often because 
ot clever sycor~ts. 
Bernardo pointed out that their ideal goverrment would have theae and othe t' 
faults as t...,U. He admitted his suspicion ot civ:U discords stirred up in the 
name ot liberty, s1nce most otten pfi"rsonal 8mbi tion is at their bUis, and • 
deliverer trom ~ usually becomes a tyrant h1meeU'. He argued that, since 
the !-'I8Ople have no discers:ll8nt, a popular gover.nment cannot be good. Under 
such a system, there is no control over the adminiatraUon ot juatioe, 
lIIaf).strates tear to antagonize the people who support them, abuns are 
mul tip1ied, and the elWious poor strike at riche8 beyond measure to tha gl"eat 
detriment of tl".EI city eo ultimately to th~ ~or themselvea. 
Be!"1"..ardo del Nero was not a Medici partisan Ear .!!. but looked upon the 
stability they brought to Florence. Yet it seemed better that they ahould not 
be restored tc; power, be remarked, for this could be accompl1shG.;.. only by 
20$ 
foreign military strength. resiX'es for revenge would be rampant and force used 
I ' I 
I 
, I 
'I 
to assure their power. He sincerely admonished the ~ men to maintain union I ! I 
in the republic by aiding the principal ci tiZellS to lay aside their 8Mb1 tiona 
to avoid internal dissension which could only prepare the way for a new tyrant 
or for serious dissolution and anarcl:\1. His last caution was that Florent1ne 
goverment must not seek to 1m1 tate the Venetian, for each country calls for 
its own kind of rule.143 
\-;i th his mouthpieces of both penmasion8, Francesco OUiceiardin1 was 
partially in agreement. Like the trio, he upheld wamly the idea of Uberty, 
but, like Bernardo, he looked back at sad experience. The sentiments he 
attributed here to the old man actual.ly seem to have been those he held with 
conviction as the tinal product of his long and serious thought on matters of 
govornment. Practical neceai ty, success, stabil! t,...these were to be the 
nonna of sixteenth-century thought for minds like those of Oulcciard1n1. The 
whole tenor of the Dial0ti!? seems to bear out the truth of the observation that 
1t was written only at the end of a "philosophical contemplation of J."lOUtical 
truth,nllW speCifically p1psueeent,? political truth. 
strong and intelligent rule was impOrtant for Florentine health, for "la 
lhlrhese arguments, very briefly summarized here, are discussed in detail84 
dialogue fom in Book I of the ~alOgo. pp. 7-84. 
1h4.rhis 1s the view of CrlveUuc1, p. 19, and also of Barkhausen, pp. tQ-6j • 
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ignorznzia ~ ciaca, confUsa e sanaa term1ne e regola, e perd dice 01 pl"Overbio 
- \ / ~ 
ehe speaso e meglio avere a tU'9 col maligne ehe co lt~;norante." Love of 
the ;patria wae not Syno~U6 with love of liberty. One could love his £Stria 
while living under a tyranny. Further, equality for all citizens under the 
laws would perhaps be even better served under a well-ordered goverment than 
under a popular one.146 LieenUa, an enemy and destroyer of the Eatria, was 
not the foundation of liberty but of the worst type of tyrmm;y.147 
A suitable and stable government for Florence 1fU OUicc1.ardin1's major 
concern. The two th1llgs in the world that he desired more than any others were 
his ciV's "perpetual exaltation l ' and U. glory c.! "caaa noetra" .forever. He 
begp'ed Clod to increase both.lh8 Hia first wish was to see the establishment of 
a well-ordered republic in Florence during his l1tetime.149 Bernardo had out-
lined Gu1cciardini's own plan of government by the ott:1matt, and had shown its 
relatiOnship to the government of Venice, "per una ci tta disarmata e1a cos1 
/ 
citta disarmata 51a coai bella come forse ma1 ave88i alcuna republica libera. ttl 0 
14St'1alosg, p. 46. 
lhltbid., pp. 38-39, 42. 
-
l47}:bid., p. 100. 
lh8"M81'IlOrie d1 famiella, If Sari tti autobio&rafict. p. J. 
149The second wiah was for the tnaedan of Italy fran all foreign invaders 
and the third, the ".freedom of the entire world trom the tyranny- of wicked 
pri.esta, fI ~cord1. I, 14. 
lSOoi!+ogo, p. 106. 
2(ff 
BOth would have a .Q.!:!E. Consiglio I and Florence r s S0nfaloniere would correspond 
to Venice's LOge as would all lesser parts of the governments.151 
Yet Guicciardini felt pessimistic regarding the Florentine future. To 
him, there were many more reasons for believing that its republic must soon 
fall into decay than there were for holding that it would long endure .152 
Bernardo could only advocate, like Guicciardini, that the Florentines be 
contented with the times .2h! ... c.... orr;;.;;;..,o0 .... no ... and accomodate themselves as best they 
could to the government under which they lived whUe they lookedto the future 
reforms.153 Virt~ was nothing else than knowing when the time was ripe to 
inaugurate reforms, patience in waiting for an occasion which could make an 
, 
undertaking easy which would otherwise be difficult: "e questa e una delle 
ragione ehe e pazienti sono tanuti aavi."l54 Guicciardinits agreement with 
Bernardo showed that he was a conservative but an opportunist as "Jell. 
Guicciardini thought that honor and amibition were more important than any-
thing else. He admitted that the management of public affairs and the 
grandeur accompanying them attracted the "supreme homage" of men and perhaps 
excusably so, for ambition seems to :many to make them equal to the gods. l5S 
151 For a detailed treatment of these points, cf. ibid., pp. 100-185. 
-
152Ricordi" I, 9. 
-
l53Dialo!2, pp. 82.8r.~ 
l54Ibid., p. 162. 
-
l55"consolatoria," cited in Geffroy, flUne autobiographiEl," p. 673. 
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If one who desires to become supre.me in Florence 1s of the Medici line and is 
backed by pSj:1il power, Gu1cciarf:tl.ni advised, he can hope to at:tain this height. 
If not of the house of Medici, his only method of achieving success lay in 
affecting the popular cause with the hope of b31nc' e13o'teu by the free voice ot 
156 
the p~ople as their constitutional chief, as 1n 1:lw case of Piero SOderini. 
self-interest and sheer utilitarianism are l1nksd here. The same holds true ot 
OUicciarditdts ea,ltiCIUs advice to a goo citizen, not to connect himself with 
the Medici government lest the people come to disl1ke him, though he should not 
for this reason withdraw altoather trom. such a connection or forego the 
benefits to be derived trom it.15? 
Guicciardini's major d1llemma was evident in his devotion to Florentine 
liberty as exemplified in the republic and his ideal of COOp'?ration with the 
status quo for reasons of honor and selr-1nte~st. This accounts in larse 
measure for his conO.1ct1ng attitudes on th4 Ueoici rule.ts. OU1f!ciardird t s own 
political affiliations followed such a course. After the Medici expulSion of 
152?, Nicco1~ cappon1,158 "cittadino d1 grande autori ~ ed amatore della 
15~~rdi" I, 155. 
157 Ibid. , 136. Flnphasis added. 
-
l.;.8C!.. Roth, pp. 59-t4, for Cappon1 t 8 early career and his pollcy as 
ion£al,?niere. 
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libe~, 11 was elected gontalomare in the new republic, reminiscent of that ot 
plare Soderini. Though heaeJing a mo(srate eoverrnent, Capponi was a 
- . 
representative of the ottimati, and, 11ke declared members ot the 2!llesch1 
faction, had a rather pronounced sympathy for another Medici return to power. 
~d th Capponi, Guicciard1ni consecrated his efforts to re.foxm in the face of 
stout opposition and to the reconciliation ot the Florentine :republic with the 
159 
Pope and the Emperor. While theoretically upholding the principles of the 
revolution ot 1521 J Gu1cc1ardini continued his correspondence with Clement vn, 
160 though in his capacity as pope and not as lord ot Florence. 
In 1529 a minor riot oecu.r.red in which Capponi was overthrown by thosevj,o 
realized that rd.d defense of Medici partisans would mean the lessening of their 
own power.161 The arrabbiati gontaloniere, Francesco Carducc1,162 succeeded 
him in office. He was corrupt, Ouicc1ard1n1 judged, and umrorthy of so great 
41,"1 honor.163 Under his administration there was pereecution ot the Medici 
partisans, contiscation ot their goods, and, as had taken place in some measure 
/ 
under the Oapponi regime, overturning ot the statues of' the Medici popes and 
159ttp..ag10ni che cona1gUano 1a signoria di Firenze ad accord.e.nd con 
Clemente VII," ~cr1ttt W1tt1ci, p. 214. 
16Oaos8i, I, 67-68. 
161storia d t ltal1a V 2$2-253 • 
................... __ .................... ' , 
16201'. Bernardino Barbadoro, "Francesco Carducci," Enciclop!dia 1taliana 
(Rama, 1930), VIII, 995. 
163storia dt ltal1a, V, 252-253. L _ 
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164 
the effacing of their arms on the 14edici palace. Such offences naturally 
rendered any republlcan accord with Clement VII impossible to achieve. The 
EmPeror, attempting to ally himself with Clement VII, offered his troops for 
the rrestabl1shment of tiedici government in Florence.16S Otdcciardi.ni lett 
Florence to meet Clement VII at Rimi.ni, following him to Bologna, where the 
rope was to have an interview wi. th Charles V. '¥ihen he d1sobeyed the orders of 
the "otto di Guardia e BIll.ian166 to appear before it to justify his conduct, 
he was condemned as a rebel and his goods were confi.scated. 
The Florentines heroically defended their c1 ty betore the papal and 
imperial troops which besieged it, but in AUf:1,UJt 1530 they were forced to 
eurrender.167 In Clement's 6efenae, Guicciardini explained that he had 
capitulated with Charles at Barcelona with the proviSO that there be nothing 
more than a change in the c1 tur' s pro-French eovernment.l68 
•• 
l64pastor, IX, 426, cf. also Francoi.s '1. Perrens, Histo1re de Florence 
r:;ts la darJ1nat1on des Medicis ~us9'!! la chute de la ,£!publiqU8 (l;tt81;-15,g) 
Va 8,""Iasa:rS!m', m; ijO. - - -
16Ser• Pastor, 56-57, for a discussion of this and the other terms or the 
Treaty of Barcelona, concluded between Charlee V and the papal nuncio, Girola.'110 
de Sohio, on June 29, 1529. 
166rhis body, usually referred to simply as the otto, functioned as the 
supreme criminal court of Florence. 
l67The norentinae put up a brave resistance against the wishes of Clement 
m, who 1s reported to have excla1med distractedly, "Would that Florence had 
never existed!" Pastor, X, 100-103. 
168"Ragioni ehe consigUano la signoria d1 Firenle," SOritti 22litic1, pp. 
2lL-251. 
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The charter at the restoration at 15.30 specified that liberty was to be 
preeeJ"'nd, but this proved to be merely a fom. Clement m disregarded the 
terms of the capitulation by July lS.:n and had CarduCCi, as well as the last 
gonfaloniere, O1r01ami, hanged. He intended to found an absolutism in Florence 
by appointing his nephew, Alexanier, the natural son of Lorenzo .. the Duke of 
Urbino, as head of the muqueracling republic. On AprU 21, 1532, the new 
constitution was made public, whe:eb:," l::~er became ~!10nie~ for ll.t'e 
and hereditary Duke ot Florence. But theactuaJ. reins of government remained 
in the hands of Clement VIl.172 
Guicciardini lett Florence when Clement VII obtained for him the poet of 
vice-legat .. of Bologna in June lSll.. His semces here and against Ferrara WW1 
especially valued by the Houee at Nedic1.173 Paul m, a. F8.1'Tl&8e and an Cimem)T 
of the MediCi, did. not wish to retain OUicciard1n1 in the important Bolognese 
legation after Clement'. death. Guicc1ardini returned to Florence in January 
172pastor, X, 104-105. At this time, Clement VII shewed himself' eager to 
effect a. reconciliation between Fra:')cis I and Charles V. The Fmperor, 
cOl1S1der1ngtbis a hopelese aim, proposed an Italian def'en.ive league to secure 
Milan and Genoa afainet French attacks. Venice resolutely' opposed tUs idea. 
It was little in keepillfl' With the policy of a pope considered neutral. :Further 
Clement continuedto inaist upon the restoration of Modena and Reggio. other 
complicating tactors came to affect Clement, especially the threatening atti tudl 
assumed at the beginning ot 153.3 by Francis I, an ally ot Henry VIII, ibid., 
21 rl. 
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1535 to become a courwellor to ,~.'Uke Alexander, surrounded by assassins and 
firmly opposed to those struggling for Florentine independence. Under this 
rule, Florence would remain the capital. of the Grand IUchy of Tuscany.17L 
The specific motives tor Guicciardini fS service to the youD.£er ~iedici line 
are not easy to fathom. Adherence to the rule of the odious Alexander because 
of affection can be ruled out. Perhaps he considered the l-1edici aa the most 
probable guarantee ot at least one gem-e ()t Florentine independence, namely, 
independence from the Emperor, who could easily have eubjeeated the city more 
completely. Only in this light or, more probably, in the light of sel1'-
interest, are we able to understand his sucoesstul defense of Alexander at 
Naples, where a great number of exiles presented their grievances to Charles V 
in ]$35 and demanded the Duke t t:; depoei tion. To Gu1cciard1n1, these were '\:mjus 
accusations."l75 
The piar,noni and the popular party stUl dreamed of the reestablishment of 
a popular goverment, led by the monks of San Marco , who proclaimed that 
Savonarola t IS prophecies waul::! now be real1Hd and Florentine liberty recOTeZlecH- 6 
17LAtter the death ot Clement 'VII, Florentine exiles included important 
personages like Filippo S1.irozzi, Ippoll to de' Medici, the historians Jacopo 
Nardi, Benedetto Varchi, and Donato Oiannott1. They entered intc a bitter 
Struf,gle with Alexander, cal.l.1ng him a tyrant and usurper, Antonaide, 1£;6. 
17SCharlea V, of course, did not desire to r~;atore any ,popular re"gime or 
repJ.blican liberties in Florence. To the ex:l.les he replied that their request, 
if granted, could lead only to uave danger, 1nter£erence in the internal 
affaire ot FlorenceJ Alexander retained the duchy and married Marguerite of 
Austria, a natural daughter oi Charles V, after paying the Em}:e %'Or a hundred 
twenty thousand ducats, ibid., pp. 186-187. 
-
l76aeffroy, nUne autobiographie .. fI p. 677. 
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\oJithout arms, however, this was r..ardly possible. Further, Gu1cciardini was 
instrumental i., preventing any such result. Leading the major palleschi, he 
hastened to proclaim Cos:l..mo de' !<1edici, a member of the youn~r branch of 
Ciovanni by a relati va J Lcrenzino, in Jan u,u'y 1537_ 
Dut Gui:.::ciardini' s plan of setting in operat.ion his government of tr..e 
otti.~ati under tho apparently unaaaumin~, inexperienced j~ung }~dici failed. 
He thought to s~cure l'.is plan by havirlf: Cosimo engaged to one of his d;mghters, 
but tho girl ".8 sent back.177 He tried to :impose several conditions to limit 
the rulerta power, like the institution of a Senate without which he could 
decide nothin.,!, but Co81mo triumphed because of continUed imperial support. 
Haking h:1:nself abscllute, he annulled all the conditions under which he had been 
chosen" 
For his I'IUpport of Alexander and Cosimo .. Gu1cciardini's l.'I'!laginary sccurs .. 
charged him with having acted as 1110 inst:-umento di offenders ed oscurare e1 
nom della patria ••• " ft "!hen he had had the very rare opportun1 ty of riving 
speical service to his F'lorence,178 he bowed before the tyranny of the later 
177 Both Coe1mo de f Medici' s mother and Guiceiardini' s first wite weJ.'e 
members of the important Salviati family, Benc.ist, 82. 
178 ItAccu.aatoria" J p_ 212. 
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THE RELIGION OF GUICCIARDINI 
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The study of religion in Guicciardini in its varied aspects must serve to ':,:1 
reconstruct his character if it is true that ttin tutti gli scrittor1 politici 
, 
1a parte del loro pensiero che r1fiette la religions e U punta di contrello 
del lora intero sistema, dove si vede meglio i1 fondo dell 'autore ... l 
Like that of various other personages of the Renaissance. Guicciardinits 
religious views have suffered from contrary descriptions. He is associated 
sometimes, and without sufficient basis, with the conception so orten 
prevalent of the irreligiosity of the period. 
The classiC and indelible portrait, somewhat exaggerated, is that ot 
Guicciardini as "1 'uomo savic, If the typical exponent of the Italian society of 
his age and a type possible only in a corrupt civUization. He is sketched as 
a cold intellect combining the famous discrezione with knowledge and experienc 
holding to neither ideas nor illusions, and relying necessarily upon his own 
2 judgment, speculare and misura. 'While patriotism, liberty and justice did 
Ipaolo Treves, n realism.o ;eolitico d1 France.co Guicciardini (Firenze, 
1931), p. 5e. -
2For a descriptive explanation of discrezione .. cf. intra, pp. 
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exist for him, they were o~ 1n the guise of abstract ideas, never living 
sentiments which spurred him to action as they did Machiavelli. Guicciardin1 t s 
only god was his own self1sh interest and his desire tor riputazione. He would 
not, these wr1 tel'S argue.. sacrif1ce his ambi tiona to the 1deals of liberty and 
s&lt-den1al, since these befitted onlY' the ;eazzl and the ignorant, certainly 
not the savi • .3 'lhese views perpetuate the n1neteenth-eentu17 patriotic 
-
criticism of Guicciard1ni, formu.la.ted on the baSis of his Jtlcordi. 
Even if not this type of Cing,uecento Italian, they write, Ouicciardini was 
at least an opPOrtunist R!! ~ellence.4 In the interest of self, he forgot 
that moral greatness means a. genuine manly triumph." still more than 
Machiavelli, he exemplified the worthlessness of politics as a science in-
dependent of morality.6 
Sometimes Guicciardini is described as a men indifferent to religion, a 
skeptiC, a pagan .. or an adherent of a formalistic faith with no intellectual or 
moral content, as one who remained simplY' in outward fashion in the Church 
since he never got around to breaking with it. 7 
Since such desoriptions of the man are obviously quite onesided, they oan 
not be wholly accurate. Fra Remigio Fiorentino, a Dominican, and a oontem:porar 
of Gu1cciardini, judged him to be a JU.n ''mclto religioso e dotato d'ottimi e 
"De Sanctis, ItL 'uome del Guieciardin1," pp. 1 ... 2.3. 
40arlo Se'gre, "Qu1coiardin1," ~a antolog;ta, LXVII, ser. 4 (1897), 472. 
"Geffrey, "Un polltique ital1en, tt pp. 962, 991, 99.3. 
6aenoist, P. 1.30. 
7otetea, pp. 318-320. 
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santissimi costumi.H8 A student of Guicciardini expressed astonishment over 
the spirit of religious fervor evident in him that one would not expect to find 
in nun politico cosl realista. n9 Another sees in his belief not formalisol but 
the sentiments of a true and living faith to the extent that in his writings 
"la soggezione a ~o ricorre come atteggiamento che informa la psicologia 0 14 
mentali t~ dell tuomo. nlO Guicciardini himself admitted that he renected on the 
tribulations of life first "come f11osofo ed uome del mondo" but also "coIDe 
cristiano. nIl But the bro are not incompatible. 
Guicciardini referred to his upbringing by a good father, "tanto 
catolico.H12 A1reaqy in 1503 his personal ambition was the basis of his 
temptation to become a priest finally, and to succeed to the numerous benefices 
of his uncle Rinieri .. archdeacon of Florence and bishop of Cortone.. His father 
dissuaded him tronl entering religion for such a base motive. h'hile Fiero had 
hopes of his son becoming rather a great teacher, Francesco was content with 
his fatherts other reason, namely, that he would soil his conscience by making 
his son a priest by greed for possessions or for renown.l ) 
8Carlo Angeleri, "n Guicciardini :nella Vita di Frs Remigio Fiorentino,.t 
Francesco Guicciardini nel IV oentonario, p. 229. Cf. also Francesco Sarri. 
nGUicciarcfinI e fa reii'gJ.one,· ibId.; p. 144. 
-
9Nulli, p. 30. 
lC1.talIlgOli. p. 91. 
11 trConsolatoria., If p. 189. 
12"Orat1C' accusatoria, It p. 198. 
13"Ricordanze," $cr1tti autobiografioi, pp. ,,-56. Of his father's view, 
Francesco wrote "parendogfi oEe Ie cose della Chiesa fussino molto transcorse." 
Further, fIche maculare 18 ccnscienza sua di fare un figliuolo prete per 
cupidita eli roba 0 di grandessa." 
II, 
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I 218 At the age of thirty, Francesco already seemed to realize the vanity of 
this life and the reasons that wicked men fear the future while good men have 
hope. He knew that he had received many blessings and praised Ood for his 
goodness and beneficience.14 He lamented the spiritual poverty of his uncle, 
15 
the bishop. The latter remained a man of eTU habite. He described his 
father's peaceful. death in 1513, fortified by all the sa.crmnents of the Church 
\ 
and deep devotion", Ite talmente che si puo sperare che Dio al certo 10 abbi 
ricevuto in luogo di salute." He equated the good lii'e with consolation, for 
16 he felt much less the death of his father when he considered his goodness. 
He wrote of his intense desire to see Plero again in hellven. He saw that even 
in adversity there were eonsolations that faith alone could give. He wrote 
that God had His reasons tor sending trials and tribulationa to man and, if 
accepted as diVine Visitations, they could redound to his ultimate credit.17 
14~A sa stes.o,R ibid., p. 99. 
-
15''Memori& di tamiglia, If ~., p. 48. 
l6t1Ricordanze," pp. 71-73. 
l7Guicciardini wrote that "le tribulazione del mondo seno speaso 
desiderabile perche sono Viaitazione di Dio a chi 1e riceve con forte animo, e 
mezzo a conseguire quella sterna felici t~, It IfConso1atoria, If p. 189. Again: 
"Perch~ come tu proponessi 1a m~ria dell t altra vita, a comparazione della 
qua1e questa e uno punto I e che Dio manda spesso la trtbulazione agli uomini 
non per gastigarli, ma per wrgarli, e chs ehi amor suo le tollera paziente-
mente ha da reputare fellcitA 10 essers Visitato da Lui di qua con questi modi, 
perch. mirabilmente approfittano d:1 1al chi dico si riducessi a memoria quests 
cose, sarebbe ne t tuoi dispiaceri· con maggiore piacere che non avasti ma1 neUe 
tue falleita,l/ ibid., p. 169. 
-
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Nor were the statements of Guicciardini's youth dimmed by the bitterness of his 
poll tical experiences as an old man. 
Guicciardini's religion seems to have been founded on the basic contrariet 
of human nature. Since man is naturally inclined to good (his was an 
18 
optimistic position), Guicciardini saw that there was no advantage in evil. 
A person who wo'!lld prefer evil to good must be considered a beast rather than a 
man for he lacks an instinct common to men by nature.19 But Guicciardini saw 
too the selt-interest could readUy incline a man to evil, since he is frail 
and is continually tempted by what is wrong. 20 Since, for the most part, man's 
afflietions stem from his excessive desires, he is his own worst enemy.2l 
At time, too, Guicciardini seemed very much aware of the presence ot the 
divinity and the power of His unseen actions. He admonished men to beware of 
contending against religion or anything which had close dependence upon God. 22 
He upheld the dignity and authority of the Church as an institution and its 
divine power to rebuild itself spir1tually.23 During the sack of Rome, he was 
\ deeply concerned lest profanations occur "aensa rispetto aleuno ne di onore di 
18 R1cordi, I, 3. 
19Ibide , 
-
4. 
20n,id., 3. 
-
21Ibid., 
-
139. 
22Ibid ., .31. 
-
23"1a reverenzia ed autorit'i /.della Chieail non llUore mai, e Be talvolta 
qualcuna dello sue ragloni e s1 inveechiata che e quasi in oblivione, tornano 
poi e tempi, e risurge pin fresco el suo diri tto e piu potente che mai, tt 
~aloS2, p. 160. 
, i 
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donne, n~ di reliquie sacra, n~ di sacramenti, n'e di nio. ,,24 In spite of his 
25 
symrathy for every reform in the Church, he attacked the Council of Pi sa as 
false and productive of diVision in the Church. 26 
Yet the gulf Guicciardini sometimes drew between morality and the rule of 
the state carried over into some vague but suspicious utterances on the 
essential qualities of religion. He argued that "excessi va religion" was harm-
ful to the world, insofar as it made men's minds effeminate and prone to error 
and hindered them from acting honorably. He stressed that his advice was not t 
be understood as derogating from the Christian faith or the veneration due it. 
He intended rather, to confim the faith by pointing out its fundamentals from. 
its excesses so that men would know what is to be taken seriously and what is 
to be disregarded. 27 
Guicciardin1 thought that the Churt:r.. },>J.8.ced too much emphasis on external 
works. While prayer, fasting and other devout observances prescribed by the 
Church or recommended by friars are not wrong, nthe beat of all good 
observances, and in comparison wherewith all others are tnsii2tficant, is to 
wrong no man and do what good you can to an.,,28 This i8 the familiar laicized 
and secular humanitarian concept, diametrically opposed, however, to the 
24ffL8 prigionia d1 Clemente VII," 9Eere ~nedite, IX, 35. 
25cf. Storia d'Italia, III, 102. 
26,'1. t ltalla dopo 1& g10rnata di Ravenna," Scrt tti eli tici, p. 87. 
27Rieordi, I, 32. 
28Ibid ., II, 159. Emphasis added. 
-
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classical view of the ruthless self-interest of the Renaissance period. 
w1dle he seems to have accepted immutable Christian doctrine as defined 
and preserved by the Church, he thought that men should not dabble in religious 
studies. Even theologians and philosophers who write of supernatural things 
utter "a thousand follies." Their probing seems to be more an exercise of the 
29 intellect than a means of discovering the truth. It demonstrates a lack of 
wisdom to preach on certain "thorny articles of our faith" Uke predestination. 
Quicciardini argued that he was not objecting to the doctrines of the Church 
though he felt that they should not be tampered with lest they give men the 
occasion to think of things which the ordinary man can never understand. Such 
ideas create doubts which can be settled onlY by the ready acceptance of Church 
doctrine.3° Here Guicciardini seems to evidence his belief in a blind faith 
with no questioning. Reasoning in the religious sphere brought about doubt. 
and he had no sympa.thy with them. 
On the other hand, he ttought that miracleo give no more proof for the 
existence of the Christian God than any other gods. They should be considered 
simply as "secrets of nature to the depths of which the mind of man cannot 
penetrate. lt31 Strong faith can lead man to believe things that are not true, 
just as certain effects are credited to the intercession of the saints at their 
29Ibid., 125. 
3OIbld., I, 135. 
-
3lTbid., II, 123. 
-
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various shrines • .32 He manifested the same fear of becoming too involved with 
non-human spheres like signs and portents in which he very definitely believed. 
Guicciardini's evaluations of prodigies, prognostications, fortuna, and 
the operations of divine providence are rather closely allied. The Middle Ages 
believed that free will determined men's actions while prOVidence guided them, 
but, for this viG~" the Renaissance substituted the prime role of fortuna and 
. 
virhl . .3.3 Though one of the dominant motives of Ouicciardin1's work is 
"l'imperio della fortuna," which no man can fully escape, he, unlike Machiavell i1 
did not concede to virt'n a Significant amount of autonomy. 34 
Some hold that Ouicciardini's historical concept superseded that of the 
Middle Ages, which considered history as a direct judgment of God.3S They 
point to the difference between Gu1cciardini and Philip de Commines36 and deny 
that a sense of the transcendent is the COll8tant though silent thread of the 
storia d'Ital1a.37 
Actually, it would seem that Gu1cciardini t s esoteric spheres of action and 
influence took the form of the joint concepts of fortuna and of God or 
providence. For example, both were speCifically mentioned when he referred to 
the politics of Clement VII. Their eftects showed that "la prudenzia ad e t 
32Ibid., 124. 
-
33PalmarocChi, p. 33. 
34Ibid., p. 43. 
-
3SNulli, p. 33 • 
.36Capariis, p. 126. 
37Malagoli, p. 2.31. I. 

r 
statement indicates that human beings are responsible for their actions and 
that they are not complete masters of their own si tuation. The use of the term 
"fortune" here connotes the normal changes that occur in human life, for 
example, the Slccession of misfortune after days of prosperity. h.3 
Guicciardini explained that the Venetians, who had heavy military losses 
in 151h, suffered "under the wrath of heaTen or the casual events that depend 
on fortune. nhh Again he wrote that men always attribute to advice :nd planning 
what has often proceeded from fortune. 1l45 Fortune is unstable and uncertain so 
that even one long protected by it must fear its change.46 
Portents of futUre horrors, indicating a change in "buona fortuna, It 
fascinated him. He wrote that together "U consentimento de. Cieli e degli 
uomini pronunziavano alIt Italia Ie future calamit'a. n47 Predictions of future 
events can be made not only by men who "per scien£a" make a profession of this 
but also by men who do so "per arna to divino. 1148 
Portents which excite general wonderment also giTe a knowledge of future 
h.3"Fortune tl has, in fact, seTeral connotations in Renaissance writing, Cf 
for example, its use in OUicciardini's description of the Florentine plight in 
1529, ibid., V, 289: the citi£ens had fino inclination to try fortune," for the. 
though'i""they had sufficient means to defend themselves for many months. In 
other words, they Simply did not wish to take a chance and lose every crumce. 
4h Ibid., In, 316-.317. 
-
45Ibid., IV, 126. 
-
46"Giustiticazione della politica,tt p. 208. 
47Storia d'Italia, III, 63. 
h8Ibid. 
-
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happenings. Ou.icciardini described at length those which occurred before the 
Italian invasion of Charles VIII.49 He dwelt excessively on those preceding 
the death of Lorenzo de t Medici, and, he felt they foretold the calami ties that 
would befall Italy. In Florence, a few days befol'S, flames had been seen in 
the heavens and there was a comet. The wolves howled and lions fought each 
other. In the church of Santa Maria Novella, a woman had a fit when in a 
vision she saw an ox with horns ot tire spreading destruction over the entire 
city. 50 Guicciardini noted similar signs which he believed, foretold the 
Florentine revolt in 1512 and the Medici return.51 A.fter the French deteat at 
Ravenna, the cardinals begged the pope to make peace, for God did not wish the 
struggles in behalf of Italian liberty to cost so much. There were many signa 
52 
of His will. And he held that the caprice ot "fortuna" played a major role 
in war as in every other human happening. In one passage, Guicciardini seemed 
to deny that some men can foretell .future eTents, sqing it i8 useless to try 
to foresee them, for human existence does not follow immutable laws.53 
Considering the relative forcea and strength ar Marignano in d:3lTlonstration of 
his stateJrlents, Guicciardini explainedl "pure li event! delle battaglie sono 
49 Ibid., I, 64. 
-
50Storia fiorentine, pp. 73-74J af. also ItElog1o, h pp. 227-228. 
51stOria dtltalia, nI, 236. 
52Tbid., 193-194. 
--
53ffSulle mutazioni seguite dopo la battaglia d1 RaTenna," Scritti P2l1tiai 
p. 89. . 
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\ / 54 dubii, e vi puo molte volte la fortuna. piu ehe la ragione. 1J Victory does not 
depend completely on the ability of the captain, the virt\ of the troops or the 
accidents of time and place, for there are always ~lle accidenti sottoposti 
interamente alIa fortuna.«SS Even more important, not necessarily do those 
whose cause is just have victory ~ tor daily those who tight unjustly are 
succesaful.S6 Guicciardini seems to imply here that justice is not possible Ili~ 
in a world where reason is not supreme. 
The twists of fortune often were dramatiC. The sudden death of Archduke 
Filippo, the young and healthy' son-in-law of Ferdinand of Aragon, puzzled 
Quicciardini. OnlY the variability of fortune could explain it.S7 Guiccis.rdin 
also thought the immediate reversal of Florentine success in battle in lh79 
after the sack of Casole could be explained by nothing else than a change of 
fortune.S8 
In some ease, evil men enjoyed good fortune but in others they paid for 
theirwickedne8s. He wrote, in connection with the scheme of Morone,S9 as he 
S4nDiscesa di Francesco I," p. 114. 
SS"Se tl Gran Capitano debbe accettare la impress. di ltalia," Scritti 
E91itici, p. 107. 
5611N, 51 pUd promettere la vittoria chi ha la giustizia della causa, 
vedendosi ogni d~vincere chi combatte per 18. ingiustizia," ibid. 
-57~~ria dlItalia, II; 183. 
58Storie fiorenti~1 p. 4S. 
59Girol~o Morone plotted to oust Charles from Milan. 
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sought for some pattern of explanation, the he could be certain only that 
"There is nothing more difficult to avoid than fate, and there is no remedy 
against predestined misfortune. ,,60 He considered Lodovico Sforza I a imprisonmen ~ 
A prince of auch magnificence, envied by so many, now in such miser"J,6l Still 
his sons were permitted to enjoy the state of Milan which Lodovico had seized 
wrongfully and Itto the ruin of the whole world. ,,62 AI though Alexander VI was 
more wicked than any pope for centuries, he was also "pi~ felice. ,,63 Antonio 
da Leva he described as "the author of so ma.ny bitter calamities and severe 
punishments, who was, however, very fortunate in all his undertakingsl ft64 
More often, however, Ouicciardinits examples of the close relationship 
between wrongdoing and retribution are very evident. Cardinal Ascanio Sforza, 
who practiced simony more than any other at the time of Roderigo Borgia's 
election to the pontificate, was overtaken by divine justice when his excessive 
ill :'1' 
, 
,I 
ambition finally made him "an object of scorn and hatred to all mankind. ,,6S 'i 
The Marquis ot Pesoarats death occurred, Guicciardini thought, "perhaps by the 
just judgment of God, \-!ho would not allow him to enjoy his evll-gotten 
gains. ,,66 Liveretto de Fermo had a just end for his own wickedness, for it was 
6oStoria d'Italia, IV, 319. 
61Ibid., I, 393. 
62Ricordi, II, 91. 
63Storie !!2rentine, p. 265. 
64Storia dtltalia, V, 197. -11-" " ______ ,
6SIbid., I, 6. 
66Ibid... IV, 321.h Although Pascara had plotted unsuccessfully against the 
F,mperor,..-ne conquered areas for himself in north and south and built up a small 
fortune bASi dAA .. 
" 'I 
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right that one guilty of having killed his uncle by treachery should also die 
by it.67 Nor was the Florentine Vitellozzo Vitelli able to escape the tragic 
fate of his own brothers, who all had died a violent death at his hand. 68 
Two of his major examples stem from the period of the greatest jeopardy to 
the Ci::suescento papacy and to Italy as a whole. In 1527 tomenico di Massimo, 
the richest of all the Romans, offered to lend only a hundred ducats for the 
defense of the City. He suffered the due punishment for his avarice. His 
daughters were raped by the soldiers, while he and his sons were slaves until 
they freed thems.l ves from prison by an exorbitant ransom.69 Again, one 
Migllau, who opposed freedom for Clement VII in 1527 on the grounds that it 
would be dangerous to the Emperor's interest, was punished for his impiety when 
he was later killed a t the beginning of the siege of Naples. 70 And in referenc 
to the maneuverings of Francis I, he wrote that "the King either had so little 
- -
.f!!! 2! 2.22. or was so much taken up with a regard only to his own interest, the 
recovery of his children." 71 :;"lhat is very interesting is that these observa-
tions of Ouicciardini on evil and its consequent punishment were never mentione 
by Machiavelli. 
Guicciardini also discussed whether fortuna favored some individuals more 
than others. While one who is a favorite of fortune can afford to be more 
67 r= Ibid., II, :;;;9. 
-
6BIbid• 
-
69 Ibid., V, 137. 
-
70 Ibid., 172, 199. 
-
71Ibid., 262. Emphasis added. 
-
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bOld than another" still he should not forget that tlnot only may fortune vary as 
to different times, but also at the same time may vary as to different things ... 12 
The wise man has to act, but he should also make a prudent calculation of 
probable effects.73 Although Rla buona fortuna ll is always needed, men should 
8i ze up their chances and move wi th care. 74 
Basically men lUUst guide themselves by the use of "la ragione. tl75 The 
intelligent man should realize that experience and natural prudence are always 
helPf'ul. 76 Both experience and reason had to operate together. 77 In the 
Dialogo .2!! reggimento !!!. Firenze, Ouicciardini had Bernardo del Nero state: 
"10 sono di quelli che in queste cose non allegherei mai la esperienze" se io 
non la vedessi accompagnata dalla ragione. ,,78 Reason also played a major role 
together with faith. Guiceiardini counselled men to put their hope in God, to 
pray and to do good works but then to make solid use of reason. 79 Here he 
meant that, while accepting religious doctrine as defined by the Church,80 men 
should not be afraid to strike out for themselves in other areas. 
72Ricordi, I, 1.38. 
73uGran Capitano, If p. 106. 
74Ricordi, II, 30. 
75Ibid., I, 160. 
-
76Ibid., II, 10. 
-
77Treves notes that Guicciardini "non si presenta senza un antecedente 
speculativo illa prova della realt'll" fI p. 42. 
78 p. 23. 
79nper L'accordo tra Firenze e Clemente VII," Scritti Wlitici, pp. 278-
279. In other passages, however, Guicciardini implIed that the majority of men 
were not intellQc1<uhallYce<l.uipped to consider theological matters and advocated 
almost. a blind nU. t. r; supra pp. 
80Cf .. sunra. D. 
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AI though the future is uncertain, Guicciardini cautioned against the prey 
of fortuna. Good fortune and divine providence help the courageous man who 
first helps himself. One must not paralyze himself by fear of the whims of 
fortune,81 for none can obtain great things without some danger. In every 
action man should have more hope than fear. 82 
F~erience, reason, resolution and action were the ingredients which 
constituted success. While Guicciardini was Ua matchless observer of the 
concrete human fact" and far less likely tha.n Machiavelli to allow his 
observations Uto be deflected to the constructive uses of his thought," he was 
quick to observe the flaws in some of his older friend's arguments.83 In the 
final analysis, the vital role he gave reason warns of the need for caution in 
speaking of him as a relativist or a skeptic. And since he never neglected the 
importance of free will, he was no fatalist. In the 1490's, an alteration of 
affairs in the Italian peninsula began with the pursuit of new policies by 
8l."Ricordisi Vostra Santita ffi1ement ng che chi si abbandona da s~ 
medes1mo, e abbandonato non solo dal1a fortuna, ma etiam. da Dio, e1 quale, come 
~ in proverbio, non aiuta chi non s 'aiuts da se stessoJ e1 pel contrario la 
fortuna favorisce vo1entieri chi s f arrischia," "Ragion! che consigliano a 
Clemente vn d:l. accordarsi con Carlo VI in contrariC' .. ff p. 197. Cf. also 
tlOratio accusatoria, fl p. 239. 
82 
"Gran Capitano" fI p. 106. 
8%enry Osborn Taylor, ThOifht and ~resSion in the Sixteenth centuft, I 
(New York, 1920), 83, 93. c1'.so Hrram aydii, TheCounter:m;naissanceew 
York, 1960).t p. 197.t for a discussion of GulcciardIiii WitE: otlier 1'igures who 
were for the most part ·'pure" empiriCists, products of the Counter-Renaissance. 
Haydn's group includes Vives and Telesio in natural science, Vesa1ius in 
anatomy, Machiavelli and Guicciardini in history and political theory, Bodin 
(With reservations) and Le Roy in historical met~od and SOCial, political and 
econemic theory, and, above all, Montaigne. He explains that, if they 'Were 
tainted by any ~"Stical or occult influences, they nevertheless followed with 
considerable fidelity the pragmatic path of naturalistic empiricism. 
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France, Milan, Florence, Naples and the papacy,84 and these were the work of 
free men. 
Yet fortuna, while not hampering the individual exercise of free will, 
nonetheless seemed to Ouicciardini to set up a certain pattern a person had to 
follow. He knew this well. He was of himself inclined always to desire the 
overthrow of the Church's civil government so he attributed to chance his 
service under two popes and his incessant striving for their success. 85 
In Guicciardini's thinking, there is often a contrariety between desire 
and action, between human acts and fortune. This contrariety is also evident 
in his view on scared abuses. Papal misdemeanors scandalized him because of 
his belief in the sacredness of the office. The pope was, for all the 
difficulties of his poSition as a Cinguecento prince, Christ's vicar on earth.8 D 
\ He lamented the evils of the Roman court I "non si puo dire tanto male della 
corte romans. che non meriti chs se ne dica pi'.ri., perche e una in:faInia, uno 
esempio di tutti e l vituperi ed obbrobri del mondo. 1f87 He confessed that no 
man could feel greater disgust than he at the ambition, avarice and pronigacy 
of the priesthood, not only because these vices were odious in themselves but 
84Storia d'Italia, I, 29. 
, . 
85Ricordi, I, 124; II, 28. 
86storia d'Italia, V, 156-157. 
87"Considerazioni,lt Scritti politici, p. 22. 
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especially because they were utterly abhorrent in men supposedly dedicated to 
88 
God. 
Yet in sections of his works and in his dedication to the popes, 
Guicciardini manifested a higher regard for them than he hL~se1f may have 
realized. He told the Cardinal of Cortona that he woUld rather be dead than 
experience in Rome the cruelty suffered by Pope C1ement.89 Whenever he 
considered, in later years, Clement's imprisonment and his anguish" he was over 
come by me1ancholy.90 What disturbed Guicciardini most, he confessed, was the 
fact that not even a single lance was broken to deliver Clement atter he had 
"stirred up war in almost all the world" for the benefit of othersl91 
Many of the statements in the ~icordi collection gave evidence of 
Guicciardini's later cynicism. Whether he meant things as strongly as he wrote 
them is open to doubt. In his reconstr.lction of the speech of Lannoy, the 
Viceroy of Naples" in 1526 in favor of an agreement with the French King, 
Guicciardini .noted that it was more to the imperial advantage "to trust the 
word of so great a king than the immoderate covetousness of priests. ,,92 
8Baicordi, II, 28. 
89f1Prigionia di Clemente" fI p. 11. 
900uicciardin1 confessed that "non ti truovi mai in ai allegro ragionament< 
e penaiero, che rappresentandotisi la memoria della sua prigione, non ai 
interrompa e si converta in somma mestizia~ non per Is conslderazjone de' danni. ~, rna per 1a sua sl lacrimosa infellc1 ta, 1tii'ConsoIitoria" If p'. 170. Ii3ttphasls 
added. 
91Storia d l lta1ia, V, 146. 
92Ibid., IV, .346. 
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With laymen apparently the situation was not quite the same, nfor the world and 
its rulers are what they are and not what they should be. n9.3 Since he never 
thought they could be anything but selfish, he did not have a similar reaction 
to lay vices. He found it hard to understand how ma!\y consecrated to God's 
service could act as they did. If not for his own ambition, he confessed. 
I should have loved !4artin Luther as myself 1 not that I would be loosed 
from the laws prescribed by the Christian religion as commonly interpreted 
and understood" but because I long to see this pack of scoundrels brought 
within due bound~~ that is to say, purged of their vices or stripped ot 
their authority. 
These sentences of Ouicciardini afford the proper opportunity to consider 
the more typical Renaissance qualities he manifested. Throughout the Ricordi 
exists the basic though often unexpressed dilemma, that one should be noble 
and, on the other hand, one has to act in an ignoble manner. To seek wealth 
and fame for the sole purpose of enjoyment, carries the stamp of a base and 
ignoble mind. Yet, since human life is as corrupt as it is, one has to seek 
riputazione lest his virtues go unnoticed and they be unesteemed as they are in 
a poor man.95 Ripu tazion~ was one of Guicciardini'l!J basic cn teria. He 
advised that a man never retrains fram doing what will gain him this benefit, 
for actually one who lacks it will also lack friends and position?6 A good 
~~icordi, n, 179. 
94 Ibid., 28. 
-
95rbid., I, l41. 
96Ibid., 174 •. 
-
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reputation is a sufficient reason for doing what is good, for it can often and 
in a variety of ways be of "utilita incredibile. n97 
He wrote of thE- reputation he enjoyed at stated periods of his life. His 
Spanish experience had turned out very successful. lIe got alone well with the 
:{iI"l£ and gain.ed for himself a good reputation.98 A fruit£ul life must have 
honor and reputation, and one must accommodate himself tel the attainment of 
these qualities so that he does not look as thou[h he were born yesterday or 
inexperienced in the' ways of the world. All should know him af'! a person of 
" letters, of virtu, of magnanimous sould and of experienceJ As a Christian, a 
philosopher and a man of the world~ Guicciardini realized that life afforded 
many opportun1t,ies for self-adVancement and the recognition of a personfs good 
quall ties. 99 
The Ricordi, which is very confusing when one seeks to understand 
Guicciardini 's mentality, abounds in unclear statements and even contradictions 
Yet even this ai tuation can be explained. Guicciardini knew what was right but 
sometimes he saw that he could gain immediat.e advantages by pursuing a course 
of ambition and self-interest. He admitted that "true merit lies in doing what 
we have to do well ••• as in a play, he is no less applauded who acts well the 
97Ibid., 168. Cf. also ibid., 167~ where Guicciardini explains one can 
gain a good reputation by rende'ring service to a group although one gains even 
more notice by serving important inCI.1 vidual.' " ' 
98uRicordanze,tt pp. 70, 73. 
99uConsolatoria, tt Scritti ~utobiograriei, pp. 189-190. 
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part of a servant than. he who wears the robes ot a king. In short, each in his 
own station may do himsel! honor and deserve praise. tt100 One who has high 
esteem for honor, the finest c,uali ty in a man, will never be guilty of any un-
101 
worthy deed. 
Guicciardini' s view ot honor seems essentially connected with riputazione 
and selt-interest. By the ruin ot the Pope, he told himself, "you have lost 
the presidency of the Romagna, a place whioh would have been most useful to you" 
policy and your personal reputation. nl02 He was proud to mention that be 
sought to serve the l?atria but be was basically motivated by ambition, honor 
and the esteem of men to keep up his good reputation. Perhaps those sentiments 
were less laudable tr~n an unselfish desire to work for the Eatria but they 
were not to be condemned. But Ouiociardini was willing to admit that one who 
lacked ambition actu~ had greater peace of soul.103 
In otber selections oan be seen the amorality and indeed the immorality so 
often charged to both Guicciardini and Machiavelli. If one is placed in a 
situation in whioh he must either sutter injury or infliot it, he should choose 
that course whioh is !2.!! !e E!! .2!!!! advantae. Guicciardini qualified his vier 
with the admonition that ~ !l!!! !.!2! alleSie dangers !£ Justi£l violence ~ 
l~cordi, I, 1,1. Emphasis added. 
101Ibid., 10,. 
-l021~onsolatoria,n p. 165. 
103 Ibid., pp. 183-18,. 
-
!:.! wants .:!:2. commit through Eeed ~ ma.lice.104 
Like Machiavelli, Guicciardini realized the merits of dissimulazione. He 
rel t that, though sincerity is a noble c;uali ty, it can sometimes hurt the one 
who practices it. Because of the perverse nature of man, deception is useful 
and necessary even though odious and unbecoming. While one should exercise 
candor in daily affairs so that he will be more readily trusted, on certain 
important occasions he might well resort to dissimulation.lO' Guicciardini 
would not commend one who spent his entire life in deceit but now and then he 
would approve i t.106 If a man cannot restore the balance with a :man of high 
station, the only renedy is to endure the situation outwardly, while taking 
secret measures against h1m.107 
Guicciardini expounded views on sever! ty in government as Machiavelli had 
done in 11 Principe. Severity is essential for good government because ot "la 
\ 
malignit4 degli uomini, It and a ruler should make it appear that he has to act 
cruelly for the public good.108 Guicciardini commended governors who inflict 
tew sever! ties or punishments but know how to get and keep a name tor ruthless-
ness.109 Actually, a ruler should resort to murder only when there is a 
lOURiCOrdi, I, 1$3. Emphasis added. 
105 r! Ibid., 4J. 
-
l06Ibid., 46. 
-
l07Ibid., 27. 
-
l08Ibid., 85. Guicciardini admired Ferdinand ot Aragon, who made all his 
actions appear good. Cf. supra, pp 
l09Ibid., U,. 
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genuine need. But Guicciardini' s rea.son for advising few murders is not that 
such action is immpral but rather that in such actions one frequently loses 
more than he gains.110 
He was convinced that both religion and the force of arms are fu.ndBmental 
to the life of republics and kingdoms.11l When he could not solve the 
difficult problem of the relations between religion and morals and politics, 
however, he tended to expedience. To rule states there is a need for men "che 
" \ amassino piu la patria che l'an1ma, perche e impossibile regolare e 1 govern! e 
gli stati volenda tenerli nel modo s1 tengono oggi, secondo e' precetti della. 
1egge cristians.. u1l2 A case in point was his recommendation that all the Pisan 
prisoners who had revolted against Florence should be killed in order to weaken 
that city. Though this might not be Christian, "ragione e uso degli stati II 
required i t.ll) 
There were other areas too where Gu1cciardini could not take a firm stand. 
He felt that there was no greater good fortune in the world than to see one's 
enemy prostrate at his feet, a situation which a ruler should do everything to 
secure. Yet still greater is the glory which comes tram extending mercy and 
110Ibid., 120. 
-
111"Considerazioni intomo ai Discorsi del Machiavelli, ff p. 21. 
112 D1al0lo, p. 162. 
ll~ere inedite, II, 212. Cf. also Barkhausen, p. 89, and Friedrich 
Meinecke, MachlavellIsm, trans. :touglas Scott (New Haven, 1957), p. 46 and n.2 
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pardon to onets enemy.1l4 
For Ouicciardini, then, the fundamental criterion for all action is not a 
moral one at all. His Ricordi conta.ined rules for ordinary cases; exceptional 
ones had to be considered separately and one had to use his discretion.115 
Discrezione is the basic directive torce tor human action. SUch a view meant 
the separa.tion of political action from that of morality. 
So much for Guicciardini' s view of the action required in a period of 
ruthless individualism and ferment. How did he accept a situation which was th~ I, 
central religious occurrence ot his age? This was the Lutheran break with 
Rome. 
The peace of Christendom was, in Guicciardini's era, something which good 
men sincerely desired but politics did not allow. Guicciardini laid accent on 
116 the danger of the Lutheran heresy and its hatefulness to God. His own view 
117 
on this "impious and poisonous heresy" shows his religious position. His 
account followed the usual humanist pattern, stress on the "sal~'of indulgences 
the break itself, and the errors of Luther. Aside from repeating the spiritual 
abuses in the Catholic Church, Ouicciardini paid very 11 ttle attention to 
Lutheran ideas of refom. He fOC"llsed his attention prlmar1ly on how political 
l14R1cordi, I, 34. 
l15The phrase is IIsi possono male scrivere altrove che nel libra della 
discrezione," ibid., 35. 
-
116storia d'It,alia, IV .. 285, 288. 
117Ibid., V, 184. 
-
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and economic motives contributed to the break and how the princes took over the 
movement. 
He explained t.hat the Holy See granted indulgences only to extort money 
from simple men and that the commissioners practiced simony. There was in-
dignation and scandal in many regions" especia.11y in Germany, where many of 
these commissioners sold :plenary indulgences while they enjoyed themselves in 
the taverns. Luther found in this a great opportunity to crusade against the 
"indulgence traffic, If and to negate papal authority as 'lrJell and thus become mos ~ 
118 popular. 
In a passage describing Luther's relations with the Curia, OUicciardini 
suggested that the apostolic delegate had goaded Luther into a last despera.te 
stand. By offering Luther some ecclesiastical dignity or some rich prebend, 119 
he might have persuaded him to reject his errors. Perhaps the revolt could 
have been avoided if such a course had been pursued at the right moment.120 
With more ~isdam, Ouicciardini saw the practical reasons for Lutheranism's 
appeal to many of the German princes. Some who embraced the sect were sincere 
or at least partly excu!lable :;y the just occasion given them, but most wanted 
money and popularity and the favor of the Duke of Saxony. These did not want tc 
be deprived of the church property they had confiscated, but others were 
118storia d'Italla, IV, 285, 288. 
1191l ... se le parole ingiuriose e piene di minacce che gli disse i1 
cardinale di San Sisto legato apostollco non 10 avessino condotto a ultima 
disperazione, 8i crede aarebbe stato facile dandogll qualche degnit~ 0 quaJ.che 
modo oneate di vivere, farlo partlre dagli erron suoi, II ibid., 83. 
-
120Ibid• 
-
2L.o 
careful and tried to keep this contagion from spreading into their realms.l2l 
Guicciardini wrote of the diversity and the lack of restraint in Lutheran 
opinions. Scripture, the v1%'1 tinge of the Fathers and Doctors, canon law and 
papal decrees were daily given new and suspect meanings and unheard-of 
interpretations. And some of Lutherts followers, already despising h!! 
authority, set out to make the Eucharist something evil and diabolicaL Even 
outside of Germany, these notions spread and further gave way to lIogni nuova e 
perversa invenzione 0 interpretazione," for they freed men from I~olti 
precetti ••• gl1 riducono a modo di vita quasi libero e arbitrio." This 
situation bred contrary opinions among the heretics themselves so that their 
thought was in complete contusion. Guicciardini rel t the Lutheran errors were 
sustained by the licence given people on the level of morallty.122 
By 1530, the schisms that arose in Lutheran doctrine were so many and 80 
contrary to one another that very rew gave any consideration to the life and 
authority of Martin Luther. Hence even the German princes began to solicit a 
general council for they could think of no better remedy for their troubles. 
Guicciardini wrote: 
For even the Lutherans, trying to justify their cause with the authority 
of religion, insisted on holding it IJ. council.!l and it was believed that 
the authority of the decrees to be issued by the council, wou1d be 
suffiCient, if not to turn the minds of the chiefs of the heretics from 
their errors, at least to reduce some of the people to more satisfactory 
views.123 
121Ibid., 68, 70-71. 
-
l22Ibid. 69-71. 
-' 
l23Ibid., v, 3OO-3Ol. 
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But the Lutheran break from the fold had for some time been consummated. 
Tris fact, war, the widespread fear of a council--all pushed such a convocation 
into the next papal reign. 
Guicciardini showed he was a man of the Renaissance, denouncing the 
corruption of the Curia as a cause for the spread of the Huseite errors and the 
rupture of Christendom. On the other hand, he was also a man of religion vlho 
was not a ble to understand how Lutheranism actually happened. He seems to have 
looked upon the phenomenon l.1. th dismay as a split in at least the formal 
religious unity of Europe. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
THE PESSIMIs-i OF GUICCIARDINI 
Guicciardinits personal tragedy was a part of the tragedy of all Italy. 
Like Machiavelli, he had actively participated in the central events of his 
age, all connected in some way with Italy's role in the power struggle of the 
sixteenth-eentury. When Guiceiardini saw no hope for Italian freedom after the 
successive imperial viotories of 1527, 1529 and 1530, he abandoned his aotive I I 
role of papal service, went into retirement, and began the writing of his 
Storis d'Italia. The tone of this work and of his apologetio writings is 
pessimistic. 
The hard pessimism of Guicoiardini, so evident in his latter years, had a I I 
double foundation, one somewhat natural to his personality J the other based 
upon the events of his career and of his service in behalf of the libert~ 
d'Italia. ,,!ben these events did not follow the only pattern whioh he thought 
, 
oould achieve this liberta, Guicciardini realized that all hope was gone. 
In any case, Guicoiardini's pessimism was not blind. Camillo Cavour 
recognized that he was a man who truly knew affairs and events and who, as a 
matter of fact, knew them better than Machiavelli. l Adolph Thiers too 
1 , 
P. Villari, Niccolo Machiavelli! ! suoi t,pi, II, Milano, 1927, 119, n. 
cited in Palmarocohi, stud! Guicoiardin1~. 2 3. 
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understood that Guicciardini was an able diplomat, an able administrator, an 
able military man and an able historian only because he was a penetrating 
observer of the idiosyncracies of individuals and of political groups. All his 
life, Thiers recalled, Guicciardini was Itl'un des esprits les plus clairvoyants 
qui aient jamais exist', surtout en affaires poll tiques. It His entire 
characterization of Guicciardini is worthy of notice: 
Il avait l'ame un peu triste par nature et par sati~t~ de la vie •••• ll 
connaissait profondement ls nature bumaige, et il trace de tous les 
personnages de son siecle des portraits eternels; parce qutil sont vrais 
simples et vigoreux. A tous ces me'ri tes 11 ajoute 141 ton chagrin et 
morose d'une homme fatigue des innombrables mis~res auxquelles il a , 
assiste, trop morose, selon moi, car l t histoire doit rester calme et / 
sereine, mais point choquant, parce quton y sent, comme dans la saverite 
sombre de TaCite, la triste~se de Ifhonn~te homme.2 
Guicciardini's few hop~e of success centered on papal leadership of the 
League of Cognac and allied cooperation within it. Only concentrated endeavors 
could dent impe rial power in the peninsula. Guicciardini could never himself 
settle all affairs of importance to Italy though a chain linked him with the 
larger affairs of the Cinquecen~. By his personal, family and Florentine back 
ground and training, his career of service to the Medici family and the Medici 
popes and in the League of Cognac, he was quite naturally involved in the 
course of their fortunes. Actually, the story of the 1 talian tragedy is the 
story of the fall of '\Ihe Florentine Medici, of Pope Clement, of the League of 
2Hiatoire du Consolat et de l'Empire, XII, PariS, 1855, x-xii, cited in 
ibid., pp. 275-2'f6. - -
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Cognac which he headed, and of Guicciardini himself. It is no coincidence that 
Ouicciardini began his Storia d'Italia with a Medici marked by good fortune and 
ended with another whose reign was marked with ill success. The papal fulcrum 
of Italian politics broke under the headship of Clement VII when he made peace 
wi th Charles V in 1527 and again in 1529. In Guicciardini.' s judgment, this 
settlement, which seemed necessary to the Pope, made the Emperor triumphant in 
Italy and nullified the effects of all the efforts of the allies of Cognac. 
All of Guicciardini's own activities as papal lieutenant in behalf of the 
League's affairs also came to nought. 
Like Machiavelli, Guicciardini understood the new political complexion of 
his period, the national states caught in the maelstrom of intense power 
politics. Were this not so, he could never have written the magnificent 
Storia, which details the lengthy struggles among these states for the hegemony 
of all Italy. Yet, unlike Machiavelli, Guicciardini was essentially a ~rshes~ 
at heart. 
Though the "barbarian tt entry was indeed a reason for the decline, misery 
and decadence in the peninsula, Guicciardini considered it only a contributing 
factor. It was not the basic cause. Nor was the Italian military weakness, 
which Guicciardini always decried, or the lack of allied cooperation against thE 
Emperor. In the borghese governments lay the best hope for Italian salvation. 
They alone could maintain peninsular stability in the face of the foreigner. 
states like Venice and Florence, for all the latter's civil disorder in the 
past, had already demonstrated their value for Italy. But somehow the~ no 
longer afforded ~ hope. 
In his account of the alliances and counter-alliances among the Italian 
il 
I 
,I 
I!,i 
,', '1 1,,11' 
," 
'I i ~ III 
'I' 
'1: 1: I'!"I I' , 
:11,'i 
245 
states and foreign powers from the latter fifteenth century through the six-
teenth, Guicciardini strongly criticized Venice for her selfish attempts to 
dominate Italy. Thus she ruptured th'3 Italian equilibrium. Nevertheless, he 
admired the Venetian constitution as a model for firm and solid government. 
Florence, despite her civic problems, had also contributed to the Italian 
commonweal. Lorenzo de' Medici had worked to maintain a healthy balance of 
power within the peninsula and, as long as he was able to act as the 
equilibratore of Italy, peninsular unity was guaranteed. The separateness of 
the Italian states, large and small, princelY or republican, actually con-
tributed to the well-being of Italy so long as this equilibrium was maintained. 
Foreign intervention could bring misfortune to Italy only if the balance were 
d:i srupted. 
This happened with Lorenzo's deatt when Fiero, ttuno pazzo, tt reversed his 
father's domestic and foreign policies and contributed to "l.ultimo tuffo alla 
citt~.,,3 Though the Venetian government remained strong internally, the 
decline of its fortunes and those cf Florence, Milan, Naples and Rome was a 
striking evidence Cif the gradual ruin of Italy. Not one of the "Big Five 'l 
powers of Italy could escape the consequences of foreign invasion and occupatio 
and the internal disorder which resulted. Habsburg and Valois fought for Milan 
and Naples and neither Emperor nor King underestimated the importance of Rome 
3Storia d'Italia, I, 38. 
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and its pope. After Venice, Florence succumbed to the victorious Empire when 
no other course lay open to her. For Guicciardini, the sack of Rome in 1527 an 
the Barcelona capitulation of that year, renewed in 1529, symbolized the tragic 
ii'" I' 
, , 
I' ,: 
, , 
fall of Italian civilization. But even more gravely significant for him and II 
for the Italian political spirit was the collapse of independent Florentine 
government at a time when there were no odds in favor of its resurrection and 
reaesertion. This was the crisis of the Italian borshesia and of the civil~ 
known to Guicciardini. The supremacy of the Impire state over the individual 
states, which Machiavelli saw as inevitable, was proof that the cycle of their ! ! 
,I 
usefulness to Italian political life had been fuJ..filled.II', 
11:
1 
The question arises in a consideration of the bases of Guicciardini's 
pessimism, was his pessimism truly based on an accurate. int4rpretation of the 
course of events? Did his closeness to them in any w~ mar his reading? He 
observed the situations carefully and reported them clearly, hence Ouicciardini 
is always associated wi th realism. As a poll tical figure and an historian, he 
had the will to comprehend the reality of things, at whatever price, and to 
destroy any illusions which might be formed. He derided the flights ot far.taay 
of Machiavelli, who wished to imita,te the ancients in many respects, following 
the ideal which had inspired the Renaissance. Ouicciardini found his strength 
in strict attention to -the realities of the times che corrono.4 His realism 
----
precluded the spacious flights of the poetic mentality and permitted his 
thought, vague in the camp of pure theory, to acquire a unity and coherence 
which could motivate practical activity. His own career always demonstrated 
4passerin dtEntreves, p. 110. 
that, for every possible contingency, he could find a few clear and simple 
ideas to act as the substance and nerve ot action.S 
But this empirici8lll. and the intellectualism which worked upon its results 
constituted at once the strength and the weakneaa of Guicciardin1. Passerin 
\ d 'Entreves wrote. 
\ 
Ma Ie sola ragione e una guida pericolosa e un t esigente compagna, e U 
lumen siccum dell'1ntelletto che rende moo, jeserto e nuda 11 mando del 
Guicc1ardini-una lands. sterile e sconsolata. In nessun t altra opere, i 
limiti di una stong strettamente politica sono piu apparenti che nella 
stona d.ltalia •••• 
These obael""t'ations on cold reality and not simple opportunism serve to 
explain some of Ouicciard1n1's rather puzzl.ing actions. In 1530, he knew that 
Florence could save itself from aubordination to Spain only by a tempest-like 
accord wi th the Pope. No longer was Guicc1ard1n1 interested in the queation ot 
a republican gcvemment for Florence or Medici rule. His dilemma concerned 
f4edici cooperation with C, arlee V or complete foreign predominance. only by a 
nece85al"1' surrender to the Empire could Florence save itself, yet, he always 
insiated that her internal. Uberty be preserved. For the same reasons, he 
defended ~e .Alessandro before the Emperor and also tavored the accession of 
Col1mo of the younger J-iedic1 line. This seemed to Gu1cciard1n1 one method ot 
working toward 8 stable government in Florence. 'When Ou1eciardin1 viewed the 
consolidation ot Cos1.mots state, however, he refund to cooperate wholly with 
SpalmarocChi J studt Ou1ec.1ardiniani, pp. 108-109. 
6Passerin d'Enueves, Pl'. 170-171. 
: I 
I 
I 
! ~ 
248 
it. It did not suit his expectations. 
Jl::achiavelll., l11ce Guicciardin1, devotedly 8erYed norence. Machiavelli, 
as Florentine secretary, must have read Guicc1ardini t s many reports to the 
Chancery and, 8S a roving ambassador tor norenee :in matters pertaining to the 
l.eague of COrMc, he came into personal contact with him. But their 
association in the realm of thought is far more interesting. If the ~tor1a 
d'Italla was Guiociardinits major historical work, it was also his :political 
manifeato. Machiavelli t s major contributions to ~iOl1 tical thought were found 
in 1! frinciE! and his Discorn. 
These works indicate clearly that, in a comparison of the two thinkers, 
Machiavelli must come out the poet and Guicciardini the 122l1t1co. Guicciardini 
saw in the unity of all the Italian states under one man a noble ideal but also 
the practical. a.nnullment of all municipal liberties. A strong Italy to buck 
the barbarians could be only a beautitul thought because history, Guiooiardini 
saw, did not allow jumps. Rather one had to consider the facts of the 
situation, the facts of dally reality, the facts of history. In a modest way, 
in his own action and in his stately bistorical analysis, Gu.icclardini coped 
with reallty~ tor this alone was the camp of action of a political man. His 
path could Mver be continuous, for he had to follow the complicated and otten 
capricious develo}Dent of facte. He could not, liko Ji!t8chiavelll, conquer 
reall ty by evading 1 t. If Machiavelli experienced delusion and melancholy, his 
method allowed him to prophesy and to hope. Machiavel111llade the groat leap 
from history and called upon Italy to free heraelf tl"Omthe barbarians. 
G:}icciardin1, as a ~l1t1co, could find his froedom from disillusionment only 
in success. If success were wanting in the end, his facts and the ideas he 
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based them upon could only become the weights which would draw him down and 
crush h:1m. Ouicc1ardini wished Italy to be free but, given the trend ot 
events, it was useless to consider such an eventuality. Therein lay the basis 
tor Gu1ccie.rdini f s pessimism. It is paradoxical that r-tachiavelli, who was not 
hemmed in by the reaU ty of the immediate, was 1n one sense more truly the 
realist. He saw the historic necessity of a revolution which would unify the 
Italian states. Italy could not separate herself forever from the modem 
phenomenon of the national state. Machiavelli could look from the real to the 
ultimate. 
Guicciard1n1, on the other hand, could not triumph over his realism.. F'rom 
the beginning, he .realized the Emperor's aims to control Italy and he knew that 
these objectives were last being accomplished. Charles' greatness was such, 
Guicciard1ni wrote, that one could "desire but not hope."7 As he watched the 
imperial successes and the Italian declJ.ne, Guicciardin1 wrote, he who has seen 
acutely "e co' calcoli e aisura delle cose pauate sa calcuJ.sre e miaurare 
assai del futuro. ,,8 
"lile'! Guicci&rdin1 retired to hie country villa to undertake his manmoth 
Storia d'Italla, hie world was at an end. This fact is clear in the 
Consolatoria, Guicciardini' s answer· to t he Florentine republicane who, after 
the Medici restoration of 1527, accused him of complicity in the poliCies of 
Pope. Leo and Clement. He was guilty of their f'ailure",. In his detense of 
7 "Ragloni che consigliano a Clemente VII di accordarsi con Carlo V," 
Scx-itti politici, p. 176. 
8!'ialo~1 p. 17. 
'11.1111 II,: 
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himself ar:ainst these charges, the most emotional part is that dedicated to the 
lost world of politics. Guicciardini'e attention to polit1eal life was in a 
fundamental sense hie religion, and his entire eXistence vas devoted to it. By 
153.5, when he had no more decisions to make and in an atmosphere 1es8 oharged 
wi th tensions and anxieties, he could contemplate the major problems of his age 
and his own role. He oould look at events trom the very personal vantage point 
which only few men poasea_d. 
At the sarne time as he demonstrated for himaelt the legitimacy and the 
neeessi ty of his past conduct, he oftered to future judges all the material 
necessary for an impartial and definitive Verdict. An historian of 1964 cannot 
find sufficient evidence to render a guilty verdiot. Guiociardini tried to 
save his eatria and Italy in the only way he knew. Though Italy fell into the 
slumber of the Barocc!t she awoke again in the Ri8oreEm't9. Guiociardin1 
could not foresee this but then the un1ty which finally came to Italy might not 
have satisfied one so pusionately ded1catd to the ideal of separate and 
distinct states in the Italian peninsula which would cooperate for the welfare 
of the whole. 
To find in the failure of Cuiceiard1ni' 13 own career the basic reason for 
his pessimism 1s tar too simple an explanation. Certainly OUice1ardini was 
motivated by ambition, an lnC'..enti ve which "Jias more meaningful to him than any 
other. "'l'he more men are feared, reverenced and honored, the nearer they _em 
to approach, and, a8 it were, to resemble God, to whoe likeness who would not 
9 
"dsh to attain. It Action upon this opportunistic motive can partially explain 
9Ricordi, n, 16. 
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the lack cf coherence in his words and actions. Althou€::h he realized that it 
is natural tor men to seek honors and preferment, he advised them, on the basis 
or his own experience, to try to rid themselves of all vain desires. ;'J'hlle God 
and his own good fortune had ra.ised h:im to higher peaks than he had ever hoped 
to l' each, he sadly admitted that he had never found in them the satisfaction 
and contentment he 8(' sincerely deeired.10 Quicciardini had to find 
satisfaction 1n rJ..s religion, and his religion vas success in the materializa-
tion of his broad political ideals and in his practical political commitments. 
lOXbid., 15J cf. also ibid., I, 59. 
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